

Fig. 1 – If the Lacanian sequence of **truth**→**agent**→**other**→**impact** ■ is not considered as exchangeable for the discursive structure of **\$**→**S1**→**S2**→**a** ■ but linked up with it by the requisite variety of resemblance (same, similar, different and other) the changing relation between the two can be documented and be made readable in a Logbook

With Lacan, hysteria changed both in way a think about it and in extension. In his scope, hysteria could be clinically isolated owing to its diversity: the ability to move and redefine its symptoms. With Charcot underwent a first change in that its diverse forms were not acceptably considered as a variety under s single umbrella—with proliferating sub-typologies—but yet could *not* be contained by a clinical institution. The Freud turned a new page, by adopting a non-responsive demeanour to its invites. With Lacan hysteria is broadened and *structurally*, rather than historically, defined.

In the scope of *psychoanalysis* the symptom of the hysteric is a *question*, it will cause itself to be explained by the *other*, while escaping objectification once named. Its demand naming is seductive. It says: *I will be whatever you want me to*—enticing the other—only *to move on and change*, once the other gives in (who is then dismissed as incompetent). In [Gérard Wajcman](#)'s perspective Lacan's discursive scope on hysteria, invites us to consider hysteria as the revelation of an aspect of the *unconscious* in general: that the unconscious is not knowing/*unknowing* of its knowledge.

A problem I see in Wajcman's presentation of Lacan—of which I would need to know more—is the shift that moves the relation between the *agent* and the *other* is that the two can be *substituted* by the signifier  $S_1$  and the signifier of this signifier  $S_2$ : the latter speaking in the name of the former. In the sense that they are the *same* (and therefore can be exchanged). But if they are considered as in contingent relation (alongside and touching) they resemble one another, but *cannot* be taken as the same and the swapped. Since resemblance includes the *same*, *similar*, *different* and *other*.

Instead, one may consider that hysteria results from the swap, and as such has something in common with the project of psychoanalysis itself: it is not directly concerned with the **truth**→**agent**→**other**→**production** sequence, but swaps it for the con-sequence **\$**→**S1**→**S2**→**a**, where the substitution will entail the *simulation* and *erasure* of the first sequence. If such be the case, the logic of transference and counter-transference would be imminent. Simply because the first sequence will *not* be erased completely. It may be simulated up to a point, treated as though identical and then retrieved at some *cathartic* turn.



Fig. 2—Sphinx at the entrance of the [Růfolium Concert Hall](#) in Prague (1885)

Which then means that it is a special case of the broader scope, aimed at by Lacan, which is residually clinical in its method. And also that the Borromean check and balance between *lalangue*, *sinthome* and the *object little a* could be an archaeological residue of a clinical practice, needed to make a neurosis convertible to the general human condition, remaining specialised rather than theoretical in a philosophical sense. In my reading, however, developing sensitivity and skill at modeling agency-other relationship contingent to the discursive machinery of psychoanalytic language, might be more consistent with the application of the discursive intelligence in Lacan's brilliant understandings of the *quarter turn*. 90° turn in the diagram (Fig. 3).

Here the passage from the *operative* to the *distributive* modes of hysteria, could reveal a passage from the operative to distributive *modes* at each turn: that is, starting with *mastery*, moving on to *hysteria*, then proceeding by *analysis* and ending up with the *university* discourse. I prefer this route, because it places hysteria closer to mastery, than proceeding the opposite way (from mastery to university, analysis and hysteria). This is because I intuit a internal connection between the manoeuvres of hysteria and the existence of *art*: and, what is more, of art *education*.

It proposes not to be primarily a linguistic exercise, but enters rich and complex errands with language. While the frontline of the education is practice—ideas in the making *through* making articulating *in* the made—the linguistic exchange is quite extant, but at the backdrop. Hence, the relation between *teacher* and *student* can in aspects be similar (at least in some phases) to the hysteric discourse; in that the learners seduce answers from the the master, but when succeeded in getting the much wanted response, will move and diversify their practice, in a dismissive way.

Here Lacan's turn on the matter may have been moving the complex from Œdipus to the Sphinx. The sphinx-complex is more *open* than Œdipus in cases where it is culturally inscribed in the artistic demeanour: a pose that comes with the affordances of the artistic way, path and practice-based reflection. However, in some cases the complex *appears* to be œdipal, and locked to a cumbersome exchange with the few professionals with *university* education who teach at art schools: students/teachers who resist the idea that art-work should have a *point* beyond art.

That is, the right—up to a point—for the artist to be absorbed in practice, relegating the exercise of having *points to make* to university academics and being generally dismissive to it (even as the teaching as as far removed from that as possible). Once something is framed as *academic* it no longer works. Here, the discourse of the hysteric defines in that the student (in this phase or stable mode) appears to be (sometimes sensationally) *ignorant*, while at odd turns may reveal *extant* knowledge: it reminds the knowledge of the unconscious...to be unknowing of one's knowledge.

In aspects, this mode is part of the art-school culture: in its avidity for academic response—of which it remains “ignorant”—it will crave and seduce it, while moving on and diversifying when it is obtained. Hysteria is, in this sense, profoundly ingrained into the *ethos* of art-school. It is at once seductive and dismissive of academic knowledge. In time, however, a number of practitioners, in the art school framework, have diversified their their relation to the university discourse (Lacan). That is, it will give some snippets to that discourse that are relevant (e.g. with artistic research).

This too, is compatible with the functioning of the unconscious according to Lacan. They evolve into knowing agents whom—in their relationship to others—will acknowledge that they have some points to make and errands beyond the art-sphere, that will have changed over time, and is a player in a larger cultural sphere. Arguably, they have moved *from* illusion *to* fiction. *Illusion* is a world unto itself, that contains its own reality. Fiction as in oblique relation to reality ([Salman](#)

[Rushdie](#)) and being marked by it, in a variety of ways. Illusion is untouchable. Fiction is contingent in its relation to the *university* discourse.

Illusion submits to the master and is contingent to *analysis* (which has a place at art school). Having students keep logbooks is a way for the teacher to not engage as a psychoanalyst. It is a bridge between the analytical and university discourse. The logbook will, at some junctures, require a synthesis and overview. Yet, providing —at the same time—the considerable power of the unconscious with sufficient space. Moving art from the defensive position of the riddle, to an education for life-long learning with the *machine* (Fig. 3). The question is, then, how we efficiently can move from *therapy* (as the paradigm of psychoanalysis) to *teaching*.




Fig. 3—The four Lacanian discourses brought together as a single model (i.e. a non-repetitive) series, linked by the quarter turn of the terms in the diagrams belong (moving clockwise). The black square marks a *punctum*. Break, pause, decision, new ground zero