




How do we account for intuition? If I say that “a diagram with an inner and outer circle is like the iris of the human eye”, this makes *intuitively* sense. When we add elements to the circles—on this basic assumption—we add *precision* to our initial statement. Whether in relation to *colour* or the *hands*.

The eye and colours: Goethe's colour wheel (from the theory of colours), above. The eye and the hands: the Bauhaus curriculum below. Both are organised as an inner and outer circle, emulating the human eye. Goethe bridges colours to *aesthetic* qualities, Bauhaus centres the *building* site.

A way to account for the intuition that a diagram with an inner and outer circle is an iris, here features *two* precisations: the one involving colour perception, the other involving the hands. Adding the education of the senses (*precision 1*) and the the wisdom of the hands (*precision 2*).



In response to Harald's presentation last time—and the ensuing exchange—it is timely to address some basic assumptions that we regularly bring on from our mainstream education: namely, that we define knowledge in terms of “lack”. Something that we *don't have* and *must acquire*. How so?

What if we turn this upside-down and *think of knowledge as something we have*, and must account for? Instead of asking “how do I know what I know?”—which is mining the knowledge field with [Cartesian doubt](#)—we can ask “why do I know what I know?”. The fact that we know. *Mysterious!*

At art-school we spend a considerable amount of time on developing this kind of knowledge, which is intuitive. It is achieved through a specific kind of work—of adding and removing, going in and taking a step back—and it is quite interesting that we can achieve knowledge in this way. How can we?

I will pick just two from Brian Eno and Norman Potter: **1) retrace your steps** [Eno]; **2) propose discourse** [Potter]. I could have made another pick, but I will stay with just these two, because one can use Norman Potter's literalist precepts to *retrace one's steps*, and the Eno-deck to *propose discourse*.

That is, to organise an *exchange*. Because when we develop intuition we understand things directly—we know *what* things are and *how* to act—and we can *use* for instance Norman Potter's precepts to retrace our steps, to share with others, and as we *argue* our position we can propose discourse.

Both of these procedures, or approaches, are active when we do *book presentations* in class. Because as your present, your *retrace your steps* of how you found the book—or, it found you—proceed sensorially through the book itself, and then account for what you take with you as you close it.

When you make your *interview-based design comments* you are *proposing discourse*. Not in words, since this term you do not disseminate your text-work, but intercepting something essential in the interviews, reflecting it with a twist, and—as it were—*looking back* at whom you interviewed.

Together these two develop intuition. Not only as something you have—because design provides you with this artistic education—but something that you can account for and share. I gather that this is one of, for instance, Harald's reasons for having embarked on the MA-programme. *I will ask him.*

So, maybe time is now for wrapping up this flyer by stating that *I started out with one question*—as a conversation starter—and ended up with a *better one*. That is, one that will add precision and clarity to our concern with intuition. Maybe a major harvest from the discussions we have had so far?

Thus, we are back to one of Nina's questions again. How much should I know to know enough? And how do I proceed without the baggage of a foundation course? For my part, I think that an answer to both questions could be that *we know and proceed by developing intuitive precision.*