



Rolling frontispiece on the homepage of [P.A.R.T.S.](#) If the exchange of parts, in the discussion below, is punned with the P.A.R.T.S. school in Brussels, it is a splendid example of metalepsis. Making common notions work for the singular and unique, which is essential when partnering arts and politics.

In Saul Kripke's *Naming and necessity* (1980) rigid designators with the same reference are necessarily identical: names are intercepted from chains of communication, even as we think that what they refer to is determined by description. They come through the backdoor of transindividual exchange—as recently discussed by [Bojana Cvejic](#) (2023)—and articulate with Baruch Spinoza's practice of *common notions*: notions that are not common, in the sense of widespread, but common in the sense of *historically* articulate, and under the "radar" of individual *description*.

Spinoza, in this sense, proposed a way *around* the Mediaeval diatribe between nominalism and realism. In his Hebrew grammar, he leans toward the position that all words are names. In his magnum opus *Ethica*, his analysis of 'the human comedy' articulates on the backdrop of nature, the real is ultimate inasmuch as it is singular/unique. The common notions emerge at the *intersection* of these two tendencies: it is through Spinoza's practice of them that we get to understand what they are. In a way reminding late Wittgenstein's notion that words are defined by use.

In Bojana Cvejic's practice, solidarity is a *common notion*. In the article referred to above, she explores—within an activist interpretation of Spinoza with which I agree—how solidarity is a *name* for something that articulates in the activist mobilisation she relates from Attica, Catalonia and Spain, and in Zagreb. These are in some aspects *unique* to their context. In other aspects, they are *possible worlds*: in the sense that they feature *a priori* equiprobable worlds in minds of the readership, who will apply them as alternative scenarios on site, where/ever they are located. With a *conatus* in various fictional/real ratios (cf, below).

Possible worlds (Kripke) are basically worlds that are unresolved in their relation to the *entire* world: so they do *not* claim a world order, but possibility. As such they could complement the giving and receiving of parts which Cvejic—in her mobilisation of Étienne Balibar—articulates in her performative understanding of how affects can be activated from slumbering human desire. This attempt may be of some importance if solidarity (as a common notion) only existed in some possible worlds, while in other not. Which could, for instance, be used to support views that solidarity is essentially of an illusory nature. The we could have a world even without mercantile solidarity.

Which is a fairly standard basic assumption of right wing *doxa*. A contending strategy—to this relatively facile ideological claim—is to abandon the logic of *basic assumption groups* ([Bion](#)), which right wing groups often are, to work groups where assumptions are abandoned for assignments that keep activism tethered to a causal level, in a sense that yields historical material: trans-individually *assigned*



Taking the part for the whole yields different takes on possible worlds: the example, the synecdoche and the metonym.

singularly *embodied* and uniquely *mobilised* collective achievements. If by cause, we understand the multi-layered category expounded by [Arthur Schopenhauer](#): cause-effect, premise-consequence, geometrical equivalence and ethics. That is, the interleaved causal category of history.


Here solidarity is not an illusion, but the name of an historical achievement *across* possible worlds. If so, solidarity is *not* an illusion. It is a *name* for something real surfacing—through the performative rungs of practice—as a *common notion*. Then we *cannot* assume that in some worlds solidarity *doesn't* refer to anything, while in other worlds it *does*. That being said, we obviously *cannot* assume that solidarity *exists* even as it *refers* to something real: the point being that solidarity refers to something *also* where there is none. It is fictional, though *not* an illusion.

Illusion is a world unto itself that contains its own reality. While fiction is always in desire of the real: it is *conative*. Between the slumbering desire and the activated affect there is an while *spectrum* of different ratios of fiction/reality ideology. Performance is what changes that ratio. Not in the sense that the aim must be to transmute *all* fiction *into* reality, since the *unique* is readily prompted by the *singular*: realisation is prompted by fictionalisation. At this point, the question of whether these extensions of mine from Cvejic and Kripke, are simply turns of *dialectical materialism*.

In my readings, the trans-individual (whether defined by Balibar or by Simondon), tends to be caught in Adorno and Benjamin's [negative dialectics](#): that is, there is no synthesis from a thesis and antithesis—featured e.g. by nominalism and realism—but only *mediations*. Hence, the temptation to attach trans-individual communicative chains in performance to what [Eleni Ikonidou](#) discussed as the *medial zone*. Not medial in the sense of restricted to *media*, but medial in the sense of *performative activism* that also includes media (usefully but *not* rigidly instrumental).

Seeing that art-school as a *training-grounds* for learning (performatively) the individual-collective connection, is the significance I attach to the *learning theatre*. The theory curriculum—featuring 3 courses over a period of 3 terms—is practiced as an *incubation* for this sort of education. That is, in anticipation and postponement of political mobilisation. A readiness-potential as it were. To sustain solidarity in the deep ecology of learning repertoires, where solidarity is name that refers to something in the modality of necessity, and cultivated through practice as a common notion.

However, what is solidarity if it can/has to be learned? In Spinoza's philosophy it similar to freedom. That is, a common notion which when named refers to something that is not illusory, but may be—under alienated conditions—for the most part fictional, supported by disparate examples and one that engages the literary imagination. But it is not (as Cvejic points out) mobilised in a political sense. That art-school education proposes a movement of the bar between imagination and mobilisation: that is, toward mobilisation in anticipation and postponement. A *scholarly contract*: what is it? Is it dialectical or something else?



The problem which is not discussed here, but suggested is what doesn't add up in dialectics, can be adequately addressed in triolectic work (A. Jorn). Here  $T_0$  determines possible worlds,  $T_1$  solidarity as a *common notion*, and  $T_2$  solidarity as a *name* with a *reference*. Size is not importance.

The embodiment of *scholè* as affect in life-long education, may facilitate mobilisation, but is not itself mobilisation. The role of parts-to-whole in learning, features in the form of more/less tightly knit cluster of *examples*: it is, in this sense, paradigmatic ([Agamben](#)). It features, for instance, in the form of a *logbook*/[research portfolio](#). However, it needs not be pledged to the causal chains of communicative interaction: perhaps one might say that it feeds off such chains with a minor contribution from time to time. It is located between the unaccountable *metonyms* of the mercantile world and the *synecdoches* of work-life.

The work of study may be political on hold because it awaits the truth of things: since the exchange of parts is not only equal, but hinge on [differences that make a difference](#). Thus our contemporary sense of the medial zone as flickering between passive assumption and active assignment. And to figure which one it is, we may have to regularly put the exchange of parts completely to rest. Relating to the medial at the level of its footprints in our present form of life. We are at the beginning of this work.