It is *not* business—*nor*, economics—that is killing our long term livelihood, but its *automation*. The metonymic logic of sampling parts to tag wholes and *substitute* them (an elliptic logic, or logic of elopement) has become tremendously *accelerated* by opting for a certain *direction* of tech-development.

The question of how to intervene with this therefore coincides with how to turn *from* metonymy *to* synecdoche: what are the technological possibilities that might bring us in this direction, and turn away from the present path. If linked to lineage/provenance we need to heed the growth of *hyper-objects*.

That is, enterprises of such a scale that the way they *mesh* (Morton) is *beyond* our scope: they are enumerable *no longer*, and become *fuzzy* and *dark*. That is, the growth of *fuzzy identities* prone to solicit violent opposition. The logic is—as always—simplex: that is small, complexity-generating, steps.

The *coded access* to a cause—conveyed by *technical* means—conjures an actor which is possible to *buy* into. The whole gamut of universal natural cause, technology and finance can thus be described from a *terrestrial* vantage point; since it defines a realm of *transduction* of natural cause.

It does not proceed directly from universal laws of physics—as life itself—but of their transformation. And pertaining to Latour's simile of [Gregor Samza](#) we are already armed with vehicles we call *beetles* (VW). Arguably all cars turn us into scarabs. In our shell, as the living earth in the universe.

One difference between this and what Latour actually *wants* therefore lies in his notion of *lineage*: money wants *exclusive access*, while at the same time *limited responsibility*, while lineage—relating descriptively and responsively to it—is to extend the *accountability* upstream/downstream of the *act*.

At this point, the difference *between* synecdoche *and* metonym is 'a difference that makes a difference'. The synecdoche is the *semiosis* of *lineage*, which will also see economics in a lineage *perspective*. The reverse is *not* true of the metonym, since it proceeds by *simulation* and *substitution*.

But then we *cannot* simply skip the old Quaker maxim, which is *doing well while doing good*. We have to give corporate responsibility the benefit of the doubt. That a share of corporate actors are up for developing life-conditions and are *not* single minded actors bent on cash-cropping earth-harvests.

Automated *responses* conveyed by *digital* automation is not likely to do the job. And apparently it is not *enough* for money streams to be *traceable*, as *bills* have been replaced by *bits*. The Bit-Coin experiment is a prime example of that: the environmental *cost* of removing banks is a *huge* energy bill.

If claims of responsibility are *emptied* by the *inability* to respond—on account of the impact of automated finances on business—then this is where the *downwards spiral* is located, and not in business *per se*. Which means that it is the restriction on the 'ability to respond' that must be focal.

What *increases* and what *diminishes* the ability to respond by simply *doing business*? This is the question that we need to ask if we want the future of the earth to include business plans at all (which Bruno Latour seems to oppose). And also to ask whether a *philanthropic* plan is sufficient.

That is, like Bill Gates, to *give away* large amounts of money after first making *huge amounts* of them. What is it possible to do with the *automation of finances* when the situation is that we are *not* going back to bills (that is, in some sense, manual finances—fetching, carrying, counting and using *bills*).

That is, the transition from money as mass-produced *multiples* in controlled amounts—which requires banking—to money as a hyper object, like plastic, that has strictly speaking ceased to be enumerable, are increasingly *fuzzy* and have a *dark* side: they are meshed in ways *beyond* us. Alienating.