

"The term theory derives from the ancient Greek *theoria*, a pilgrimage undertaken to a foreign place to see a religious festival or to consult an oracle, in which the *theoros* is the individual who makes such a journey on his or her community's behalf.' Plato's *Republic* begins with an account of such an undertaking: **SOCRATES**. I walked down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to make my prayers to the goddess. As this was the first celebration of her festival, I wished also to see how the ceremony would be conducted. The Thracians, I thought, made as fine a show in the procession as our own people, though they did well enough. The prayers and the spectacle were over, and we were leaving to go back to the city, when from some way off Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us." [...]



[...] The theoretic voyage was thus one that was an enactment of solidarity, though at the same time it demanded physical and psychological discipline and endurance from the *theoros* and entailed periods of solitude: The early Greek *theoria* was not a private matter, an individual intellectual or professional path leading away from home and native place, family and community, and supported by them every step of the way. Theory, the journey to new and more comprehensive insight, and practice, the living of daily life, were not divorced. Theorizing did not lead only outward and forward, in the linear style of modern thought, but back to the hearth and the polis.

Plato's *Republic* thus begins with precisely such a scene: Socrates has been at the Piraeus, the port of Athens—about six miles from Athens proper, connected to Athens by the Long Walls, two parallel walls six hundred feet apart—where he has witnessed the first festival held in honor of the Thracian goddess Bendis and been struck by the impressiveness of the foreigners' prayer and procession. As he returns home with Glaucon, Polemarchus approaches them and initiates the dialogue without which the history of Western thought is unthinkable. And here, at the outset of the *Republic*, we find the "interhuman intrigue" that has, perhaps since this very moment when it emerges out of the interruption of Socrates' theoretic voyage, been Western thought's "unthought".

[Thompson, Chris. (2011). *Felt—Fluxus*, Joseph Beuys and the Dalai Lama, the MIT Press.]

Being trained as an anthropologist can entail closing on a defined *circuit* of references, which is necessary to have any purchase as a professional anthropologist. However, it can also extend as a *modus operandi* extending *beyond* this circle of references. That is, when the professional training as an anthropologist is focussed on the expanding of *participatory* methods.

That is, within and beyond the current fieldworker repertoire, that can bring the research quite far off anthropological readability—even legibility—and recognition. The point being that intellectuality cannot be determined by the precincts of the anthropological pensum, at a given time. The chances are the anthropological training hatches an intellectual ability to *respond* beyond this.

Which is the point—after all—of the participatory methods developed with the discipline: if it is developed *within* the discipline, it must also go *beyond* in order to work. It may also have to go beyond the anthropological training in order to work: after all, the people in settings where fieldwork takes place, are often oblivious to the fact of existence of anthropology & anthropologists.

The time spent by anthropologists on explaining anthropology and validating anthropologists, could be an impact of of this *aporia*: in order to work, the methods used by the anthropologist must go and reach *beyond* the boundary of the subject, and her definition/identity as an anthropologist. Otherwise, there will be *no* fieldwork. So, in turn, s/he spends a lot of time *representing*.

Representing the subject and representing the people s/he has done fieldwork with. While an alternative, clearly, is to consider the theorising which is indigenous to the anthropological professional realm simply as an addition to what is already achieved through fieldwork: that is alongside, or adjacent, to doing research *with*. It is sustainable through its *proximal* relationship.

And therefore *not* by representation. It can claim credibility through the integrity of the human document—the assemblage made up by the pool of ethnographic and anthropological effort—rather *than* by representation, and interpretation. Thereby abandoning the idea that a foreign material would *need* interpretation and representation: as these may well be colonial ideas.

Correspondingly, the anthroponomic scope takes stock of what is needed to move beyond what has been coined Euro-provincialism: or, what we, more broadly, may understand by anthro-provincialism. Moving our focus to what things are for humans—their advantage and their future—to an observational mode: here, anthroponomy is the equivalent of astronomy vs. astrology.

If the range of the proximal extends—through cartographic intermedia of *deep surfaces* as models—extends from the most intimate to the remotest recesses of time, then there are *two* attributes (Spinoza) that a stratified approach to references express in different modes: i.e., *thought* and *extension*. The cartographic fiction marked by reality features a *vectorial sum* between the two.

The criterion for accepting the complexity of referential strata is that we have moved from illegibility to readability. That which, given some work, can be comprehended *without* being contained: be it as fe/male containership, or other forms of appropriation (those, particularly, overlooking the detail of the weft of context and substance when an interface is *moved* and rescaled).