




Slowing down the hands is something we regularly do whenever we are working on detail: whether it is rock-climbing, archaeological digging, practicing a musical instrument, or manufacture. Be it the manufacture of a finger from a piece of wood found in the forest, with the use of a knife.

Precision (the Næss algorithm) also has to do with slowing down. It occurs at the exact moment when the urgency of need is brought to exchange with longer term adequacy. That is, moving from the internal dialogue between reason and sensing, to the intuition of substance.

Substance is here understood as a *specific* connector that also contains the exchange (and its reality). Substance escapes reason, but not the steps and structure of movement, and projects unto our imagination. Carving a finger out of a stick—using a knife without which it is helpless—makes this point.



Recent research has brought to evidence the specialised learning capacity of the cerebellum in *self-motion perception*, and also the perception of gravity. The cerebellum is packed with neurons—about 3-4 times the cortex—but is not myelinated as the cortex: an enormous slow capacity.

If the cerebellum has a mirror, on account of its learning capacity in slow-motion perception, it hence is an asynchronous one; relating to its subject—self-motion perception—in its own time. Slow does not mean inefficient. As good walkers, climbers and practitioners of T'ai Chi can testify.

Thinking about it: if the complex system we know as *human* did not only possess awareness, but the possibility to articulate *quick* and *slow*—as dialectic articulations of *active* and *passive*—it wouldn't be able to conceive *change*. That is, neither environmental change nor adaptation.

And certainly not creativity—mitigating external and internal change. And the cerebellum appears to have the ability to contain change, given the chance to process what happens in the rest of the body, the environment and the relation between them. Chance methods may provide this chance.

There is also a connection between slowing down the field—assessing change—and theorising. And what chance-methods and theorising moreover have in common, is that they are not less busy from being slow. In fact, they may be more busy, extending work (as it were) to work on time.

That is, speed works under the yoke of time; while slowness works on time as a material. So, the cerebellum does not merely work—in this train of thought—on self-motion perception, but on time-perception. Which means that it paradoxically can play a role, in the flash of a moment, with *interception*.

Because what is an event other than 'the eventful contrast between speed and slowness': between the ephemeral and the noteworthy? The event reflects back on the consciousness of the entity being present and brings it to awareness (and brings awareness to it). That is the mechanism.

The Weberian idea of mechanism conceived in terms of the *exchange* between **a**) bringing something to awareness (e.g. a natural phenomenon) and **b**) bringing awareness to it (i.e., an historical phenomenon). The notion of natural history correspondingly relies on this exchange: the mechanism.

The *mirror*, therefore, is the name of a mechanism. It is not a mirror in the narrow sense of reflecting an image. But in the extended sense of reflecting a *category* (of thing, animal or any conceivable entity): in other words, what determines *what something* is from *what it does*. Extended thoughts.

In this sense, extended thoughts (cerebellum) are *containers* of intensive thoughts (hands): the latter being the ones that we routinely consider as *contents*. Our hands and fingers are—doubtlessly—the quickest and most articulate organs that we have. They come together in a variety of ways.