

Fig. 1—instructions at 07:01 am. What the result of the operation (leave hat on/take hat off) depends on the distribution: if the stick-men can all see each other, then the men 2, 4 and 4 will remove their hats. If not, only 5 will remove his hat. Contingency defines at two levels: at the level of operations, and the distributive level (the mutual visibility of the men).

What is contingency? If we define contingency as a *relation* resulting from the vectorial sum between *chance* and *adjacency*, it defines as proximal from afar/departing (i.e. about to either join or leave). In terms of verbal tense: gerund or future anterior. In time: in progress *or* about to conclude. Contingency thereby is time in a suspended state: a provisional time-will-show mode. Contingency determines the relation between (1) the *same* and the *similar*, (2) the *different* and the *other*, as well as (3) the *operative* (same-similar compound) and the *distributive* (different-other compound).

Which means that, as a *relation*, contingency determines an integrated condition *between* merger and separation: the same and similar (1) might alternately be merged/separated, as the different and other (2) or the operative and distributive (3). As in *quantum theory*, the question is whether contingency defines as a relation of fragmented uncertainty or integral complementarity. In the latter case, contingency has a status of its own: we stay with the trouble, we do not go into the problem-solving mode, instead we accept the meantime in the provisional modality of contingency.

More than anything, contingency features a form of *asymmetric* dependency: an operation depends on distribution, a distribution depends on operations, but *not* in the same way. We can relate to the same in operative and distributive aspects. In turn, operations and distributions may have *some* similar features, differ in *some* and be completely separate in *some*. Indeed, contingency may fruitfully define in/by conglomerates such as these: being in some aspects the *same*, in some *similar*, in some *different* and in some *other*. Auto-, endo-, iso- and exomorphic.

Contingency here defines a cartographic take on knowledge-foundations that can shift immersive investigations *from* assumption *to* assignment: featuring the *learning theatre* as the contraption within which such *mapping* can occur. That is, a semiotic theatre in which transitions from assumption to assignment as a transition from assumption to assignment can be worked out/made to occur. Here, mapping defines as the transition from assumption to assignment, and works directly on *doxa*: bringing together operative and distributive affordances that are effectively at work, in aspects that are the *same*, *similar*, *different* and *other*.

When we can ask “what do we do next?” it means that we have a map. The learning theatre is here defined as a headquarter—or, the camp—in a fieldwork-driven investigation. The cartographic take on *mapping* makes easy to conceive the contingent relation between the same, similar, different and other; simply because it can be *shown*. It is visible on the map (because it can be pictured and/or drawn). This is not the case, to the




Fig. 2—in the diagram contingency is expressed in the form of a group-homomorphism, in which the departure domain is the how the stick-men operate in function of mutual visibility, and an arrival domain featuring the distribution of the instructions among the stick-men. The function *f* maps the visibility unto the instructions.

same extent, with mapping in the sense of homomorphism. However, the virtue of the mathematical study of mapping is that it proposes an original definition of *semiotics* (as assignment).

That is, a foursquare definition of signification: where the sign is *never* given/assumed but results from a contingent assignment readable in the map. This is important because once the sign has been defined—whether in the *structural* or *pragmatic* tradition—it is also *assumed*. Which entails that its foundation in the *assignment* is lost. In the absence of assignment there is *no* map, and only *doxa*: which also means that there is *no* sign, and what we have is an *unsegmented* material. The problem has been studied by U. Eco in *A theory of semiotics*, but in rather convoluted terms.

The question is then whether the mathematical approach will yield a *less* convoluted framework for the study of signification. The need to establish an alternative foundation springs from the premise that *neither* the structural *nor* the pragmatic approach to semiotics, considers in clear and precise terms the *alternative* that there may be no map, and therefore no signs. That is, *doxa* in the purest definition that where everything that could have been sign, is assumed directly, sensorially and experientially (which it is always in *aspects*). They do *not* consider how signs are crowdsourced.

Hence the corollary: what are the conditions for signs to exist and operate under immersive conditions? Under immersive conditions we can move and work, think and act, with/out a map. The map intervenes politically, at the level of the *doxa*, by declaring a *right to partake of the life in the city*, so long as one defines one's pursuits in care of collective happiness (*ethics*). In other words, one is not obliged to partake of *doxa* (or, comply with it). The map unties my hands, and I can define my *own* pursuits—based on its existence—provided that I have the collective *good* in care.

So, what is democracy? Does it define from the *œcumene* of citizens—whose hands have been untied, yet bound by ethics—in a social contract based on the share-cropping between assumption and assignment? And what part do the people who are living by *doxa* alone (or, mainly) have in this form of democracy (beyond submitting their votes to a ballot at regular intervals)? In continuation of the same dilemma: is there a point in analysing alt-right populist candidates for democratic elections, in semiotic or journalist terms? Probably not: because they have wired truth to impact.

The established semiotic framework on the move. *If* our framework is the *rerouting* of operational and distributive aspects of what presently constitutes the political assignment, *then* the loop-of-assumption **agent** → **other** (*doxa*) expanded by the loop-of-assignment **truth** → **[agent** → **other]** → **impact** (*production*), can be mapped in terms of its assignments in various discursive frameworks (*reception*). Could we consider *doxa* as the equivalent of the *unconscious* under open conditions—beyond therapeutic confines? And how would that affect the theory of the unconscious?




Fig. 3—fractal SWIRL-diagram as defined in the body text. At each iteration contingency generates self-similarity.

As understood/practiced by Jacques Lacan, we accept that *doxa*—like the unconscious—is an enormous repository of knowledge, which is unknowing of its own nature and extension, then the relation between **agent** → **other** (*doxa*) and the assignment of the signifier expressed by Lacan as the signifier of the signifier ( $S_1 \rightarrow S_2$ ) is also the receptacle of the unconscious, taking stock of it:  $\$ \rightarrow [S_1 \rightarrow S_2] \rightarrow a$ . That is, contingently: in aspects that are the same, similar, different and other. Taking stock of unconscious as a knowledge.

Conceiving the *spiral* and inverted *s-line* in the swirl-diagram (*left*) as *operative* and *distributive* aspects of the compound, the joinery of these are also contingent: in aspects the same, similar, different and other. Which means that we can define a fractal that realistically will iterate *self-similarity* (which has been used to define a fractal). This fractal will serve to model the extent to which taking consciousness of the unconscious is possible: in principle (virtually) and -extension (actually): the aspect in which the unconscious is contingent on consciousness.