

Reading the introductory chapter to Spinoza's *Ethics* again, I am struck by how much it reminds me of the kabbalah: that is, what in the way he discusses substances and how they remind me of the **sefirot** (i.e., the 10 nodes of the Etz Chayim—The Tree of Life): something that is in and conceived through itself.


Substance, attributes and modifications are clustered and their hierarchy in this order. What is to prevent us from looking a substances as emanations, attributes as according to the nomenclature of the nodes of thee tree, and the modifications as the 22 channels that determine the shifts between them?

Spinoza refers to a baggage of debates—contemporary to his time and those going back in the depth of time—amongst which his diatribe with people of his own Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam (1632-1677). At this time the kabbalistic philosophy was part of the cultural baggage from the peninsula.

רפבר reads **sefer** (a book), a **sefor** (a count) and **sippur** (a story). In the Sefer Yetsirah it is stated that G-d created the world by writing, number and speech: which is consistent with **book**, **count** and **story**. *Ethics* displays the three: the volume's concept, the numbered paragraphs, and varieties of proof.

A case has been made of his <u>kabbalistic references</u>: especially Abraham Cohen de Herrera's book *Puerta del Cielo* [the Gate of Heaven]. The initial part of the first chapter of *Ethics*—concerning substance—deserves a sufficiently careful look. Substances are defined by that their **essence** also involves **existence**.





Spinoza was a lense-maker. If the geometry of the tree of life—which is made up by circles, squares and triangles—was part of his cultural baggage, the role of geometry is regularly auxiliary to his philosophical proofs (in the sense of Q.E.D.). They are auxiliary, but in Spinoza's perspective not contingent.

Still, there are some real questions on how the book (as a found entity) the narrative (his message on things unknown) and the numbers (as negotiated in the book in the sense of being included into the book, or indicated from it) unavoidably will involve contingency: now I am speaking as a reader/receiver.

Moreover, the **looped** premise of **essence** and **existence**—homologous to properties and attributes—in Spinoza's notion of substance, **rather** define them as subject to **individualisation** than to be conceived as 'isolates'. And, surely, with this premise we cannot consider *Ethics* itself as an isolate!

For instance with murder, the crime is bound to be **twofold**: on the one hand, the victim is denied its **existence**—as a human life-form—on the other hand, the murderer denies his/her **own human essence**. So, as a crime, murder is truly **relational**, in the sense that the **transgression** goes necessarily **two** ways.

Murder here reveals as a particular case of a broader transgression: theft, or robbery. The separation of essence and existence is precisely this. And conversely, the conjoining essence and existence is the core of ethics. Something almost like an ethical method. At the same time it is a design.

For my part, I cannot read Spinoza without thinking of him—as I read—as one who writes philosophy, in a context of having and living from a trade: lense-manufacture. He is also someone educated in the philosophy of his time, who has a kabbalistic cultural baggage. We do not have to call him a Kabbalist.

Because we have a situation. Not a problem to be solved. Because we know then exactly what is to be done. A situation is specific and becomes clear to us as it individualises. Perhaps we have to understand that between the infinite and the finite, there is a skin. That is, they are connected by touch.

A substance is the infinite aspect of a situation—the aspect relating to individuation—while the finite aspect of the situation is the specific. Where the finite aspect lies in precisation, the infinite aspect lies in perfectibility. The difficult part of is accept that the infinite and the finite touch one another.

Touch—or, the haptic link—separates and connects; it is 'a difference that makes a difference'. It doesn't yield meaning it creates value. This is what I think when rubbing shoulders with Spinoza, as I work to receive *Ethics* through my effort of experimental reading: that is, I work am cloning it.

Substances are infinite: they are in themselves and conceived through themselves. 1-in-1 so substances are clones of the 'in one', that are transcendental by a factor X. What expresses nothing beyond the thing defined. A conception of which can be formed independently of other conceptions.