



Figure 4.

Credits.

« Le quoi, à chaque fois, du projet-de-monde nous renseigne en effet toujours en même temps sur le comment de l'être-dans-le-monde et le comment de l'être soi. Pour vous rendre plus intelligible l'essence du projet-de-monde, je voudrais maintenant vous confronter à quelques concepts de monde biologiques. Je pense en premier lieu au concept de monde biologique de von Uexküll, et cela parce que, malgré sa dissemblance, il révèle quelques concordances dans son application méthodologique. Je commencerai par les concordances méthodologiques. Vous vous rappellerez que von Uexküll parle de monde d'indices, de monde interne et le monde d'action des animaux, et qu'il réunit le monde d'indices et le monde d'action sous la dénomination de monde ambiant. Le « mouvement circulaire » existant entre ces deux mondes, il le désigne de *cycle de fonction*. Et de même que nous dirions : il n'est pas possible de décrire la psychose d'un homme si l'on a pas pleinement parcouru ses mondes, de même von Uexküll écrit : « Il n'est pas possible de décrire la biologie d'un animal si l'on n'a pas pleinement parcouru ses cycles de fonctions. »

Ludwig Binswanger

13. Das gleiche Subjekt als Objekt in verschiedenen Umwelten



Abb. 32 Förster und Eiche.



Abb. 33 Mädchen und Eiche.

Credits.

I will paraphrase the citation of Ludwig Binswanger [recto]. It is included in French on account of my concern that “international” does not simply mean English. This is due to the fact of my reading Binswanger in French, owing to the number & quality of French-translations of Binswanger from German.

The passage brings more detail and clarity to the assertions, in the present flyer series, of how Binswanger’s *clinical* practice bends his interest in philosophy to what he calls an *existential anthropology*. It articulates with a phenomenological approach, but is multiple, extant and varied.

The breaking-point at which Binswanger’s philosophical interests starts bending to what he calls ‘existential anthropology’ when he passes from an ontological query on being self and being-in-the-world, to *how* the self & being-in-the world is. Converging methodologically with Jakob von Uexküll.

Von Uexküll’s basic scheme features a world of indexes (*Merkwelt*, top diagram, *recto*) and a world of activity/action (*Wirkungswelt*, *idem.*): the circular motion between the two is inner & ambient, linked to the environment. The circular motion he calls “function”. Binswanger breaks off here.

But he converges with von Uexküll on his methodological approach to his field of study. Von Uexküll writes “It is not possible describe the biology of an animal without having fully retraced the cycle of its functions.” The world of an animal springs forth of cycle of its functions, in a specific environment.

Likewise, Binswanger writes: “It is impossible to describe a psychosis if one hasn’t fully retraced its worlds.” Psychosis not abnormal, in this sense, it has a norm of its own. It leaves the social circle, and articulates the environment in its own intrinsic way. It counterposes its world to the common.

In relating to psychosis—in the clinical framework—the psychologist can establish a system in how it tracks its targets, while jointly seeking an attitude to *match* what the client lacks: namely, a common world. This development is quite evident from developments in the Warburg *anamnesis*.

There is of course a risk of human exceptionalism in how Binswanger is underscoring human being’s unique ability to live potentially in multiple worlds and to recalibrate its own worlds to the world s/he shares with others. It is this match which—in my sense—is *anthroponomic*. The traffic.

In this sense, psychosis features a condition of something whose target-seeking falls short of working on the attitude. That is, they are not only off kilter. But the one is completely overtaken by the other. But, the communicative interaction between the psychiatrist and patient creates another path.

Reading the anamnesis (above) this path features a kind of existential creativity: that is, a kind of creativity for which our mainstream account is rather poor. But may yet constitute the needed backdrop to turn to a renewed assessment on the nature of design, and what design *does*.