



Scenery-photo

What is it that changes in the *scenery*-photo when juxtaposed to a photo of a *path through a forest grove*? The photo above shifts from being proposed as a metonym of certain kind of *coastal nature*, to appear in synecdoche with a *walk*. While the former is part of a *discours*, the latter partakes of a *parcours*.

However, this transformation of the image is *not* complete: it does *not* make the discourse, nor the landscape, *obsolete*. Rather it features an instance of how an operational circle (*parcours*) includes a social circle (*discours*), in a way that the social circle does not: *parcours* does *not* eradicate *discours*.

However the reverse does not hold. A scenery can be *spoken for* in hermetic terms that are *unlinked* from the operational circle (featuring, in this case, the walk). The experience of the scenery is then *isolated*; promises are made that it can be acquired by *other* means. Significance *ranks over* happening.



Path-photo

The function of the synecdoche is *deictic*, while the function of the metonym is *emblematic*. One to *indicate*, the *other* to flag. For a synecdoche to be effective the *part-whole* needs to be established in some *operational* aspect, whereas the metonym features the *whole-part* [ideologically](#).

Thus, there is a *mereological* difference between the synecdoche and the metonym: the one being ontic, the other deontic. Evidently, they feature the part-whole in different, non-identical, aspects. One relating to what might be called the *operational* circle. The other relating to the *social* circle.

In the scope of the synecdoche, what is materially *rich* differs from what is what is the material *wealth* of a metonym: material *richness* is a quality of sensory-motor experience on account of the operational reference of the synecdoche; while the verbal affluence of discourse marks the metonym.

The synecdoche can be materially rich, while the material wealth of the metonym can be comparatively poor. Here *parcours* beats *discours*. But it is often the reverse; that is, whenever bespeaking and cultivating *labels* provoke the *externalisation* of forces, causes, operations, labour and work.

This provokes a lateral drift in the social circle *away* from a range of life-forms, that define themselves *pervasively* through their *immersion* in their operational circle, thereby rendered socially marginal. Resulting not only in economic *disadvantage*, but leading to the marginalisation of *life-ways*.

It is difficult to imagine a distance between them greater than in our present economic situation. Liberalism festoons the hegemony of metonymic culture. It is about the celebration of labels—brands and corporate—and the development of a discursive relation to reality: the externality of the world.

Metonymy is here understood to operate as a “semiotic drain”, boosting linguistic inflation (*discours* before *parcours*). How can we similarly imagine—in counterpoint—a cultural hegemony of the synecdoche? That is, in some sense, a world *richer* in semiotics (*parcours* before *discours*).

The change envisaged here is not total, but constitutes a proposition of *partial* change. It suggests *anamorphosis* as a model of change, over metamorphosis (total change). It is compatible with a world redrawn to listen, even as no word is spoken. Signs that stand to *witness* when they do not speak.

Here, signs are *not* understood as the large signifying elements of discourse (Roland Barthes)—thought to extend, embed or supplement language—but signifying entities that *differently* assemblaged than by *grammar*. Instead, signs are assemblaged in relations of *practical pertinence* (Luis Prieto).

A *road sign* with a blue frame centred on the depiction of a *knife* and *fork*, is *not* to replace the word ‘restaurant’ *but* to guide your movements—driving, cycling or walking—to get there: it is *not* a metonym for a *linguistic* term, but a *synecdoche* plugged unto the assemblage of an ongoing operation.