

Fig. 1—ἀνάπτυξις (*anaptúxis*) features a cartographic assignment of mapping—a homomorphism mapping distributive and operative modes of function  $f$ —applied to a situation involving *contingencies*. *Anaptúxis* matches as score of steps ( $n=120$ ) against a performance of the same steps. *Anaptúxis* means opening, unfolding, development, explanation.

Understanding how transactions *between* people involve transactions *within* people—with elusive factors such as *gut-feeling*—follows *mediately* when transactions involve *more than one* level of scale: specifically involving *operational* and *distributive* intelligence (the one being spatiotemporally restricted, the other expanded). Any transaction resting on operational assignments and distributive applications will not only run *between* people who are engaged in this sort of transaction, but will also run *through* them. Hence the challenge of articulating differently scaled tasks *conjointly*.

A methodological challenge resides in becoming involved at levels of being human that are not readily articulated (in the sense that they require training and education). The specific problem springs from the nature of the *subject* which is always in lack of its other (better or worse) **half**. Inspired by Lacan's nomenclature we may denote this *subject*  $\$$ . The dilemma is stated in his apologue of the *blind* and the *paralytic*: when we *act* we are (selectively) blind; when we *look* our ability to act is correspondingly limited. Though, of course, we are rarely completely blind/paralytic.

There are *sectors* of the operational intelligence which are blind. And there are *segments* of the distributive intelligence that are paralysed. In some situations it will be preferable to act; even if in the dark. While in other cases it will be preferable to take stock of the total situation (and *then* act). But in some cases—which is what takes some education/training—blindness *and* paralysis *join* and combine *into* something else: an *alignment* of agency and sight, with regard to *options* that appear in a restricted field, with *learning outcomes* in the expanded field: the [learning theatre](#).

So, there are two steps: **(1)** the first step is to join documented blindness and paralysis in a limited space [with the emergent alignment afforded by this restriction] ; **(2)** the second step is to transpose this alignment into a wider space [here selective blindness and inaction still prevail but is affected by the transposition]. The difference between **(1)** and **(2)** accounts for operational and distributive assignments and draws our attention to the *transactions* between them. The relation between them is conceived as adjacent and contingent. Which is why we cannot be interested in *linear cause*, but *only* in communication: that is, not in the agent-other couplet, but in *truth* and *impact*.




Fig. 2—Image by Kevin Dooley, shared under provisions of Creative Commons Attribution license 2.0. It gives an idea of the difference between transactions between and within (distributive and operative)

Conversely, we will only take interest in the signifiers  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  in communicative terms, while the relation between the subject  $\$$  and  $a$  are not communicative but *intraactive*: they are in exchange with the agent-other couplet. Which means that the transaction we are interested in writes: **transaction = communication + intraaction**. Moreover, this reformulation indicates how people can be in transaction with themselves, in the sense that they move *from* an operative *to* a distributive framework (and back). The docking of the computer comes in exactly here. The intraaction we have been belabouring therefore corresponds exactly to the *interpolation*, we have been discussing previously: didactic/analytic. Analytic is with the 'elements of

the sum'. While didactic is with the 'sum of the elements'. Their scale differs in the exact same way as the transaction *between* people and *within* people differ. Concomitantly, there will be transactions between the two (*within* and *between*) which—when they occur—yield an *opening, unfolding, growth, development, explanation*. In Greek *anaptúxis* (ἀνάπτυξις). That is, the event/process of hatching theory from practice: the turning-point, or trope, where practice *shifts* to theory (*stops* to work psychologically for a *shift* in nature). The stop-and-shift features a *grammar* for complexity.

That is, a stop-and-shift which certainly comes out as an *achievement*, but which is at the same time of consequence *beyond* the meanderings of the individual psyche. Achievements of this kind are achievements *in* nature and *among* people. Which means that the moments in which we are blind and paralysed, either will be met by a stop-and-shift (objet petit a)—we close the transaction and move on—or we *hold* them conjointly till they *take* place; and a potential transactions in a new realm has come about. But what is explanation in the sense of *anaptúxis*? F. Barth (1966, p.15):


«Human behaviour is 'explained' if we show (a) the utility of its consequences in terms of values held by the actor, and (b) the awareness on the part of the actor of the connection between an act and its specific results». If (a) involves a *blind* sector, and (b) involves a *paralytic* segment, they become conjoint only inasmuch as they somehow *take place*. If a more skeletal version is pitched by a ritual score, a performance of the score will hatch the play of interpolations—which determines a transaction as such—where *anaptúxis* compounds the ritual score-and-performance.

Or, *anaptúxis* is the emergent real within the compound of the ritual score and its performance: in essence, it reflects my errand with *homomorphism*: which is to acquire more nuance in articulating *resemblance* in complex dynamics involving contingency. On the one hand, to reap/harvest contingency when moving *from* ritual score *to* performance. On the other hand, *gathering* contingency in a sense where *taking place* initiates a process of *fermentation*: fermentation-taking-place *prompts* the spatiotemporal *affordance* for transactions to be conducted in a new segment of the real.

Taking responsibility for the human life-form includes the ability of responding to it. In the scope of natural evolution it is always *in information*: it proceeds by hatching new natures, through the dynamics of *anaptúxis* unfolding through interpolation. The three levels of transaction—between, within and beyond—each require care & attention: complexity *summons* care and attention; complication *arrests* it. Complication comes from limiting transactions to exchange between people. Money is e.g. the chief vehicle of complication: as it conflates *payment, trade* and *value* in transactions.

Complication comes from attempts to make up for the differences between payment, trade and value by developing *systems* in which these differences can be *neglected*. Which they cannot in actual practice. And a process is initiated to compensate for ever new contingencies, that exceed them: in short, there is *no* contingency-plan. By making a difference between them it becomes evident that payment relates to *operative* intelligence, trade to *distributive* intelligence, and value to *anaptúxis*. Here economics is *not* conceived as formal system superimposed on the real, but one that brings about new realities: troubling or problematic/chaotic or complex.

Troubling, if left to the logic of complication. Problematic if following the logic of complexity: that is, where transactions do not attempts to solve problems, but to create a new sense of problem (as a kind of entrepreneurship in the realm of practical readability). The scale of operation is different from the scale of distribution. The scale of *anaptúxis* can bring a measurement of the complexity in which operations and distribution conjoin: here, we suggest the use of polyhedra *with* adequate contingency markers (**Fig.3**).



**Fig. 3**—*disdyakis triacontahedron* (a polyhedron with 120 identical sides). Using polyhedra for scaling bridges between steps as designed (distributive) and steps as performed (operative). With adequate *contingency markers* this polyhedron will be able to account for transactions—conceived as processes of communicative interaction—in 120 steps ( $n = 120$ ). Function: wind-rose.