



Færder (lighthouse in the outer Oslo fjord)

The strongest indicator of movability in our categories of understanding—that connect our senses and action—is simply money. It is a *mover* in the relationship *between* necessarily *and* contingency, that both define categories as *given*, but does not define what *moves* our categories.

So, our categories are movers; but what moves our categories? It is interesting that [Slavoj Žižek](#) should have linked *capitalism* to the *end of the world*: that we more readily can think the end of the world, than the end of capitalism. But then, perhaps they somehow coincide in our categories?

In other words, if there are a class of *placemaker* acts—that are potentially on the human repertoire—that do *not* pass through us, but engage us *instrumentally*, that are *architectural* in nature, and *ritual* in understanding (what and how they communicate) congregating *environments* into *habitats*.



Wending village in China (close to Myanmar)

Whoever is interested in *categories* as something paradoxically *given* and *discoverable* at the same time, is bound to find in Kant's notion of synthetic *a priori* a worthy puzzle: statements that are *always* and everywhere true, but also *hold good* for situations that can change. Is it even possible?

In other words, that something can be necessary *and* contingent at the same time. Is it possible? Intuitively, questions about categories bring us to to the end of the world, where things ultimate and opposite come together. Kant lived *between* two worlds; with the *dawn of science* on the horizon.

Thus, whether we should consider categories as the *constants* of what we can know, or the heralds of *change*, is uncertain. Perhaps, therefore, one first of all should ask: *why* ask about categories *now*? Or, *when* is it that we ask about categories? Are categories linked to *phase-shifts*? *Time-change*?

Not a change *in* time—when we do not necessarily question categories—but changes *of* time: a shift *from* questioning categories contingently, *to* question them necessarily. That is, a shift from when we consider emotions as *subjective* states, to ones linked to the *transient* states of phase shifts.

Here emotions are here *interceptions* of first movers—changes beyond visible, subjective or objective, change: working *within* and *beyond* what we may experience, or observe, that still *affects us* and that we *somehow* also affect. Something *at once* at the margins *and* the core of our being.

Something that *tests* and *challenges* our emotional capacity: our emotional capacity to *exist* and to *level* with existence. But is it possible to come further than to do *each our circuits* around *philosophical evergreens*? What can we do with a responsivity that is *indifferent* to the humanly un/pleasant?

How do we *respond* to a *responsive* reality which is *indifferent* to whether we feel pain or pleasure? Do we have to *abandon* the pleasure-principle, or does it—within the changing bounds of sustainability—mean that we have to place the pleasure principle *second*? What is emotion *beyond* pleasure?

Perhaps we can see emotion as a *6th sense* rather than a *whirlpool of feelings centred on the human ego*. And then to figure out *not* if, but *when* emotion is such. A radar unto the world, rather than a vortex of human preoccupation. We know it can work like that. But certainly not always.

If what a sense *does* is to pick up on *changes*, in the relation between the *human body* and the *environment*, emotion is a *sense*. But it is at odds with sensing in that changes *in* and *of* the self—in the *environment* and the *body* separately—invite considerations on *how repair also engages re-pair*.

Not tending the connection between the two is to cause damage. That is, a connection that actually does *not* pass through us, but still can be *intercepted* by us. That is, *reality as it is* and the way it exposes *our lives the way they are*. A just *neutrality* to whether/not this is to our liking.