


In the <u>Erlangen Programme</u>, mathematician <u>Felix Klein</u> (left) argues in prose. That is, without the use of mathematical systems. In a passage relating to focal and expanded groups, he argued the necessity of special entities that insure some consistency between the principal and the expanded group.

If the principal group is equated to a *work*—say, art-work—then the special entity (he calls them 'special beings') is a *reference*: it is defined by as one adjoined to the expanded group to preserve the properties of the principal group. But how did it come to be included into the principal group?

In Lévi-Strauss' analysis of myth, the reference-myth is not your typical element (in a group of myths): rather, it appears to be exceptional, featuring family resemblances in an odd combination. But it testifies, or gives credit, to a structural cogency to the rest of the group, which whereby is *held*.



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The question whether *rounding* and *following up* a creative process with the objective catching up with the lateral drift which *alienates* work, not content to *add* this effort but somehow considering it as necessary internal part of creative work: the part that *sorts out* claims to varied aspects of ownership.

That is, the aspects of ownership that will stay with the *work*, and is in this sense inalienable from it—its value—involving the properties of the work that are effectively attributed to it. A key concept in this here are *references*: that is how the work in question is *credited* by elements *joined* to it.

What we are talking about here—that makes references effective—is that their adjunction to the work demonstrates something, and should therefore also be argued. How does the demonstration and argument of *including* such elements into our work *proceed*? Is there a logic to it, or is it mad?

To start with, one has to 'pretend to something' to include a reference, *without* being pretentious. It has to be *justified*, and therefore rely on judgement. Others may disagree, yet *comprehend* how that a reference can be included from this *vantage point*, which is thus *situated* and *positioned*.

What does it take for an element to be included into a work as a *reference* for it? One can elements springing from *one* work come to testify as reference to *another* work? We are then talking about an *element* that can belong to the *activity* of *either* one *or* several persons. But *not* the same work.

The *reference*, in order to give *credit*, must come from a *different* work. Its function is then *attributive* and to reveal one/more *properties* of the work. The way <u>Aby Warburg</u> worked with *Mnemosyne*—his visual experiment targeting the categorisation of books by contact metaphors. *Blackboards*.

The black boards with black woollen fabric where he pinned photographs; *not* based on similarities, but on *reactive* patterns: if adding the photo of a Zeppelin, how would the other elements (containing e.g. a seagull and Mona Lisa) react? He was not concerned with mimesis, but *pathos*.

That is, how the *forces* operating between elements would allow each element to become *manifest* in a particular/desired way: justified through the *workings* of forces. It is also the kind of exploration we find done by <u>Rosalind Krauss</u> in her famed essay *sculpture in the expanded field*.

In that essay, she uses Klein's groups—or, Piaget groups—to propose a more *specific* approach to the *logic of forces* between elements. It is based on an article by <u>Marc Barbut</u> explaining a mathematical notion of *structure* to the *humanities*, which was published in the review *Les temps modernes*.

She shows the *internal* logic of an *expanding* field. <u>Claude Lévi-Strauss</u> does that too—in fact, he uses the method to cover entire continents in his work on indigenous American *myths*—but his centrally method includes the notion of *reference* to explain how logic of myths is *held*, not just argued.