Fig. 1—if it is only possible to claim a certain understanding of Jacques Lacan's work—especially outside the realm of therapeutic experience of his take on psychoanalysis—the likelihood that it would only be by snippets/slither (Lacan's "lichettes") it is strictly impossible to determine whether this understanding is inside/outside Lacan's scope.

In preparatory research dialogues on a bi-modal search infrastructure at the National Library of Norway, we engaged the possibility of conceiving text-image compounds as *edits*. If moved from the search infrastructure *inBIT* to the *learning theatre*, the recent developments in this domain allows a new take on the subject matter. Which is the generative role of *editing* in bringing up *emergent* contents, that in the past would be framed as *authoring*. The *learning theatre* is a differ-ent frame *than* the authoring frame, based on the *superposition* of instructions and protocols.

Frame-analysis (Goffman) is concerned with the *organisation of experience*. The *learning theatre*, with this approach, is concerned with organising the experience of *writing* in alternative terms: making it possible for people who do *not* see themselves as authors—with a pen and signature—to develop emergent *contents*. *Edits*, here, determine elements that come about from *mapping* (rather than authoring); or making decisions on how practice and viewing come together. That is, the itinerary from **agent —> other** under constraints of the learning theatre and its *embodiment*.

Hence the *edits*—as they are compiled in a mapping device (a *logbook*)—features a specific (and, in phases, unique) itinerary of each [dividual] practitioner in the *learning theatre*: where individuation adds a process of superposition, interaction and entanglement; as the result of truths that emerge in the practitioner's *circle of care,* and the experience of how these extend, in the variety of im-pacts *harvested* in the learning theatre (whether in the role of a presenter, small groups or the en-tire attendance). By successive iterations, embodiment features **truth—>[agent—>other]—> impact**.

Fig. 2 swirls—it can hold both the **agent—>other** sequence and the **agent—>other** con/sequence.

The *truth will out* in the sense that—through the procedure of the learning theatre—will become keenly aware of the kind of feedback s/he needs: either from someone in the entourage of the learning theatre, from a wider set, or simply being self-directed in where s/he takes it from there. Which, for instance, is congenial with the process and outcomes of someone who works with design. But also in hatching procedures of combining practical instructions and viewing protocols in the use of a bimodal search engine: e.g., by moving from the logbook to the user-profile: where instructions and protocols combined.

If we theorise this, for a bit, in the Lacanian framework, it would entail that if the subject is divided—in the sense that we are dividuals, and what is more, *half the chicken*—and we denote it **$**, then the plight of this *half*, unconscious of its blind part, could reflected by modelling it through the constraints of a similar relationship between two signifiers: e.g., a signifier with a *name* (S_1) who *speaks* (another signifier S_2). Where we take it from there depends on whether the relation between the two signifier S_1 and S_2 is *alternatively* an illusion *or* fiction.

Here, the possibility that Lacan might be more concerned with *illusion* than with fiction, will determine the role of language in how *truth will out*. Since, if *fictional*, the relation between S_1 and S_2 could be an effec-tive stratagem, since the distinguishing feature of this compound is that

it then can be marked by the real (i.e., it is not locked, nor exhaustively contained, by the *half-chicken* subject **$**). Even if blind to the other half of all things—cf, Lacan's example of a painting succeeding to fool birds into taking the depicted *fruits* for real, and another painting showing *veil* so realistic, that people will ask what's behind it—it could still move towards balancing with its blind half.

Lacan's schemas of **$—>[S₁—> S₂]—> a** does appear to suggest a profound and resident dualism, that it is impossible for humans to overcome. Yet, he argues concepts such as the *sinthome* with an idea of *how we can live with* the simple trauma of having been born. And the compounds it enters, using the Borromean knot, with other elements—such as Lalangue and object petit a (**a**)— is suggesting of a *triadic* theme/turn in Lacan's thinking. But the Venn-diagram design of the Borromean knot (from the coat of arms of the Borromean family) is static. But his dynamics are *dualistic*.

Or, it at least, it appears to be irreductibly dualistic: almost in the mechanic sense of *something* acting unto something *else*. An alternative could be to look at the dynamics in triadic terms, that sums up in a fourth element (**a**). Such an attempt is made in the Gate-diagram below. Here we take the wisdom of the dividual subject **$** as *opus operatum* and apply it—in the manner of a *score*— and play it: considering **S₁** and **S₂** dual constraints (rather than in linear **agent—> other** relation), in regard of which the divided subject **$** (of the dividual) is brought into a provisional balance.

S₁ and **S₂** can feature the modus operandi of the dividual subject **$** and its "blind" counterpart. This is then the fictional counterpart—or alternative—to the revealing of illusion, that might be a core aspect of the psychoanalytical heritage (revealing we know, etymologically, amounts to the moving of the *veil*). While the counter-pressure between **S₁** and **S₂** is *interceptive*, in the sense that it is brought to individuate (Simondon), and as it does, connected at a trans-individual levels with commons, crowds or classes. Here, individuation moves *within* and *beyond* the commons.

This way of applying—and assigning—the basic framework that we owe to Jacques Lacan, within the workings of the *learning theatre* will define the challenge/task of mapping in the gap between **truth—>[agent—>other]—> impact** and **$—>[S₁—> S₂]—> a**, which here is *never* simply taken, nor assumed, to correspond *1-to-1*, but always is *contingent*: alongside and touching/bleeding, in the four modes of the same, similar, different and other. Indeed, this is how fiction (as defined above) is marked by the real. The *1-to-1* correspondence which Lacan appears to assume doesn't allow this.

What is more, the dividuality of *(1)* **truth—>[agent—>other]—> impact** makes the gap with *(2)* **$—>[S₁ —> S₂]—> a**, something that it contains within itself. So, it is *not* like two circuited systems, whole and integral, with a duality between them which can be overcome (whether it is assumed to be identical, as is my impression with Lacan, or contingent as here), but that **agent—>other** is non-identical to **truth—>impact**.Their relation is intrinsically *contingent*, in that contingency reverberates from these two—as same, similar, different and other—unto the relation between (1) and (2).

In sum, we have here determined a model of completeness that will apply under *suboptimal* conditions, and through its assignments, have the possibility to *level up*. Which is the point when thinking of a viable concept of practice for a radical democracy. Perhaps a figure what might pitch this idea for a new era is—as Nataliia Korotkova has pointed out—is *fermentation*: between human and natural, the raw and the cooked, between mineral and living, potential and real, pleroma and creatura (pneuma). In short, an alternative which Lacan made possible, but perhaps never realised. But that can be pursued along a different track by moving from Gobbledygook to Balderdash, and see if it is possible to establish a new narrative/prose for a world at need, which is critical of Deleuze (according to a method similar to what has been applied here to Lacan). A *cartographic* mode of approach to the problems of philosophy. And see whether there are viable linguistic strategies beyond authorship.

Fig. 3—this version of the GATE-diagram is simply called a. It features the objet petit a (or, the small object *ϰ*)