

If AI is a proposition featuring the unity of thought and extension in our time, it is a claim on substance. Is there any way around it? VR says Jaron Lanier. He discusses VR as digital technology developed for immersive and interactive purposes. We don't need VR-goggles and gloves to be part of this.

Our VIDEO-meetings—during the corona shutdown—are both immersive and interactive (even if they bring us into what Lanier calls 'the valley of the uncanny'). Lanier underscores the potential of existential awareness as we endure. Growing sustainable containers for this experience is a sensorial task.



Substance is discussed in the first 39% of Ethica. Spinoza defines it thus: "By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through it-self: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception." A compound of a term, its reference and mediation in one.

His concern with pleasure—however—is throughout the book (97%). In counterpoint to pain, and in opposition to lust. His ethical project builds on the metaphysical foundation of substance. And what brings us from this foundation to the precepts for a good life, is necessity vs. contingency.

Spinoza's stroke of genius may lie in the way contingency turns to necessity when constituted at the metaphysical level of substance. Consider that you have initiated an operation A and you encounter an obstacle B. You then determine a way A' to get around B; you record an effect B' of that choice.

That would seem to fall squarely into the definition of contingency: the joinery of something found with something negotiated. Now take the whole of the 4 steps above into consideration, and form an idea of it (in your thought). Then compare that idea to how whole operation actually turned out (extension).

Thought and extension are one in substance, claims Spinoza. Necessarily so. We have moved from contingency to necessity. It does not happen by itself—automatically—but requires that we put in some work. A shorthand of Spinoza's ethics, if we in our definition of contingency include the unknown (X).

The found, the negotiated and the unknown when turned through the clockwork of Spinoza's 'telescope', contingency will yield necessity. In our masterclass in design at KHiO—in the school year 2019/20—we have explored this assumption as a regular litmus-test in our stages of learning together.

This relates to a research-culture in design, featuring a via negativa in the sense that what is explored is regularly external to design. It is similar to anthropology, in this sense, which is based on fieldwork. The joinery of negotiated findings is well established. But if the unknown is part of the equation?

It is on this backdrop that I, at the present occasion, re/turn to Saul Kripke's lecture-series at Princeton, published in Naming & Necessity (1980/1970), where he argues that names—as opposed to descriptive notions—are rigid designators of the object across the different worlds in which it exists.

It is therefore conceivably in the unknown aspect that the things in our world are named: which is of consequence if we consider makes & brands: for instance, Tesla which is now a car in which the genius of Nikola Tesla (1856-1943) is now encased. That could be seen as a turn from pleasure to lust.

Can one do such a thing?—see me do it! It's a lingo in our days. We live in an era where the work of metaphysics might be left to A!. I know that Jaron Lanier would agree. A kind of metaphysical hijacking (détournement) that will continue—unless we do our job—for no other reason that it can be done.