


Descartes "[...] maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways." Q.E.D. Spinoza, Ethica, Kindle.

CONTEN

"So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in different ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognised by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical." Q.E.D. Spinoza, Ethica, Kindle.



I'd like to continue on the track of sensoriality. To avoid all misunderstanding: 'sensoriality' is not a bias for perception before reason and intuition, but the wiring of the three—reason, perception and intuition—into a reflective practice, which one can easily trace from the renaissance to the baroque.

Sensoriality more broadly connects to the techniques of conjuring memories joined to places we have not physically been. Ranging from methods of memorising texts to the method of loci: perambulating a palace conjured to retrieve text-passages from memory: metaphor is a means of communication.

This is relevant to Spinoza using the metaphor of an Euclides style treatise of geometry, retaining and developing the metaphysics exposed in Ethica: articulating his own contribution at the edgeland between philosophy and kabbalah. That is, the precincts of natural philosophy since the renaissance.

Spinoza's use of references is sparing: his references to Descartes and the Jews are reductive; his knowledge of geometry—owing to his practice as a lens-grinder in the high-tech of his time (telescopes)—exceeds the examples he sets in Ethica, which are limited to squares, triangles and circles.

Spinoza's correspondence, with scientists and philosophers in his time, was extant. But the presuppositions of his metaphysical venture are neither historicist nor cultural. Its current interest lies here. For all of those memories we claim but strictly cannot have: historical and cultural memories.

The metaphysical project of Ethica brings us to the outer precincts of time: which is where we get to read about substance, thinking things and G-d. Spinoza's panentheism—everything is in G-d—is interesting, from a design point of view, since it invites us to think in depth of what we call containers.

What is the affordance of a container to hold thought and extension, acting as a kind of vessel for them, that calls on them conjointly. The container, in this sense, contrary to content, articulates at the limit of what memory can hold. Yet, Spinoza states that thought and extension are together in substance.

I think of the piece we listened to—Nulla res singularis—as a container, in the same sense as my reading of a book (certainly Spinoza's Ethica) is held by the book as a container. This holding entity is ineffable in the hands of the reader who is working through it, yet it is also irreplaceable in that capacity.

It is also irreplaceable in the sense of that specific copy of the book, even though it has been mass-produced. Re-reading Ethica for this lecture, however, I have been managing the text on my Kindle-device; and find myself challenged to conjure up the book in the aspects discussed here.

Which is why I do not relate philosophically—in contemporary terms—to Ethica, but as a visual anthropologist with a take on books as a reflective practitioner. With the hit-and-impact of digital media I am querying how Spinoza can be relevant to the sensorial education of new generations.