


What strikes me about Timothy Williamson's little book—*I'm right you're wrong* (2015)—is how English one can be. The other thing that strikes me is that the four-way dialogue (it is a tetralogue) is that the whole book takes place on a train, in a compartment shared by Sarah, Bob, Zac and Roxanne.

An alternative title could have been *Oxford in a train-compartment*. Nothing is there to alter the characters through the philosophical tetralogue—coming out as an Agatha Christie story (without a murder plot)—in the idle framework of train journey, where the characters together have some “English time” to kill.

Taking on the voices of superstition, science, relativism and logic, there are a number of topics that will never cross their path. For instance, double negation and occasional cause. Of course, it entertainingly ends up in nothing. *Double negation* has a knack of emerging with the occasional forays of the SELF.



How can the format of the *panel* feature the journey with the self? It is easy to mistake our intuition of the self—given that it is a sense and a notion—with *identity*. However, the self may be closer to individuality than to identity. And based on the insight that *individuality* comes with information/communicates.

This alternative path emerges with the realisation that identity is really tricky. Generally, we agree that ' $5 + 7 = 12$ '. But we also agree that ' $6 + 6 = 12$ '. Yet, we immediately see that ' $5 + 7$ ' and ' $6 + 6$ ' contain different (numeric) information. While the expression ' $12 = 12$ ' is the only one here that states identity.

If the two first expressions determine relations of identity, they also constitute *numeric* individuals. The numeric individuals ' $5 + 7$ ' and ' $6 + 6$ '. Which means that even sums—seen from the vantage point of the individual—are vectors. Based on this view, numbers are *not* arithmetic entities decomposed/merged.

If we assume that the self is troublesome as long as it is an entity that calls jointly on identification and differentiation—e.g. the text as a self caught and defined by a hermeneutic circle—it can be *alternatively* conceived at the juncture between the two, in terms of *individuation*: as a generative process.

It could e.g. explain why/how a process can generate form, and that this possibility and the possibility of individuation are aspects of the same. That is, they both relate to the *self*: that is, the *agent intellect*, according to Aristotle. To which our (philosophical) soul cleaves by giving form.

A similar idea is formulated in the Kabbalist text *Sefer Yetzirah*: the book of *formation*. Here we are initiated into the categories of *emptiness* and their work. Entailing that emptiness is not really empty. Beyond language there are signs. Beyond signs there is agency. Agency is a container with a mind.

That is, a mind of its *own*. This is what we mean by the self. In Jungian terms, integrating the self—as the hallmark of individuation—the ego, persona, shadow and anima/animus are no longer agents (with an occasional frustrating autonomy), but are instead protagonists of the *self*. Its makeshift characters.

In the realm of the self, language *cannot* be exhaustive: even as it appears to be exhausted it is not. When it comes to signs, they are mirrors rather than mimes. Language and signs are vectorial components of agency, featuring *individuals* in the realm of the self. Here belonging, *not* identity, is currency.

The logic of the self hinges on our acceptance that there is something—which is *not* us—which is, as Spinoza states, a thinking thing: *substance*. Substance reflects in the relation between form and matter, and then features the individual. And there is an argument to support that it might be like this.

Learning that some things *only* can be understood by doing—that is, by agency—comes hard for humans. We would like to understand it beforehand by calculation. We can anticipate agency by *doing* things in our imagination. It is a psycho-somatic process. But the understanding relating to the self, as an intellect that is not us, is linked to the act *itself*: because it *includes* making.