
PERIODs -




If periodisation of reading/writing is chosen as a constant, it is evident that it has developed and acquired an intelligence of its own: in theory.

From his Nuffield lecture in 1965, Fredrik Barth notes that (p.15): "Human behaviour is 'explained' if we show (a) the utility of its consequences in terms of values held by the actor, and (b) the awareness on the part of the actor of the connection between an act and its specific results." If we take (a) to denote *meaning* then it is from a vantage point which is not the actor as such, but someone else (here, the anthropologist). While (b) denotes the *communicative chain* (Kripke). But since humans *learn*, the relation R between (a) and (b) defines a non-repetitive series: a *model*.

Hence the discussions I had with Fredrik Barth (who was my thesis-director) about whether the model was a theoretical simulation of process, pattern and form determined experimentally in ethnographic fieldwork; or, if it could be a vantage point on people's own theories (assuming that it is somehow natural, perhaps even cognitively innate, for humans to theorise). His idea of model departed from Games Theory and required a *specialist* training. Mine, on the other hand, was rooted in the observation that people were increasingly monitoring R (a)/(b) with digital displays.

For this reason, I argued, our notion of model needs to be immersive and incorporated into the tool-box of *ethnographic experiments* (for which he had also argued in the Nuffield lecture). That



<u>Fredrik Barth</u>. *Photo*: Max-Planck-Institute of ethnological research.

is, experimentally *producing* behaviours by going beyond the regimen of participant observation, as the one recognised method used by all anthropologists. Or, put in other words, moving from determining people's *assumptions*—through the roles we play in everyday life (Goffman)—to their *assignments*: known by *making*, in Tim Ingold's sense. Fredrik Barth's fear was that by following this procedure, field investigations would branch off in knowledges too complex to *contain*.

And they do. Hence the question of what we can do to still *comprehend* them. One way to go at this is to assess a history of knowledge in regard of comprehension (not containment as personae and bodies): that is, knowledge as a *timely* rather than as a fixed—inventoried—asset; intercepted, as it were, with a *skilled* response (depending on the knowledge and training of the person). That is, the **X**-factor towards which (a) and (b) point or converge. A *vectorial sum* determined as **X**, by which the model is indeed immersive. **X** itself is that heterostructural pattern noted: **X** = **R** (a)/(b).

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Or, alternatively, (a) + (b) \mathbf{i} = X. The notation X = R (a)/(b) is more suggestive of the cross-pressure between (a) and (b) from which a pattern emerges, featuring a system-*like* behaviour (though *not* a system in a cybernetic sense). This is the sense that Fredrik Barth attached to a notion of *disordered system* which he had from his father Tom Barth (who was a geologist). Example of a disordered system: between the weight from the labyrinthine chaos of the glacier, and the counterpressure from the valley of rock that holds it, a formation of regular hexagonal-like ice-rods.


The bed of ice-rods is different from both the valley and the glacier. The glacier and rock-valley are similar, in the sense that they are both studied by geologists. The bed is different in the sense that they might be studied by people more broadly interested in disordered systems and comparing them. If we, in turn, take interest in disordered systems that *learn* we have taken a decisive step to theorising humans (*meaning*) in processes of communicative interaction (*communication*). Which is why the X-factor, defined above, will demonstrably take off as a mobile/changing entity.

Up to the 4-5th century c.e. a *period* in a manuscript—what we regularly call a *sentence*—was determined by cantillation: patterns of melodic articulation which the reader would have had to learn from someone who already knew it. There were no punctuation marks in the manuscript text. The mediaeval philosopher Augustine of Carthage learned to read from his confessor Ambrosius of Milan. But in a new way: he was shocked to note that Ambrosius read without moving his lips, as others did at the time. Essentially, Ambrosius is ascribed the invention of *silent* reading.

The cantillation—what was known at the time as *ekphonia*—was preserved in collective readings: as in 9-10th century Gregorian chant: whole tones are named *punctum* and half-tones *virga*. That is, *dot*/full stop and *comma* as they are named in Latin languages. The point being that punctum (Fr. *point*) was double the length of the virga (Fr. *virgule*). In common norms of type-writing, a stop was followed by a *double* space. While the comma was followed by a *single* space. To indicate to the reader a longer pause (dot) and a shorter pause (comma). They had come do denote *silences*.


In modern theories—whether academic or artistic—the *punctum* came to denote the haunting after-image of photographs (in the wake of the photographic study/studium); this is in Roland Barthes' <u>camera lucida</u>. In Wolfgang Iser's scope on the <u>wandering viewpoint</u>, the passing optics of texts connecting (inter-textuality). Marcel Duchamp's notion of the <u>infrathin</u> in the double-boxed structure that he used in many of his works (using 'disordered systems' as constructive principle). Finally, Samuel Beckett's transposition of the *dot* into the relational interactive space of a <u>QUAD</u>.

After modernism, the contemporary framework—'being the other to one another' in each *our own* time—moves the punctum to yet another realm: *periodising* agency by <u>relational shifts</u>, in which the function of the punctum is to put productive agency on hold, and leave space for interaction



That is, **(a)** the *utility* of the consequences and **(b)** the awareness of the connection: each separately they have been changing (evidently); but the punctum where they meet—and separate/connect—has also changed. The point being that the former **(a)/(b)** is a manifestation of the latter **X**. Which indicates that the generative processes we should be looking for, and investigating, are located at this level: **X**. That is, the act of making in the pursuit of *assignments* that prompt the interception of **(a)/(b)**. That is, assignments that pass on the assignment: changed, but essentially part of the self-investigative process that we call *theorising*, and its relation to self-organisation.

The idea, concept and practice of the *product* is created by a systematic aloofness to (a) and (b): which we can see in the disappearance of utilities, commodities, goods and services from economic/financial parlance, to be exchanged for the product. I prefer to move in the apposite direction: to connect, as actively as possible, utility to consequence. To inhabit the disarticulation of economic value *from* utility *and* consequence, conjointly, to hatch *new* repertoires.



Changes: social X, transactional (a) (b)

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