


Turing's test is perhaps most interesting if understood on the backdrop of a real question that he asked after exerting his team, and finally succeeding, at *cracking the codes* coming out of the German *Enigma*-machine. If the intelligence was used would the Germans get that they had broken the code? Would the Germans understand that they had *it* (the Turing machine)? In the aftermath we may ask: **1)** what was *it* that they had? **2)** what did Turing and his team contract, by having a source of *intel* that they could *not* use? A virological question from the very beginning/inception of information history. The *other* question that came out of Turing's work was the *halting problem*. He showed that for any equivalent of his machine—that is, any computer—an algorithm that can calculate the stopping time, at which the given problem is solved, cannot exist. But can we map out the two of them jointly?



The two issues with computing raised by Turing (recto) are *two* determinations of the word 'cannot': **1)** they could not act on the intel [relating to *impact* and *ethics*]; **2)** one cannot produce an algorithm to solve the stoppage problem [relating to *content* and *container*—cf, Kurt Gödel].

As the alert reader will have noted, we are presently concerned with the relationship between the two questions/problems: **1) and 2)**. Because neither 'cannot' the energy-footprint of these two arrests, is not likely to emerge; nor is the kind of intel and algorithm would emerge if *combined*.

This observation is warranted since the equivalent of these to indeterminacies do combine in the logic of *cultural encounters* (#03). Hence the question on what the entailment might be, if these two arrests were models for/of human *behaviour*, are warranted. What is *it*, then, that is stopped?

But first what is it that is explained F. Barth (1966:15) wrote: «Human behaviour is 'explained' if we show **(a)** the utility of its consequences in terms of values held by the actor, and **(b)** the awareness on the part of the actor of the connection between an act and its specific results.»

So, this is *consistency* **(a)** and *consequence* **(b)** as previously defined (#03). There is an energetic exchange between ε_A and ε_B in **(a)** and then a transposition to an exchange between $\varepsilon_{A'}$ and $\varepsilon_{B'}$ in **(b)**. The different kinds of *correspondence* featuring in **(a)** and **(b)** is seated in $\Delta[\varepsilon_A; \varepsilon_B]$ and $\Delta[\varepsilon_{A'}; \varepsilon_{B'}]$.

Turing's first arrest, the halting problem, is one of *consistency*: a computer cannot be expected to be *consistent* in a sense involving a shift of levels, such as humans can **(a)**. The second arrest, the impossibility to use the intel, is one of *consequence* **(b)**: the Germans would get that they had it.

So, if both **(a)** $\Delta[\varepsilon_A; \varepsilon_B]$ and **(b)** $\Delta[\varepsilon_{A'}; \varepsilon_{B'}]$ are arrested, on account of having a computer, what is the new *energy-bill*? The account left to the tracery of the omissions from what F. Barth assesses as explanation? In a sense, what makes it possible to transide from behaviour to action? What is left of it?

Intuitively, it makes sense to assume that an amount of *wayward* energy is released that will find a way of reiterating F. Barth's query on behaviour/ action at different level: that is, alongside and contingent (*a mode*), in one aspect, but also necessary and orthogonal, in another aspect (an *attribute*).

This is the problem of the *edgeland*: one take on this is Fred Wander's narrative on the camps (#02)—it is a mode of resistance (contingent), which is necessary in regard of what we regularly consider as the base-line of humanness. Another take on the edgeland is our *current* condition.

We are finding ways of living in the time-space *between* viral contamination and digital connection, defines a [contact-zone](#) that we can (and should) make our subject matter in design. Which is to say that the comparison with the camp is structural. Substantially, however, they are incomparable.