


In the phenomenology of *embodiment*—the interaction and exchange leading up to apprehending object as a *body*—there are some basic mechanisms suggested by Johani Pallasmaa in his little book devoted to the [eyes of the skin](#). It features the mechanisms of the *haptic* sense.

The first step is to conceive that all the *other* senses—vision, hearing, smell and taste—are *derived* (and specialised) from the haptic sense. Then the haptic sense thereupon comes in as a connector *between* the other senses. As a consequence they are available to a variety of changing contracts.

The variety of such contracts become part of our *sensory history*, that co-evolves with knowledge (including its *rational* aspects). The conscious work to develop *intuition* across this *gap*—as a foundation and a connection—is the purpose of the *gap-game*, and the prerogative of the *learning theatre*.



How do we pass from being *dutiful* as readers of a text, to being *critical* in our assessment of it: that is, from being *observant* and true, to being *observing* and emancipated? How do we stand, as a body, before an object that we have embodied—through a work of reception—and take stock of it?

The work of reception has these two sides: (1) sensorial and intellectual *receptivity* hatching intuitive empathy; (2) taking a critical stand in which we cut/sever *some* of the vital connections we created as we embodied the object. We move from respecting the *integrity* of the object, to our own.

This brings us to a new phase—or, level—in gaming over a gap. We *cannot cheat* regarding the object, and the work/energy it contains (1). And we cannot cheat in *our own* regard (2). The use of chance methods come in as an element, in bringing about conditions where (1) and (2) are *re-constituted*.

The variety of ways in which the relation between (1) and (2) is reconstituted puts them *both* to the test, because while the *relationship* between (1) and (2) is typically *specific*; the test it is submitted to, by the use of chance methods, will paradoxically make it more *precise*. So, this is what we're at.

In gap-gaming we are working with *precisation* ([Arne Næss](#)). It is easy to conceive that *drawing* fits this description: gaming over a gap, that becomes *specific* once it becomes a *relationship*—a relationship always succeeds at *containing* a gap—and *precise* as it is randomly varied.

In other words, *precisation* occurs as we succeed at containing random. Which means that it is no longer random: but in one aspects *contingent*, and in another aspect *necessary*. Over *this* gap—*between* contingency and necessity—yet another *container* may hatch, which what we call *freedom*.

Some may object that chance methods are used in order to avoid making choice. However, the use of chance-methods that has been ventured *here* amounts to making choices under *constraints*. Which is clearly not the same thing. Using chance methods, here, is to take *our* chances...

From this vantage point, it becomes part of the works(wo)manship of *risk* ([David Pye](#)), in which we take stock of a situation in which something may go wrong—as we perform—at any point of time. This is so because we, in this experiment, also have been pledged to logic, and hence to a game.

Not to a ludic game but to a serious game—cf, the difference between *ludus* and *jocus* in Latin—in which the stakes are real. When we succeed the work lives and we will grow. The range of freedom becomes greater, and the stakes higher. So, gap-gaming here relates to negative dialectics.

Which is to say: there is *no* synthesis between the terms of a *gap*—here between engaging and observing—there are only *mediations* ([Adorno & Benjamin](#)). But there *are* mediations. These mediations will shift into *relationships* as they become *specific*; emancipate as they become *precise*.