


Box 1 – If the strip to the left is the hours of the day as measured by steps, the orb to the right are the hours of the day on a dial. Although they both count the hours, they add up differently (Jacques Lacan): a) as a *sum* of elements, b) as elements of a *sum*. The latter is *synchronised* to the former. This works for all polyhedra w/Euler characteristic. $\chi = 2$. The strip and the orb are paired with a Möbius-strip and a Torus. While the M-strip models exchange and is non-orientable, the Torus is orientable but not in exchange. The Euler characteristic is calculated with this equation: $\chi = V - E + F$ (Vertices, Edges, Faces). $\chi = 2$ goes for a range of polyhedra and includes the *sphere*. Which means that any number of steps with roundups can be modelled in this way. The strip and orb are paired with topological entities with $\chi = 0$ (which includes the M-strip, the Torus and the Klein's bottle). The point of the present diagram and body text is to study how the swap between S and S' works (frontline to deskfront) and what can be done to get around it.

If we take the sign \approx to determine *resemblance*, it covers this range: the *same, similar, different & other* (in the sense that all these are included). Which is the specific sense in which \approx determines something else than simple equality. In sum, the expression $F_x(a) : F_y(b) \approx F_x(b) : F_a^{-1}(y)$ —which follows Lévi-Strauss from *Mythologiques* to *La potière jalouse*—says: what $F_x(a)$ is to $F_y(b)$ *resembles* what $F_x(b)$ is to $F_a^{-1}(y)$; where $F_a^{-1}(y)$ is the opposite to $F_x(a)$. So, here opposition is complex, rather than elementary (as in propositional logic): derived from the Klein's group $x, 1/x, -x, -1/x$.

So, Lévi-Strauss' (L.S.) formula is not a direct extension of the Klein's group: a *term*, its *opposite* and their *inversions* (the four elements above). The reason is that L.S.—contrary to Klein, who is a mathematician—is working with *signifiers* (i.e. myths mainly and masks in his later works). So, in Lacanian terms, **a** and **b** would be **S₁** and **S₂**: a signifier and the signifier of that signifier. In L.S.' formula they are linked up with two different functions, called **x** and **y**. Let us say, then, that **x** and **y** (to keep it straightforward) are **\$** and (*objet petit a*). If applicable, what do we have then?

What the /function of the split subject **\$** applied to the signifier **S₁**/ is to /the function of **a** applied to the signifier **S₂**/ *resembles* what /the split subject **\$** applied to the *signifier of the signifier* **S₂**/ is to /the functional application of the inversion of **S₁** applied to **a**/. The latter is taken to be the opposite of **\$** applied to **S₁**. What L.S. did was conceivably to find a formal language that could be linked up

to mathematics (Klein), in which opposite is not really opposite, but *other*. What is called the *opposite* in math is the *other* in natural history.



But from the vantage point of *resemblance*—which now clearly emerges as the [forbidden] trope of *contingency*—the opposite determines the other: in the scope of contrasting qualia that make up *resemblance* (\approx): the same, the similar, the different and other. That is, under some circumstances, *contingencies* features in *clusters of variety* that we call *resemblance*. So, either we have math rotely applied to the analysis of contingencies (restricted option), or we have a type of machine learning which either is powered by human agency, or is disempowering it (expanded option). In this re/configuration the focus will be on *the communicative aspects of all human behaviour* (Leach's ritual) or on a disembodied *symbolism* (myth). Opening and closing: 1 and 0.

Box 2. Lacan was concerned with discourses, I am asking what the implications might be that we instead concern ourselves with *parcours*. This alternative follows from the two-tiered analysis of the strip and orb of polyhedra, designed as topological models. Hence my concern is with the *parcours* of the master, the *parcours* of hysteria, and the *parcours* of the university. And also of the overall *parcours* involving mastery, hysteria, analysis and university: as the standard life-cycle of *anaptúxis*. When the positions are held by the terms, we are in a training phase. While when the terms are held by the positions we are in an enabling phase, where explanation and materialisation conjoint.

Which brings us to how the quadrant $\$ \rightarrow [S_1 \rightarrow S_2] \rightarrow a$ affect the other of Lacan's quadrants: **truth** \rightarrow **[agent** \rightarrow **other]** \rightarrow **impact** (which then will either be arrested [0] or will be driving [1] the

first quadrant). Please note the similarity between the way Lacan sets up the two quadrants and the Klein's group. Which means that the quadrant **truth**→[**agent**→**other**]→**impact** alternates between being contained [0] by the quadrant $\$ \rightarrow [S_1 \rightarrow S_2] \rightarrow a$ and containing it [1]. In other words, the application of $F_x(a) : F_y(b) \approx F_x(b) : F_a^{-1}(y)$ to the *truncated* nomenclature from Lacan (£) yields a reversibility that we find in the Klein's bottle (which L.S. uses in *La potière jalouse*).

In other words, we have the possibility of considering *one* mode in which the *imagination* quadrant **truth**→[**agent**→**other**]→**impact** is *arrested* by the symbolic quadrant $\$ \rightarrow [S_1 \rightarrow S_2] \rightarrow a$, [0], and another mode in which the quadrant **truth**→[**agent**→**other**]→**impact** *facilitates* the quadrant $\$ \rightarrow [S_1 \rightarrow S_2] \rightarrow a$ [1]. The alternation between arrest/facilitation is part of a standard learning protocol in which the learning *imagination* will be arrested by the *symbolic*, till it learns. Then a shift will occur by which the symbolic is facilitated by the imagination: process of communicative interaction.

Communication as it can be considered as *intrinsic* to machine learning (M.L.) at all levels of manufacture/edition. That is that the aspect of behaviour that we are interested in, when we are concerned with Leach's sense of *ritual*: the communicative aspect of behaviour when it is involved in the *manufacture* and *editioning* of artefacts, where the learning is tied up with the machine-like workings of artefacts (in different modes), which will correspondingly define the symbolic. In sum, what *communicates generatively through learning is a candidate definition of anaptúxis in M.L.*


But here we are in a situation similar to when the mounting of a polygon *from a strip to an orb*, features *two* senses of *montage*: the one *cinematographic*, while the other is *hyper-dimensional*. While we have previously seen how the Möbius-strip is indicated in the tiling-steps—in a succession of joining edge-to-edge till the orb is complete—there is a shift in the topological backdrop as soon as the polygon is completed (orb). Where the Möbius-strip was previously a guide, the Torus is facilitated/promoted by the polygon-orb. This shift is of major importance to conclude here.

Simply because, as the watch overtakes the diurnal cycle—once it is synchronised with it—the signifier of the signifier S_2 shifts into becoming a signifier S'_1 . This is the swap: $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ becomes $S'_2 \leftarrow S'_1$ and then the swap (which is a *short-circuit*): $S_2 \leftarrow S_1$. This is the logic of *simulation*, *substitution* and *erasure*. That is, the mechanism whereby what was the frontline is *exchanged* for the frontdesk: *from the signifier to the signifier of the signifier*. The question, then, is in which way L.S. algorithm $F_x(a) : F_y(b) \approx F_x(b) : F_a^{-1}(y)$ perhaps can help us stay clear of this repressive turn.

It is quite clear by now that L.S.'s formula is *not* any mathematical equation but an *algorithm*—in Marvin Minsky's definition, an 'effective procedure'—that applies to a topological segment in which

explanation and creation are inseparable: which is the sense I have put into *anaptúxis* (growth, development, explanation). The potentials that may lie in $F_x(a) : F_y(b) \approx F_x(b) : F_a^{-1}(y)$ to study the communicative interaction of *lateral drifts* (of which one might find parallels in L.S.'s study of myths). Such as the lateral drift from the *manufacture/edition* of the Nansen passport, discussed in 142, to the lineup of *metadata/boxing* of the item in archiving.

Between the *first* and the *second* there has been a *publication* (without which the lateral movement above would not be possible). The publication in the form of a small *exhibition*. So, if $F_x(a) : F_y(b)$ (manufacture/edition) *resembles* $F_x(b) : F_a^{-1}(y)$ (metadata/box), the box, can be seen as the *other* of publication (which is *archiving*): $F_a^{-1}(y)$. In this scope, publication is $F_a(y)$: in £ it spells that applying S_1 to a , the cause of drive a , has been moved and the split subject \$ will follow suit. It anticipates and postpones the archival acts. And it means that we can move from frontline activity, to frontline activity.



Box 3—Klein's bottle. Red is *positions*. White is *terms* (cf, Box 2). Of the entities with Euler characteristic $\chi = 0$ the K-bottle sustain a two-tiered strip/orb model.