




The transposition of responsibility unto the ability to respond, implies moving from a normative framework (reponsibility) to a resolve (seeking the ambient conditions/resident principles that condition a response): linking responsivity to what Joyce called 'enveloping facts' and 'circumstantiating events'.

If we conceive movement not as something which is necessarily planned and premeditated, but moving is deciding (or, decision is immanent in movement), then we are in a different place as we seek to proceed reflectively—as the redoubling of decision—in frameworks with each their practice: SAP-practices.

Decision then is part of a first science where aesthetico-epistemic operations are located between contingently related facts and events. Moreover, decisions are specific and implicated (entangled) in the building up of an intention and with many specific choices becomes increasingly precise.



Even if there certainly is art in the kitchen of philosophy, there is rarely philosophy in the art-kitchen, and science is its own kitchen. We have to make do with clusters like these, in which relations are unilateral and makeshift. And we can provided we accept that there are practices within and beyond them.

That is, that under the radar of SAP-practices (Science, Art and Philosophy) there is something like what Laruelle has called the First Science, or what Arne Næss calls 'deep ecology'. A realm of practice where findings are never conclusive, negotiations never closed, and the unknown is the receding real.

Among the practices of the first science is walking and collecting: making and sensing are corollaries. Perhaps this will give the idea that the first science is somehow 'neolithic'—and that the project of a deep ecology springs from this level of humanity. Between making and sensing there is a gap: diverse paths.

What connects them is motion. When it is morning I sit on the edge of my bed a little while before I stand up. I never manage to determine the exact moment when it happens. It is as though moving and deciding is the same thing. It is not like I decide and then move. Moving is deciding, above all.

But, deciding does not pretend to determine what things are, in any definitive sense, but to move: where to go and next what to do. Being interested in the decision itself—rather than its whence and wherefore—is rather post-historic rather than neolithic. Relating archaeologically to an ongoing decision.

That is, deciding as an aesthetic-epistemic operation, relating to decision between A and B: not opting for one and ruling out the other, but locating decision at the interstice—the between space—between A and B, as a third element. Decision is scandalous in the sense that it is causal and occasional.

And it requires A and B to be co-incident, and not to their separation as alternatives: in fact, deciding between A and B—as a third element C—intercepts and draws on the contingent relation between A and B. Their being alongside and touching (con-tangere) rather than to their being parallel.

So a decision regarding decision is to consider the contingent elements A and B—from which the task and occasion of deciding emerges—as orthogonal: that is, as at once touching and maximally distinct. In this sense, deciding is related to the radically immanent real. And brings us to quantum theory.

That is superposition (touching), intra-action (A and B sensitive to changes in the apparatus) and entanglement (A and B will correlate even when removed from one another). So, C is has an aspect of readability—with regard to the situation—but is also a critical/hatching factor in a growing of intention.

Here, intention is not something pre-determined—as by a plan—but simply is the collusive trail that follows in the wake of decision. The point to understand about intention that it is precisely not-planned but still will end up pointing in a certain direction: taking responsibility for that requires an ability to respond.