

Fig. 1—l'objet petit a/the object small a has been a subject of fascination among people in different walks of life: above is the image of a sticker that you can glue on your favourite thermos. It denotes the cause and failure of desire. And presents itself as a logical monster or chimera. It is linked to the existence of hysteria and the notion of the unconscious

Inconspicuous as it may seem the *objet petit a*/object little a is a chimera. It will call upon desire as it causes it. It will reroute, shift and multiply when it gets it. It will dismiss the coveted desire as it passes from being a seductive entity to becoming an object of desire. Seductive then dismissive it will multiply and shift its appearance. In language, it features that much debated moment at which a *sign* (a) becomes a *thing* (a): or, let us write them -(-a)—a *sign*—and "a" an *object*. The **object** little a is these *two-in-one*. It moves an diversifies: in puns...virtual Rube Goldberg (RG) machines.

It plays out *causally* (RG machine), then shifts to *semiotics* (the pun): if not a language pun then, even better, the visual pun... which plays with cause: the *libido* as a cause. An ornamental drive producing visual puns caused by desire. And so with no real cause? A symptom as a *question*, and no other cause than the *desire* that responds to it. Whereby the respondent becomes guilty before the symptom in question. We find a commercial exploitation of beriddled entities in the <u>gadget</u>. We are guilty as charged, we have fun and therefore we buy them. They elicit the impulse of spending.

Bataille gives us a theory of such spending in the <u>Accursed Share</u> (La part maudite). If we look at them from the vantage point of Lacan's discourses (the 3 quarter turns from *mastery* to *hysteria*, to *analysis* to *university*) there is no way around the *little object a*. If it is proposed as a *problem* it has *no* solution. If proposed as a *question*, answering is a *trap*. If contained by *expression* it is *violent*. But in all of these questions notice that no real problem is defined, no specific question is asked, and the expression leaves the *other* no space. S/he is taking hostage by the *object little a*.

But we have the choice of considering the **object little a** from two vantage points: from the vantage point of *illusion*, and the *fictional* vantage point. From the fictional vantage point—which is clearly the one we are adopting here—we are interested in the adventures of the *object little a* and how it fares in the world, with the work of time. From the vantage point of illusion, however, the **object little a** features as an unchangeable core: it is the result of a swap... it claims the place of <u>substance</u>. Or, claims to represent substance while keeping it captive. From the vantage point of fiction, it is therefore an impostor. It is accordingly a regular guest of the impostor syndrome.




Fig. 2— The four Lacanian discourses brought together as a single model (i.e. a non-repetitive) series, linked by the quarter turn of the terms in the diagrams belong (moving clockwise). The black square marks a *punctum*. Break, pause, decision, new ground zero

However, it can only work in this way on the premise that *discourse* is ruling the grounds. That the truth—>/agent—>other/—>impact ■ sequence has been substituted for the \$->/\$1->\$2/a ■ consequence. Which means that if the object little a offers a discursive problem (without definition), a discursive question (which is a riddle), and in a discursive expression that leaves the other *no* space, it works in this way because discourse is by its nature distributive. If so, it cannot be worked out in conversation. We then have identified the specific point at which a therapeutic situation cannot be dealt with in therapeutic terms—or, therapeutic premises—and we have to move *from* therapy to teaching: that is a framework where problems are defined, questions improved and

expression leaves a space for the other. Which the sphinx will claim but never actually deliver.

That is, teaching as a psychoanalytical practice defined in a post-clinical era, in which criticality in agent—>other relations moves alongside therapy: that is, contingently—alongside and touching—to therapy, resembling it. That is, screening, intercepting and framing therapeutic practices in relations of sameness, similarity, difference and otherness. So, by asking for problems to be defined and questions to be refined, the teacher will attempt to impact making space for whichever truth there might have been in the matter at first (before the scam): i.e. prompting making.

The discursive swap is a residue of the *clinical* assumptions; resting on pathological ascriptions. While moving *from* therapy *from* teaching, leaves aside the pathological ascriptions—as desk theory—and instead develops *assignments* that might turn illusion to *fiction*. Accepting Lacan's *quarter turns* (90°) as an early repertoire bringing us beyond discourse *per se*, are early steps in this direction. The quadrants of Lacan's schemata then already have been transposed from a *distributed* definition (between agents) to an *operative* definition (within agents). It is a homomorphism.

Which means that the *object little a* can shift between distributive and operative *modes*. In the operative mode it appears to work like Roman Jakobson's *shifter*—making and orienting space—while in the distributive mode it annihilates and disorients space. It is either a warping agent (*shifter*) or a chimera (a *sphinx*): a *fulcrum* at ground zero (0), or *placeholder* of the empty set (\emptyset). It is either a stowaway at every shift from the same, the similar, the different and the other (fiction), or it is part of a discursive contraption working by simulation, substitution and erasure.

Hence the understanding that there is no need to invent a gobbledygook language—tethered to *Lalangue* (Lacan)—nor a *sinthome* to live by/with trauma. These creations derived from the idea that the topics of psychoanalysis are made and resolved in language/discourse. Instead, we need to be weary of the attempts of distributive intelligence at annexing, colonising, suppressing operational intelligence. Here mastery, hysteria, analysis and having/making a point (which the university discourse arguably is about) are normalised in the sense of being *jointly* included *and* belonging.

That is, integral parts of the life-cycle of creative work where knowledge will be partly unknowing—which is the style and signature of the *unconscious* in psychoanalysis—or known only by snippets (*singularities*) or premonitions (*excrescences*). Using the language of Lacan's student <u>Alain</u> <u>Badiou</u>. In this perspective, the quadrants of Lacan's quarter turns (**Fig. 2**) is a textbook example of a *desiring machine*. That is, in which desire is not held hostage but refined through the rungs of learning, to be a causing agent in a real sense: if only, in producing a living collective awareness.



Fig. 3—Jacques Lacan with his <u>Davidoff Culebra</u> in his teeth, passing the large A of anarchy tagged on an urban facade. His errand was with the small a, *l'objet petit a*.

That is, (a) collective in the sense of individuation as assemblage, (b) collective in the political sense of the acting multiple, or (c) collective in the trans-individual cultural sense of the rhizôme. But moving from Lacan and Badiou to Deleuze and Guattari, may amount to move from gobbledy-gook to balderdash. This does not derive from the discursive assumption—since D&G is tethered to agent-other pathways—but from certain mathematical assumptions that will need a separate treatment.

From <u>earlier work</u>, however, we already know that the problem is linked to a different kind of chimera: the mathematical monsters of fractal geometry, their challenge to topological numbers and the ordeal of defining smooth and striated spaces for operative narratives. Walking alongside as the key to a contemporary approach and rub of the learning theatre.