Here a protocol for field-knowledge is proposed. It is a protocol for learning in the field. When the field is our learning-theatre, the protocol for learning to take place is called a programme. It is taken in the sense of Karl Gerstner —instead of solving problems, programming for solutions. Field-solutions.

Field-solutions are considered as facets of becoming skilled in moving, resting and sojourning in a particular landscape. If expanded to include reading and writing/drawing—in modes that are non-mimetic but indigenous to the landscape—then the skill is transformed into fieldwork.

The point being that theorising—under such conditions—does not lead to insights that automatically comprehend, or are applicable to, other situations. Field-theories are therefore provisional & comparative. Wether what is learned can be transposed, depends on a *non-theoretic* point of EXIT.

In Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss' work there is some ambiguity as to whether his notion of elementary logic is dialectic, algorithmic or *both*. If the last option has been selected, as the preferred one, it is because the digital —as writing—is considered as a human power machine-like contraption.

That is, it is *not* considered an automat. Even when the contraption has some automatic components. What they do can be called work only by association to human beings. The idea of combining chance methods and precisation phases in human activity and the passive side of machines.

The precisation-algorithm has two main instances: one is general, the other is specific. The general instance says: if a statement U comes after a statement T—or, other similarly ordered adjacent relationship between the two—then U is taken as a precisation of T (and is included into its circle).

The specific instance says: given the general instances of precisation, the relation between T and U will be reversed (i.e. T will be included in U's circle). These are the two operations that it takes to define the critical phases of two circles moving through a *Klein's bottle* (in a full cycle).

This sets off an an isomorphosis between U and T (*isomorphosis* has been defined as a *controlled* metalepsis). That is, in the reversible ordinate position as a container, U and T will not only appear as alternative paths to achieve R, but also to the *virtual* possibility and actual *existence* of R.

Vi is a priori neither actual nor virtual—neither passive nor active—but the condition for human being and machine to enter a relationship of programming. It therefore makes our case for an expanded eco-logic, to one that includes final cause, *without* veering to false assumption and *teleology*.

The three passage-points in this process are: **1)** the triangulation of U and T on R [its virtual possibility]: **2)** bringing it home by operating virtually from R [hence bringing it to existence on an hypothetical assumption that requires work and cannot be brought down to teleological Hermetism]; **3)** critique.

The process begins with the fact that two adjacent elements U and T have the potential of becoming causally involved with one another, if we think about their relation in ecologic terms. They are environmentally connected so their entanglement can bring about specific results in this environment.

By programming an experimental interaction it is possible to test whether the U and T converge on something specific (R). Because R is *intuitive*, the said test is also a *discovery procedure*. If specific, precisation—in a second phase—continues, but this time to determine whether T-U is reversible in R.

This is a falsifiable proposition and since R—which is not a synthesis between T and U, but a *mediation*—is specific, the corresponding procedure is a *falsification procedure*. Here we are at the second passage-point at which a value critique hinges on whether a new repertoire is hatched.