



The combination of chance-methods with logical inference is what is used to define a 'game' in this series. The game is used to evidence some domestic structures that lay dormant in practices that involve human artefacts. It rests on the notion that some games are strategic applications.

They thereby constitute a category with the broader field of what has been previously discussed as techno-cultural devices. The type of game that interests us here is one that is bound to *random* samples, yet remaining obligated to *precision*. Indeed, this is game's defining risk factor.

Precision is here used to define a relational qualities between performances that are heteronomously structured by different sets of rules. Which is why the subject matter of the game is the gap: or, the edgeland (determined, for instance, jointly by the perils of viral contamination and digital connection).



Gap-gaming is a term invented for design of programmes for the edgeland in its widest and multiple definition. The type of gap being addressed is of the kind that plays between reading and writing. That is, the kind of gap that exists between a maker and user: which is not an addresser to addressee.

When you go from writing to reading, mind the gap (did I write that?). When you go from reading to writing, mind the gap (now I understand!). Hence the bewilderment of the edgeland, in which one alternates between being confused and understanding, as it were, as the normal state of mind.

This territory is well covered in literature (e.g., Lewis Carroll's *Alice in Wonderland*). What comes with the territory is a question of the nature of our cognition where natural language meets mathematics: i.e., elementary logic in its local, generative and sometimes confusing receptions.

Logic—in this understanding—is not a field, but an *edgeland*; defined as such on account of the heteronomous regimes that come together in elementary logic, and compete for its attention, to side with it, own it and to appropriate it. Which is why it holds a number of emergent connections.

For this reason, though logic is linked to necessity, contingencies appear to be unavoidable—as a kind of collateral—whenever logic applies: whether we speak of the contingencies prevailing on the conditions where logic applies (i.e., the application of logic), or that are summoned by its application.

Also, the contingencies typically will have changed in the wake of its application: there is a hit (*necessity*) and impact (*contingency*) of logic. We have to live with that. The question is how well. Hence the application of *chance methods* alongside the application of *logic*, is of certain interest.

The fictions we conjure in writing and their factual extension in a readable sentence, testifies to their existence—if only as fictions—in ways that fuels writing, and feeds fiction. At some point a pattern begins to emerge, as though fiction is “chased up” by facts (rather than facts escaping fiction).

This occasional development is one defined by *criticality*: once a threshold is crossed—as a critical mass of instances have been generated—there is an avalanche-like development as the fictional narrative is overtaken by the logic of events, and reality starts behaving as though it is directed.

In the terminology of rhetoric tropes this is determined as *metalepsis*: “cursed be the axe that felled the tree from which this cradle was made.” In the reading-game—or, the broader category of the gap-game—I am interested in weaker forms of this trope, as regularly occurring in text.

Any string of steps that succeed in conjuring an idea, itself forms an extension—an expressive material—that more/less effectively feeds that idea. There is nothing we can do to eliminate this. It is reality. But we can moderate it: and will do so experimentally by combining logic with chance.