

Fig. 1—The cartography of *exomorphism*: featuring a map of a process that arguably would move on without dispute nor exchange—on the contrary, intentional annihilation may result precisely from a place beyond dispute and exchange. We are here discussing whether intentional annihilation should contain a sub-clause: the annihilation of intention.

As things are, we need to ask: how do we detect and define *intentional annihilation*? To what extent does the 'annihilation of intention' serve to recognise the systematic degradation of someone, or something, till it no longer exists? The gradual habituation to exceptional measures—to protect something of unquestionable value—till they are no longer exceptional, but become routine of a kind to generate a special form of transparent invisibility. And when is such annihilation intentional?

Prima facie the annihilation of intention is included into intentional annihilation, in the sense that *if* 'intentional annihilation' is a domain, *then* 'annihilation of intention' is a subdomain (or, subgroup) of that domain/group. It could then be defined as that *troublesome* mode of homomorphism—in the cartographic sense—we have coined *exomorphism* ***f***. For instance, *if* the domain of *departure* is 'precautionary measures' *then* we could understand 'annihilation of intention' as an *image* of ***f***.

From a kernel—***ker (f)***—of 'precautionary measures' we would thereby have a chance of understanding 'annihilation of intention' as a *distributive* domain; w/—***im(f)***—resulting from the mapping a core of 'precautionary measures' unto 'annihilation of intention'. It is likely that e.g. *genocide starts* with **(a)** the 'annihilation of intention', **(b)** mobilisation, and expands to **(c)** 'intentional annihilation'. We should not lock this discussion to genocide, even though it is a clear example (cf, Wannsee): it happens through a *reverse* mapping from the domain of *arrival* to the domain of *departure* (**Fig.1**).

If the kernel [***ker(f)***] are precautionary measures in the form of violence, then the *annihilation of intention*—through routing/habituation—is the potential hatching ground for *intentional annihilation* (in which case measures are *not* precautionary any more). During the two public hearings at the ICJ (International Court of Justice), convened January 11th and 12th by 15 judges (2 *ad hoc* judges) and presided by H.E. Joan Donoghue, the South African (January 11th) and the Israeli (January 12th) delegations both featured 'innumerable & nameless' entities in their cases: **i)** in South Africa's case the Hamas; **ii)** in Israel's case Palestinian people in Gaza.

Fig. 2—during Hamas terrorist attack about 1200 people were killed. Exhibit in Tel Aviv University October 22nd 2023. Photo by Yonatan Sindel/Flash90.

They are nameless-and-innumerable in the adjacent sense that the victims of the atrocities committed by Hamas October 7th 2023, were *named* and *counted* in Tal Becker's introductory pitch on the public ICJ hearing's 2nd day. The underlying premise of the counterpoint—fuzzy-and-innumerable identities—is the problem that is tentatively discussed here: the hatching of the intent of annihilating someone/something *completely* (beyond the expected war casualties). The roots of this intention in the kind of numbness to people—or, to substantial elements of trouble—in a plea, defence or plan: the passage from an operational to a distributive logic: *from* one that is implied, *to* one disseminated.

When formulated in this way, we become aware of an underlying premise that is *much more* common than the hatching of an *actual* plan of annihilation. Which means that one must step gingerly before deriving the latter (intentional annihilation) from the former (the annihilation of intention). But in the mentioned example from the ICJ hearings, the applicant (South Africa [S.A.]) and the litigant (Israel) both accuse each other of numbness to public matters (res publica): the existence and humanity of the Palestinian people (S.A.), and the existence and crimes of the Hamas (Israel).

Hamas was not addressed by S.A. because it is not a state, and therefore is not subject to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of genocide. Neither are the Palestinians a foreign power, since the conflict departs from contesting claims on the same territory since 1948 (since expanded beyond the framework of the UN resolution). Part of the context of the applicant, is the history of Apartheid in S.A., and the emergence of a new type of society in the wake of the extensive work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission there. Israel did not mention this context.

Israel, however, did articulate another context relevant to the circumstance: that of the Nazi genocide of 6 million Jews (the names of whom are recorded in the archives of Yad Vashem). Furthermore the Israeli delegation focussed mainly on the nation's right to defend itself against the attacks of an enemy: both as a substantial claim, to argue that the case presented was *not* under the ICJ's jurisdiction, that S.A. had no case, that ICJ should remove the court-case from its list. No concession was made (explicitly): it was a case for good statesmanship in destroying the opposing view.

In the parlance of management: where S.A.'s approach was *bottom-up*—focussing on the facts of the ground in Gaza; Israel's approach was *top-down*—focussing on the *institutional* level and its work (both at the state, military and legal levels). Adding to this there are two other players: the one is *Hamas*—whose programme is articulately genocidal, but is not a state; the *4th party* are the people who take pictures and circulate them, often in real time, on the internet. In both hearings, the litigants showed some restraint in sharing such (typically inconclusive) material as "proof".

That is, *nothing* to illuminate the points already being made, but merely to *illustrate* them. Much of it is not likely to count as evidence. They are significant to people with *operational* ground-knowledge of field-facts. The content of the images was mainly *distributive* (non-operational): damage, duress, launching sites and logistic exchange-points. What is of importance in the image is what they map *from* unknown field-operations. Intention obliterates: in most cases, we cannot know what we see. We are limited to gauge the utility of the consequences of showing the pictures, in terms of the values held by the presenter.

Fig. 3—4 of six camera angles used by the TV-broadcasting team during the hearing. The litigants were well prepared and were brought to listen to each other for a total of about 7 hours. S.A. delegation—Ronald Lamola, Adila Hassim, Tembeka Ngcukaitobi, John Dugard, Max du Plessis, Blinne Ni Ghralaigh, Vaughan Lowe and Vusimuzi Madonsela. Israel's delegation: Tal Becker, Malcolm Shaw, Galit Rajuan, Omi Sender, Christopher Staker, Gilad Noam.

What we need to determine is the *awareness* on the part of the actors, of the connection between acts (operations in Gaza) and their *specific results*. That is, moving beyond the nameless-and-innumerable. And establishing a fact-finding mission and determining the *awareness* of what thereby is found. In managerial terms the role of the ICJ—given this methodological framework—would be neither top-down nor bottom-up, but *middle-out*. Since this outcome was implied but *beyond* the reach of each litigant, it still provides a substantial *focus*-area within which they potentially could converge. It would also serve to determine where/not intentional annihilation (or, imminent danger of genocide) applies. Q.E.D.