



The above image features a wood-carving by Bjørn Jørund Blikstad. The ornamental approach is inspired by [Tillman Riemenschneider's wood-carving of the "furry" Mary Magdalen \(1490-92\)](#): but while this carving Mary's ascension was an altar-piece, Blikstad's is placed on a cabinet.

The compound work (below)—the peacock cabinet—is thus differently "laced" to the horizon/ground than *Riemenschneider's altar-piece* (which is to be found in a church in Münnerstadt). In Blikstad's work of reception, his profuse writing-process, the work transposes unto a body-with-computer.

Making and contemplating are the two principal modes of his work. It can be seen as a critique of the 'horizon' in phenomenology (which, of course, is already critical in these terms). However, his interest also takes him to some metaphysical aspects of semiotics (C.S. Peirce): sense-making as a *mover*.



What are exhibits outside of visiting hours? Can such exhibits even exist? In the post-cultural society—with viral the proliferation of security controls—it is rather essential that they do. The question links up with the topic featured in the last flyer (#03): when do found drawings become acts of portraiture?

At one level, this question is on the origin of a *sign*. At another level, it could be the detachment of a thing from its domestic horizon as a *body*: that is, embodiment as the appearance of a body on a current horizon. The phase shift from knowing an object, to its phenomenological appearance as *body*.

If so, it becomes immediately clear why ontology is often categorised as aesthetic theory. The semiotics of the embodied thing—when drawing shifts to portraiture—is retrospective (to the shift). The phenomenology of the embodied thing—when knowledge shifts to being—is similarly prospective.

Hence, a new question: when does semiotic-phenomenological compound become a *monster* (rather than a body)? This is a sequel to the Heidegger-Adorno debate. If seen from a metaphysical point of view, the monster emerges when the compound—as a palindrome—starts to work *causally*.

A furniture designer who has operated experimentally in this realm of artistic research, is PhD fellow Bjørn Blikstad. There is clearly a difference between *putting in the work* and what occurs when it somehow as been *obtained*. His topic being how a thing—a cabinet—can emerge from ornament.

The generative medium is *wood-carving*, while the joinery his way of tying up its odd ends. He is working directly on the horizon: the action is in the making, the embodiment in his means of contemplation: resulting in a profuse outpour of writing. The compound is a monster, and also it *does* things.

In his work, the wood-carving is the equivalent of drawing. Its found qualities are then exhibited by a *cabinet* (the making of which becomes an act of portraiture). In some sense, his writing comes about *between* the word-carving and the cabinet. It documents the process of portraiture.

Correspondingly, his work is a self-exhibiting compound, of the kind with which this flyer is concerned. It features an experimental comparison between the Heideggerian monster (the *onto-semiotic* compound) and a different compound, discovered in this process of artistic research.

From the ground zero of the palindrome, two vectors are possible: the monster and the mover. The mover is a vectorial compound of the *semio-ontological* drift where the ontological output remains connected and indebted to the work that is put in. It is, in this sense, un-marketed.

However, as much as the philosophical counterpart of a commercial product—both indebted to reality—the mover is differently convertible, if seen to extend Aristotle's notion of the 1st mover (the soul) and the 2nd mover (action). The 3rd mover is the 'aesthetico-epistemic operator'.