

In this handout we will distinguish between T-shirts to be made—convertible as merch—and as wearables not to be produced but as wearables that come with an assignment; and clarify the terms on which a problem is set, in materials that are much more complex. While making this handout an interaction with two dancers—Emilie Karlsen and Marlene Bondesen—took place alongside, on their recent final turn of their MA at KHIO called [To the sides of this body](#). What would have been like, I asked, if the prints above were front and back for one dancer, and then flipped for the other. Who would be in charge? Who would have the last word? A question infusing their pas-de-uns throughout... (cf, also Sang Hoon Lee's work exploring another side).

To this point, I have enjoyed and learned *more* by listening to Ilya Sutskever ([Open AI](#)) talk about AI, than myself using AI. And I am grateful to Odd-Wiking Rahlff, for having connected me to the most important current source of AI. Sourcing the *human surge* in AI is important to me. Not only because I am an anthropologist but because my interest in technology is *not* for technology *per se*. And, for the moment, am still in lack of an experimental assignment that would allow me to determine a critical approach/attitude to AI: the [criticality](#) in human use hatching new [repertoires](#).



The auto-encoder symbol on the T-shirt worn by Ilya Sutskever during an interview with [Dwarkesh Patel](#). What he has to say, here and in other interview, would seem to outsmart any choice of T-shirts. Yet, Sutskever appears to be quite articulate in his choice of T-shirts. It is relevant to the topics raised in the handout, since it attempts to articulate the kind of push that occurs [in medias res](#).

In sum, as I listen to Sutskever, I have a sense that [AGI](#) is brought to [AI](#). Not only what AI does—or, can do—but what that does: that is, to my options, or people's options. What I am beginning to see is that Ilya Sutskever is particularly good at identifying [critical](#) options. Ones that contribute to progress in the field of AI. A curt reaction to the sensationalist approach to all that AI can do, and will be able to do, is in sum: so what? I am interested but will not be infantilised. So, I am holding back till I can have a clearer notion of what AI can do to change my options and repertoire.

Which is why my ears pointed when Sutskever—in an interview with [Dwarkesh Patel](#)—on the question of whether his many breakthroughs came from what was already there in books, or were basically unscripted, he answered: *both!* to answer how breakthroughs, once made, seem obvious in their simplicity, someone will always have written about it, and there will always also be someone to find/closing the reference. I am thinking that this could be instance of how Sutskever's model of language is working when applied: i.e., that [language is a projection of the world](#).

Here, at this point, it becomes essential to *define the border that separates [thinking](#) from [wishful thinking](#)*. Or, the border that separates the host from the ghost. In sum: who g/hosts whom? Sutskever's own values seem to cover the issue in terms that I could condone. However, what might be needed is a set of [assignments](#) to replace our

assumptions on AI: whether we are followers/believers, or we are sceptics/disbelievers. At the level I am trying to flesh out here, there is no difference. It is the difference between assumption and assignment that makes a difference: modelling the border within wishful/thinking.

This challenge—one of artist Luis Camnitzer's in *The assignment books* (2011)—brings us to the exact point where a fork defines between indulgence/infantilisation (or, simply, passivity) and action, in response to real options: the latter having to be adequate in order to succeed. So, the question I think that we must ask is whether AI can help us dig deeper into our pockets, not only paying to articulate thinking—bordering to wishful thinking—but to determine adequate options. Of course, this will have to be done in hitherto unsegmented territory, that yet can be logged.


I think this could have been Sutskever's point. We'd want to be led by AI, in this direction, but not be fooled by it. Clearly, Sutskever is successful in featuring the role of the host. But from I have heard from the interview with him—so far—there is no model to separate between hosting and ghosting the user. In other words, there is no model to determine who is the guest. In the language-games that I am pulling out of the hat here, there is also an implicit model of what language does. Or, what language can do if conveying an assignment, rather than a set of set assumptions.

Assignments put us into a search mode. Who is the host? In some language (as French) the term for host (*hôte*) means both guest and host. Who dominates the conversation? Who gets the last word? The surge of AI forces us to ask these questions. There is no way around them. Which is why I am in quest of an assignment. As a first step to a generally conceived usership (which it is my impression that we do not have now). I think that what will bring us further—on this important point—is to further understand and use of transduction in/from disordered systems (emergence).

Disordered systems determine processes of communicative interaction between series of actions and events that to begin with are separate: and tangle & tango as the border between them becomes a subject matter of thinking vs. wishful thinking. As they are no longer independent series but relate as sequence to con-sequence; as they are not quite causal but develop an unstable, occasional and local efficiency. Similar to a compression of information in progress: where a push of a different kind will define. As it does between wording and naming in linguistic practice.

That is, acting on a job before it is done. Action can come in the beginning—as a first mover/master—in the middle (as a maker) and in the end (as a slave). As a middle-maker, action can screen, intercept and frame patterns of data before they are programmed. It can thereby transduce patterns that are in the making, and transpose them somewhere else and determine where it is an adequate option to go. Options the adequacy of which is determined even before the compression is completed: before things have names and what it is possible to say about it is up for grabs.

From the bits and parts of what he has to say about the subject matter, I am suspecting that this is Ilya Sutskever's model of creative usership (MCU) that we call research. The challenge lies in what we'd have to do to make it a general model of usership (GMU). And it may be rather urgent to do so, if there is any sense to what I am elaborating here. Because, it is then apparent that AI (especially AGI) can also be readily caught by Hegel's master/slave dialectics in a particularly nasty edition. One that is already hatching in our political landscape.



Luis Camnitzer — *This is a mirror. You are a written sentence*, 1966-68, Polystyrene, 48,4 x 62,5 x 1,5 cm, Photography: Peter Schälchli, Daros Latinamerica Collection, Zürich. This is another example from Luis Camnitzer's work in which makes the receiver shift from an assumption to an assignment w/a transductive output.

Which means that we may have to actively resist the temptation of keeping the surge of AI locked up in AI, moving from illusion to fiction: that is, moving from illusion as a world unto itself containing its own reality, to fictional human/machine-companionship that can be marked by the real. Which means that rather than giving in to apocalyptic speculations of what A(G)I will bring, to set up massive educational programmes based on assignments reaching unto the roots of thinking/acting in the arts (cf, [Luis Camnitzer's work](#)).

A problem in our current professional culture of knowledge intensive ventures, is likely the infantilisation of the arts: alongside the general value of infantilisation, in what one might call *pax stultorum*.