Fig. 1—in the above attempt to define time, an operational rather than a distributive approach is used. Or, rather, the distributive approach (time as clocked in hours, minutes and seconds) is derived from the operational definition of time with the help of glass and sand. It is defined as the sum of the elements (hourglass) and not elements of the sum (clock).

Why is it that time forbids us to move from (1) the *past* to (3) the *future*, and catch (2) the *present* between the past and the future: in their "squeeze"—or, embrace—so to speak? One thing is to know that this would amount to knowing our *fate*, and live our lives in the clockwork orange of the present. Another thing is to determine that it is not only undesirable/forbidden—contrary to the freedom of will—but that it is impossible, in the sense that something would collapse/we would die in the attempt. While all other combinations are possible and recommendable in different aspects.


Fig. 2— the past, present and future disposed from right to left, to convey an idea of the whole (or sum) as something else than a distribution of the three elements.

How so? In *agent-other* relations we know it as the "killer-spell": if make a statement of how our fate is sealed from the past, we already know how it is going to end, and we *blame* the other for this, we leave him/her with *no space* for reply. But, of course, s/he may break the spell by acting: it is how the spell is dispelled. In other words, if we do it—or, somehow make it happen—it will dissolve before our eyes. We will then see that it cannot work. If we have a *logbook* in which we can demonstrate that the future followed with a mathematical precision from the past, the demonstration would have to take place in the present. Thereby showing that the present is not determined since the demonstration does not take place automatically, but requires an *added* effort.

It would also appear that (i) the *future* followed (ii) from the past, with a demonstration taking place in (iii) the present. Which means that in order of procedure we begin with the future (3), move unto the past (1) from the vantage point of the present (2). Which means that as soon as we move *from* distributive assumptions *to* the operative assignments, the original proposition is *counter-evidenced* by the performance of the proof *itself*. So, this is why it is not possible. But why are all other combinations possible then? Well this is where we get to discuss some fundamental properties of *homomorphism*. And is why this discussion has a foundational importance to a wide range of other quests and queries.

The (1), (2), (3) sequence is expressed by Augustine: "Perhaps it might be said rightly that there are three times: a time present of things past; a time present of things present; and a time present of things future. For these three do coexist somehow in the soul, for otherwise I could not see them. The time present of things past is memory; the time present of things present is direct experience; the time present of things future is expectation." (St. Augustine [1], Book 11, Chapter 20, Heading 26). But then if we have a logbook the performative sequence shifts.

We meet the logbook with our experience of the present, we review the expectations we had in the past, in the light of what our memories of the past might have been at that time: (2), (3), (1). Or, we are asking with regard to the past (1) what have we here? (2) where is it moving? (3) how far has it come in terms that have already been achieved? We are here in the present experience, but in aspects related to presentness (2), futurity (3) and pastness (1). Whereby it is indicated that to whichever permuted order of *distribution*, corresponds a *different* permuted order of operations.

Or, expressed in different terms: the *elements of the sum* (distributive) are differently ordered than the *sum of the elements* (operational). Which means that whichever the order of distribution, it will have a counterpoint in the order of operations. If the orders of *distribution* are (1)-(2)-(3), (2)-(3)-(1), (3)-(1)-(2), then the orders of *operations* are (2)-(3)-(1), (3)-(1)-(2), (1)-(2)-(3). That is, *if we have a logbook*: this is how we enable ourselves at seeing/demonstrating how the two orders—distributive and operational—*compute* in relation to each other. That is, it becomes a problem of *computation*.

The algorithm is simple: *when the last number is placed first, we move from one triplet to the next* (in the operational permutation the same algorithm *applies to* the sum of the elements). What we have—in terms of the associated distributive and operative orders of time is Derrida's différance— Clearly, the (1)-(3)-(2) triplet is not produced by the algorithm. This opens the question of what to do with the *diagonals* of the gate-diagram (a lopsided "magic square" since the diagonals are not produced by the algorithm [neither when applied to the elements nor the sums])? See **Fig. 3**.

The diagonal (3)-(3)-(3) is produced by the computation *in* the diagram. Since it belongs but is not included it is a *singularity* (Badiou). The diagonal (1)-(3)-(2) is an *excrescence*: since it is included —by virtue of counting all three numbers—but does *not* belong (by virtue of not being produced by the algorithm). Though there is *no* correspondence 1-to-1 between the distribution of elements and the operational sums, they are still defined by *one* algorithm: which makes the *ensemble* holistically *congruent*. Which means that it can be a take on acquiring knowledge of the unconscious.

That is, taking knowledge of the unconscious knowledge: its extension is enormous, but is unknowing of its knowledge (by definition). Which is why *knowledge* of the unconscious knowledge can evolve *alongside* the unknowing knowledge of the *unconscious*. The difference that makes a difference is whether this knowledge is a knowledge from *without*, or a knowledge from *within*. In the case of the biblical *tabernacle*, as the ultimate container, the visceral symbolism of sacrifice yields either a divine alignment, with a normalisation from within, or an excrescence from matters divine, to which it then becomes quite incomprehensible. In art history, the passion of the christ organises around this very tipping point: operation and distribution.

Fig. 3—In the Gate-diagram above, proceeding from right to left, the rows and columns correspond. While the rows feature the elements of a sum, the column features the sum of the elements. It makes a difference as the algorithm defined in the body text applies.

Ornaments—through exquisite in the tabernacle —are not likely to be decorative: they are to be concealed, hidden, forbidden and contained from within. Ornaments define in the twilight zone between excrescences (Loos) and singularities (Blikstad): one veering to the *add-on* (Loos), the other the virtual possibility of *alignment* (Blikstad).