

VICTIMS

MONUMENT

SPECTACLE

This book brings together two independent texts by Natasha Marie Llorens and Tony Bennett and two visual essays of Michael O'Donnell's work, which deal with the three interwoven themes of Victims, Monument and Spectacle. These themes have been the central focus of O'Donnell's art practice for the last thirty years: looking at how values and structures – germinating largely from Christian moral codes – emerge and resonate in the theatre of memory. The new work featured in this book can be seen in reference to the earlier publication *EXIT* (2011), which presented work from the series 'Final Sentence'. Some images from that series have been included in this book's section of Earlier Works to allow for comparison with the new series 'The Right to Remain Silent'.

The texts in this book consists of a new essay by Natasha Marie Llorens, *Victims and Their Objects: A Threnody*, edited by Natalie Hope O'Donnell, and a reprinting of Tony Bennett's essay *The Exhibitionary Complex*, originally published in the journal *new formations* in Spring 1988, without its original images.

Llorens's essay explores memorialization and the variable award of the status of victim according to gender, class, race and relative position within the social fabric. She evokes the work of Cathy Caruth, Georges Did-Huberman, Barbara Johnson and Stephen Eisenman to explore the representations of victimhood, drawing on institutions of incarceration from the asylum of Salpêtrière in Paris, in the 19th century to the Abu Ghraib prison of the 21st century. Through a reading of the depictions of inmates – particularly photography – and their relative muteness within this imagery, cast as complicit in their own denigration, she asks "To whom is the opportunity given to raise their voice in protest against their own violation, and to which cries of protest is the value of truth accorded?"

Bennett's text evokes Michel Foucault's notion of surveillance as a means of social regulation and discipline, and Antonio Gramsci's perspectives of the ethical and educational function of the modern state, in sketching the formation of an 'exhibitionary complex', which provided a context for the permanent display of state power and knowledge and embodied its rhetoric. According to Bennett, this power aimed at achieving a rhetorical effect through its representation of otherness, rather than a disciplinary effect. Drawing on Nicholas Pearson's distinction between "hard" and "soft" exercises of state power within the arts in Britain, Bennett cast the museum as a soft power, but where its instruction and rhetoric failed, punishment would begin, and the closed walls of the penitentiary threatened sterner instruction in the lessons of power.

VICTIMS AND THEIR OBJECTS: A THRENODY

NATASHA MARIE LLORENS

Michael O'Donnell makes one wax surrogate for the body of the executed inmate, and then another, moving through forms that represent its weight. His studio is saturated with the smell of wax. I wonder whether smell has mass, like a trace mineral evaporated into the air. I wonder about the infinitesimal loss of such mass as the wax from one sculpture is broken, melted down, and reused for the next. I wonder what is released as O'Donnell works. It is this possibility in his work for release, for unbounded particles, that most severely challenges the logic of the monument.

He makes a pile of the inmates' words, their last words. The words they say right before the state executes them. Everyone involved in these utterances – jailer, jailed, reporter, witness, executioner – understands them to be both an act of testimony and also monumental. Perhaps this mutual understanding is the crux of O'Donnell's own interest in them. They are phrases meant to act metonymically for the whole life that is ending. "Stay Strong." "I love you Irene." I am struck by their brevity, the lingering sense of amputation they convey. They are words that reveal conflict about the status of the executed: is (s)he a perpetrator of violence against the innocent or is (s)he a victim of state violence? How could (s)he be both?

I am provoked by O'Donnell's effort to give the criminal weight and language. He seems fascinated by figures that shimmer on the very edges of our ability to perceive the violence done to them. I wonder when I watch the tension in his forms: who is the victim? To whom has wrong been done? To whom is the opportunity given to raise their voice in protest against their own violation, and to which cries of protest is the value of truth accorded? I am not talking about the victim as the one without agency, the one who can do nothing. I am talking about the victim as the one who bears the mark of violence in public, the one who can accuse their perpetrator with clear and legible testimony. This category, the victim, is politically valuable especially in contrast to a situation in which violence is done but for some reason the wounded person is unable to put language to the event. There is some confusion about the truth of what she says because she is insane, or because he is black, or because she is angry, or because they are slaves, or because he is a criminal. Something about this person blocks their access to the category of victimhood in public. Something invalidates their testimony about what has been done to them – amputates it. A second question O'Donnell's work raises is *how* to smuggle unauthorized testimony into the public sphere, into discourse? How to make a victim appear as such, when traditionally s(he) has been represented only as insane, as a criminal, or as a slave? What monument would that kind of speech require? Or would such language break the logic of the monument irrevocably?

In her introduction to *Unclaimed Experience*, Cathy Caruth argues that literary narrative – which is analogous to art in its capacity to figure forth trauma – can represent the wound that we cannot see and cannot acknowledge. Caruth writes:

Trauma is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in an attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise accessible. This truth in its delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to what is known, but also to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language.¹

Caruth suggests that the victim may be incapable of language recognizable as “proper” testimony about his injury. And if the victim, the inmate, the trespasser, cannot claim with “proper” credibility to have been wounded, he cannot claim the status of victim – the one to whom something has been done against his will. Thus, the status of victimhood, like the appearance of the wound, is profoundly precarious, profoundly dependent on narrative forms capable of accounting for the “unknown in our very actions and our language.”² I propose that O’Donnell’s work is – on a structural level – figuring forth such precarity and the crisis of visibility it produces for the victim. He is searching for a truth linked to the unknown in order to monumentalize it. Furthermore, he fails to produce a viable monument, over and over, and that the failing is part of his point.

There is something about the victim’s testimony, the truth Caruth characterizes as delayed, belated, unconscious, that O’Donnell wants to make into a monument but that remains recalcitrantly antithetical to the ideology of the monument; and, so, he forces this contradiction into form. In order to understand the stakes of O’Donnell’s structural contradiction, I want to look at representations of the victim that do not picture the crisis of her visibility. I want to analyze images invested in making her victimization invisible. I want to read monuments built to close the space of testimony, cauterizing traumatic memory rather than acknowledging the importance of the belated address.³

¹ Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3.

² I borrow this insight about the relationship between art and Caruth from Rosalyn Deutsche, who writes: “But, since by definition the event that caused the trauma was so overwhelming that it could not be fully known or experienced at the time it occurred, the victim suffers from incomprehension, and, if the witness claims to understand the experience, he claims to understand too much, and so betrays the victim. This poses a problem for aesthetic representations that want to respond to the suffering of others, for while traumatic suffering calls out for the event to be witnessed, it creates a need for a new kind of witnessing—what Caruth calls the witnessing of an impossibility, the impossibility of comprehending trauma. Witnessing in the ethical sense of responding thus necessitates a critique of images based on notions of representational adequacy.” Rosalyn Deutsche, *Hiroshima After Iraq* (New York: Columbia University, 2010), 69.

³ I should say that while I make a binary comparison in what follows, beyond its use as a means to understand something structural about O’Donnell’s work, the binary itself is uninteresting. It should be fleshed out as a spectrum, complicated.

Death

The Monument to the Army of the Orient and of Faraway Lands was erected on the cornice in Marseille in 1927, well before this strip of land was re-named for American president John F. Kennedy. It is supposed to commemorate those who died fighting for Allied forces deployed along the Macedonian front line during the First World War, in particular, but it is also commonly used to anchor commemoration ceremonies for all French soldiers, who died overseas. Designed by Antoine Sartorio, the monument is a giant archway built on a rock outcropping that juts into the Mediterranean. It was imagined as a two-way mirror – from land it frames the viewer’s perspective out to sea, towards the ‘Orient’; and from the sea it is a colossal freestanding gate to Marseille, the European port-city *par excellence*.

The structure has all the restrained, organic elegance of high Art Deco style. The arch rises with long, clean lines. Upright bodies with smooth, open chests and simply articulated musculature flank the arch without overwhelming its formal authority. Two stolid and monolithic female angels lead on the either side of the arch, while soldiers peer out from underneath the shade cast by their wingspans. A Bronze statue of Victory stands solitary in the void that the arch frames, her body arched upward and her arms extended to the sky, but her gaze firmly fixed on the City in front of her. On the side of the monument is a small granite slab added after a federal decree in 2003 to commemorate the *harkis*, or the people of non-European descent who fought on the side of French during the Algerian war of independence. The Marseillais response to this decree is a square roughly the size of a small person’s chest reading simply, “Hommage aux Harkis”. It faces the sea. The French largely abandoned these people after the Evian accords were signed in 1962, which effectively ended the war. Algerian nationalists massacred anyone suspected of collaboration with the French throughout the summer of 1962. To the great shame of many in the French armed forces the government did little to protect its former native agents or their families.

Tacked on to an existing structure without a date, without even naming the war for which the fallen are being honored, this gesture unwittingly undermines all the careful idealism of its parent monument. Together, they form a commemoration to the dead unwilling to think the complexity of death or the complexity of identity in death. If a Muslim subject of the French department of Algiers died in Macedonia in 1918, this monument remembers him, unequivocally. If a Muslim subject of the French department of Algiers fighting in the French Army was executed by the Algerian revolutionary army, this monument stammers in response before muttering something barely intelligible. There is contradiction here, as in O’Donnell’s work, but the tension it produces is chaotic, unconscious, disavowed. It dissipates into the sea.

In a short text entitled *The Instant of My Death*, Maurice Blanchot describes the fate of a young nobleman at the hands of the retreating army in the countryside at the close of World War II by way of two very different moments of clarity in the face of death. In the first, the young man in question faces a firing squad led by a Nazi lieutenant in front of his own property. "He was perhaps invincible. Dead – immortal. Perhaps Ecstasy. Rather than the feeling of compassion for suffering humanity, the happiness of not being immortal or eternal. Henceforth, he was bound to death by a surreptitious friendship," Blanchot writes of this young man's experience.⁴ There is a selfish relief in death, which represents a kind of freedom in Blanchot's text; freedom from further injury and also from further implication in the immoral business of life during war.

Blanchot continues: the Nazi lieutenant is called away at the moment he should have given the command to fire, the soldiers step forward to declare themselves Russian and, therefore, both aware and respectful of this nobleman's humanity—recognizable by virtue of his nobility—and the man escapes into the woods nearby. Freedom in death is retracted from this man. The reader is made aware of how many nearby peasants have been slaughtered without a second thought and that the man's chateau and family remain untouched, that his absence is not avenged with their lives or his property. "This is war," Blanchot writes, "life for some, for others, the cruelty of assassination."⁵ And so often, he implies, the difference is the degree to which one's life is perceived as valuable in the eyes of power. What effect does this reprieve from death signify for the man? Blanchot describes his clarity thus:

There remained, however, at the moment when the shooting was no longer but to come, the feeling of lightness that I would not know how to translate: freed from life? The infinite opening up? Neither happiness. Nor the absence of fear and perhaps already a step beyond. I know, I imagine that this unanalyzable feeling changed what there remained from him of existence. As if the death outside of him could only henceforth collide with the death in him. "I am alive. No, you are dead."⁶

Clarity issues from the act of naming a profound conflict between the experience, on the one hand, of living, breathing, walking through the woods and back to a chateau in the French countryside, and, on the other, of the visceral understanding of the arbitrary nature of just such privileges in that time and place. That man is dead but for the nobility he did nothing to earn and so he is dead inside, even if one form of death still remains outside of him. Blanchot's text, in contrast to the monument in Marseille, thus, functions as a quasi-monument for those who have failed to be absolved by death.

⁴ Maurice Blanchot, *The Instant of My Death* in Elizabeth Rottenberg (trans.), 'Maurice Blanchot, *The Instant of My Death* and Jacques Derrida, *Demeure – Fiction and Testimony*' (Stanford University Press, 2000), 5.

⁵ *The Instant of My Death*, 7.

⁶ *The Instant of My Death*, 8–9.

Insanity

The Salpêtrière in Paris served simultaneously as a prison for prostitutes and an asylum for the female mentally ill from the middle of the 17th century until the beginning of the 19th century, when Phillipe Pinel gradually transformed it into something approaching a modern-day psychiatric hospital.⁷ The institution before Pinel was characterized by filthy conditions and the lack of distinction it made between criminal sex-workers and insane women. Pinel's adjustments to psychiatric confinement were widely considered less physically brutal and committed to the treatment of illness by means of careful observation and moral sensibility.⁸ Pinel removed physical walls and metal restraints, as well as the older ideological framing mechanisms for inmates' containment—such as the idea that Salpêtrière was a prison for the indigent and for sex workers. Pinel aimed to control deviance using more discursive mechanisms, and he called this instrumental shift “moral.” Tony Robert-Fleury's painting from 1887, *Pinel Freeing the Insane*, epitomizes the myth – which was not entirely ungrounded – of the empathetic and rational character of the man. Pinel shares the center of the painting with an incandescent but visibly mute woman standing classically poised as the belt that secured her chains is removed. With an expression of intellectual intensity Pinel gazes beyond her, beyond all the women who are still enchained, towards a future structured by his vision.

Still, several signs in Robert-Fleury's painting trouble a seamless glorification of Pinel as an agent of female emancipation – the most striking is that both of the young, relatively attractive, women freed of their manacles immediately begin to also lose their clothing. The central figure's stockings are loose around her ankles, her dress slips off one shoulder well below her collarbone. Her gaze is downturned but sly; the look of a woman wishing for the breach. The woman on the ground behind her appears to be writhing, her fingers entwined in the fabric of her undergarments and her hair loose in the dirt of the courtyard. Her hands are rendered as though in anxious movement, tearing open the bodice to expose a breast as her head arches backwards. She appears at first to be responding to the woman behind her, whose manacled hands are outstretched in supplication, but the older woman actually looks beyond her toward Pinel. This image is about desire provoked by his presence and the freedom he bestows, rather than desire between inmates. In addition to their licentiousness, the figures have a blankness that both admits the viewer's gaze and permits the categorical reorganization Pinel has come to implement in their lives. The two women on the left in the

⁷ See Guillaïn and Mathieu, *La Salpêtrière* (Paris: Masson, 1925), 41.

⁸ Richard Keller, in a book that traces Pinel's legacy in colonial North Africa, confirms the emphasis on moralism. He writes: “As the legend goes, in a fit of utopian fervor, Pinel brought the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity to those most marginalized of *citoyens*, replacing the bonds of the insane with the invisible chains of the asylum and its injunction to moral responsibility.” Richard Keller, *Colonial Madness – Psychiatry in French North Africa* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

foreground symbolize this duality: both are clothed but with bodices loosened to reveal their breasts to the viewer as though by accident. Their faces betray their self-absorption in pain or delusion. It is as though each were distracted by some inner turmoil from the task of maintaining proprietary visual boundaries around themselves. They appear complicit in their sexualization by virtue of their madness.

The function of Robert-Fleury's painting is not to tell the story of these women, their suffering, or the conditions that produce it, but to monumentalize Pinel and his vision for the institution. To this end, the distinction between the victim and criminal that Pinel is credited for having addressed is submerged – at least in Robert-Fleury's painting – in the representation of uncontained and submissive forms of female sexuality. In sexualizing the mad rather than showing them and the poor as distinct groups within the Salpêtrière, or representing those who have turned to prostitution as a means of survival, Robert-Fleury forecloses the possibility that either might testify to something done to them against their will. Two things are especially important to understand the structural contradiction in the representation of the violence perpetrated: firstly, a painting that aims to monumentalize Pinel represents all the inmates as equally in need of the light of reason he embodies. There can be no differential relationship to the monumental figure among his subjects, because what is being pictured is his stature rather than their (individuated) experiences of suffering. Secondly, this equalization is achieved by sexualizing the inmates. Thus, if, on the one hand, O'Donnell's work forces the viewer to consider some fundamental contradiction in the victim/perpetrator distinction, these two mechanisms allow Robert-Fleury's painting, on the other, to mask any possibility of such contradiction.

George Didi-Huberman elaborates a more direct example of the role monumentalizing representation played in repressing testimony of the women of the Salpêtrière in his book, *The Invention of Hysteria*. He discusses painting, but the primary aim of his analysis is the institutional use of photography as a diagnostic tool the effect of which was the disqualification of patients' speech. What is especially useful about his argument in this context is that it complicates any temptation to make an easy distinction between the picture of an event – sexualized inmates, their muteness in the face of reason's intellectual force, monumentalized masculine power, etc. – and what happened in "reality". Jean-Martin Charcot succeeded Pinel at the Salpêtrière and is credited with having founded modern neurology and naming hysteria or, according to Didi-Huberman, isolating it as "a pure nosological object."⁹ Didi-Huberman argues that hysteria was not legible as a medical phenomenon until Charcot literally segregated its victims from those suffering from epilepsy and other disorders. Charcot invented the diagnosis by insisting on the determining nature

⁹ Georges Didi-Huberman and J M. Charcot, *Invention of Hysteria: Charcot and the Photographic Iconography of the Salpêtrière* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), 19.

of visual evidence of disorders. This understanding of diagnosis and the role photography played in substantiating it would have lasting consequences on the history of photography and on the history of psychiatric diagnosis. Sigmund Freud – who attended Charcot’s famous Tuesday lectures and became one of his erstwhile translators – wrote of Charcot that “[h]e was not a reflective man, not a thinker: he had the nature of an artist – he was, as he himself said, a “visuel,” a man who sees.”¹⁰

As such, Charcot believed that mental pathology was visible, readable, on the surface of his patients’ bodies. Writing in 1887, he argued that “where nervous disorders are concerned, psychology indeed has a presence, and what I call psychology is the rational physiology of the cerebral cortex.”¹¹ Phenomenon occurring in the cerebral cortex could be watched by observing the play of symptoms upon the body, like the shadows cast by figures on a wall. Physiological symptoms were understood as indexical to phenomena occurring inside the brain. As Freud recounts:

Charcot used to look again and again at the things he did not understand, to deepen his impression of them day by day, till suddenly an understanding of them dawned on him. In his mind’s eye the apparent chaos presented by the continual repetition of the same symptoms then gave way to order: the new nosological pictures emerged, characterized by the constant combination of certain groups of symptoms.¹²

For Charcot, order was achieved through a prolonged act of perception. The other was not interrogated; the other was watched. Everything pertinent to the classification of a woman’s mental pathology could be ascertained by looking at her, rather than asking her to speak. This is not to say that the women in question were actually silent, but that whatever they happened to say was ancillary to their classification on the basis of the visual, the photographable. Didi Huberman insists that while Charot’s hysterical body was an object in the theoretical sense – a nosological object – it quite tragically also became an object in the physical sense. Experiments with electrocution, isolation, and drug therapy were, by contemporary standards, the more reputable of Charcot’s repertoire. “He had no qualms about plunging his fist into a hysteric’s groin,” Didi-Huberman writes, “nor about instrumentalizing the so-called ovarian compression or prescribing the cauterization of the uterine neck, in certain cases.”¹³ Didi-Huberman barely stops short of accusing Charcot of promoting the institutionalization of rape as treatment for hysteria. He asks:

¹⁰ Cited in Didi-Huberman, *Invention of Hysteria*, 25.

¹¹ J. M. Charcot, *Leçons du mardi à la Salpêtrière. Policlinique*, Course notes by Blin, Charcot, and Colin (Paris: Progrès médical/Delahaye & Lecrosnier, 1887–1888), 115. Cited in, Didi-Huberman, *Invention of Hysteria*, 25.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Didi-Huberman, *Invention of Hysteria*, 176.

[H]ow the relation between a physician and his patient, in a hospice of four thousand incurable bodies, how this relation, which, in principle, was nearly the only one besides marriage to authorize and even institute the *fondling of bodies* – how this relation could become servitude, property, torment.¹⁴

Charcot created a scientific system by which women's own testimony of their experience of suffering – and of "inappropriate" desire – was systematically superseded by the observation of an authority figure, namely himself and his surrogate the camera/visual archive complex. The hysterical women could speak all they wanted in the profoundly phallogocentric environment of the clinic, but an objective photographic discourse, nevertheless, effectively contained their speech. The result of such containment was that at no point could their language constitute a claim to victimhood or testify to abuse. In order to work in service to the kind of truth Caruth lays out as pertaining to traumatic events, photography and its agents must be willing to relinquish the objectivity of their own discourse of truth. To relinquish objectivity would be to admit that the photograph records a small fraction of what happened in the moment it is taken and that the profound truth of the event simply cannot be pictured beyond all doubt.

O'Donnell's work to represent a subjective contradiction (victim/perpetrator) rather than the event of death at the hands of the state is one way to think about what necessary doubt looks like, formally. Some of his projects even represent doubt specifically in the context of photography – his painstaking deconstruction of crowd photography from the early 20th century, in search of Hitler, in search of nationalist populism – but the point I am making here is that doubt is a necessary element of any feminist or non-masculinist form of representation. Photography is simply the limit case.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Muteness

Charcot choreographs his patients' apparent muteness because muteness is constitutive of photography's authority. Female victims must be represented as silent about their experience of violation in order for the photographic images of their bodies to be seen as objective or scientific. Yet, Didi-Huberman does not quite ask what might be important about spectacular objectification that silences a female victim. Feminist scholar Barbara Johnson, in an essay from 1998 entitled "Muteness Envy," puts the question Didi-Huberman neglects thus: "But why is female muteness a repository of aesthetic value? And what does that muteness signify?"¹⁵ Johnson is superficially talking about abstract beauty as the aesthetic value in question, but I think the point is the same: the photographs (and other representations of hysteria) at the Salpêtrière are only truly valuable as diagnostic tools insofar as they replace a victim's speech, or, only insofar as they participate in objectifying the person in question as a type (a nosological object). In both cases, muteness is the "repository" or the container for aesthetic value; apparent silence is the condition of an object's appearance as something classifiable.

Johnson goes a step further than Didi-Huberman to argue that women's muteness doesn't just bar them from speaking about their experiences of violence; it also produces confusion about whether or not they wanted the thing that was done to them. Johnson sees the proliferation of representations of female silence – and the confusion about the status of the victim it engenders – as integral to the structure of patriarchy. Muteness is not only a prop for Pinel's authority or for the authority of the discourse of photographic objectivity Charcot is invested in; Johnson argues images and forms that monumentalize female muteness do so in order to bolster the binary between male and female, between marked and unmarked terms.

Women are notably silent, Johnson argues, about their pleasure and about their violation. When they speak about either their own desire or their experience as victims, they disrupt a patriarchal fantasy about the woman as the object of speech, rather than its subject. "The work performed by the idealization of silence", Johnson notes, "is that it helps culture not be able to tell the difference between the two."¹⁶ If a woman's beauty – in other words her visibility as a subject – depends on her silence both about what she wants and what has been done to her, it becomes possible to conflate the two. Patriarchy depends on a binary system in which one gender is marked as not-the-other, not-male. On a structural level, patriarchy is primarily concerned with naturalizing the subordination of one term to the other, rather than simply oppressing women. When naturalization is successful, the

¹⁵ Barbara Johnson, *The Feminist Difference: Literature, Psychoanalysis, Race, and Gender* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), 133.

¹⁶ Johnson, *The Feminist Difference*, 136–7.

difference in position between men and women can be argued to be the result of individual talent, aptitude, or biology, etc., rather than the product of violently enforced male privilege. Thus, on a structural level patriarchy strives to construct representations of woman as silent because, on some level, she enjoys her own violation. Female testimony is intolerable, according to Johnson, because it claims the right to make a distinction between abuse and desire. If the woman wanted it, there is no subordination, and, thus, no power dynamic that allows one term to dominate another. Testimony, on the other hand, potentially illuminates the production of a binary structure in which the female is subordinated, and, thus, undoes the careful naturalization of the male privilege to establish what counts as abuse and what counts as desire.

Perhaps what was done to women's bodies at the Salpêtrière – both the physical violence and the relentless imaging of this violation – was misogynist, the result of some repressed hatred or fear of women. But Johnson insists that a victim's necessary muteness goes beyond misogyny. In the context of patriarchy, "[i]t is not that the victim gets to speak – far from it – but that the most highly valued speaker gets to claim victimhood".¹⁷ The analogy between the role of the woman as the marked term in a patriarchal system and the role of the criminal as a marked term in the criminal justice system must be partial, but in the context of state violence the (often non-white) body of the criminal can be understood as marked in such a way as to be unable to claim victimhood. In other words, whatever is done to criminal body is mitigated by their own guilt, their own epistemological disqualification from testimony.¹⁸ In this light, O'Donnell's monumentalizing of the victim's speech is a feminist move in Johnson's vein in that his work systematically challenges the stability of the binary underpinning the US justice system between victim and criminal.

¹⁷ Johnson, *The Feminist Difference*, 153.

¹⁸ It is worth pointing that testimony from women and from people abused by the criminal justice system do exist and are enormously valuable. I am not trying to present a totalizing argument here, just an analysis of the structures that makes regular acknowledgement of the abuse of women and of inmates in the criminal justice system possible.

The Hysteric

I linger on the hysteric because the semiotic seepage between the image of the 19th century (usually female) hysteric and the image of the war-hysteric, or the (usually male) body feminized by its submission to (state) violence is viscous, dense with contemporary relevance, and toxic. Two examples will, hopefully, help to clarify the structural point here.

Louise Bourgeois' work *Cell (Arch of Hysteria)* (1992-1993) was an installation shown as part of the artist's *Cell* series in an exhibition entitled *Locus of Memory* and remains a succinct critique of the 19th century fantasy of the hysterical body. In a small enclosure constructed with large steel panels, Bourgeois placed a standing antique bandsaw and a low table on which a headless body arched in the classic hysteric pose. While later sculptural versions of the *Arch of Hysteria* are more ambiguously gendered, this first iteration of the form is recognizably male both in its genitalia and its physiognomy.

The headless body stretches across a white sheet on which is written over eighty times in neat, red handwriting, "je t'aime." "I love you", it claims relentlessly. Even if the body's interlocutor is a bandsaw and there is nothing tender in the room apart from the written admission of love: the body loves. The body without a head to reason with, whose love is rationally intoned in the most precise, school-child handwriting. The contradiction between language and form in *Cell (Arch of Hysteria)* is starkly illustrative of the ontological quandary of Charcot's hysteric, that of being unable to speak the difference between pain and pleasure. As in the clinic, the victim of *Cell (Arch of Hysteria)* is an object whose testimony is undermined by her form. The bleak cell, the industrial bandsaw standing ready to injure, and the roughly cast bronze rendering of a thin, suffering body signify victimhood, legibly, yet the words articulate the opposite.

Compare Bourgeois's reversal to a painting by Pierre Aristide André Brouillet, *A Clinical Lesson at the Salpêtrière*, (1887). In it, Charcot is portrayed describing the arch of the hysteric using a female subject as model. Her pose is echoed by the reproduction of a charcoal drawing of the same subject by Paul Richer from 1878 on the back wall of the classroom, demonstrating the symptoms' objective continuity as its treatment evolved. All of the light in the room is centered on the neckline of the woman's dress as she arches backward into the arms of an empathetic medical assistant who is holding her securely at the waist. The glowing surface of her skin gives way to the soft white material of her undergarments, which gives way to the lip of her corset, which is in turn revealed by a dress that is unbuttoned to the waist, turned in on itself. Her eyes are closed. Brouillet has not pictured a victim of abuse; he has pictured a longing, ecstatic surrender to the light. Both Brouillet and Bourgeois represent the hysteric yet, in her ability to picture the fact that the hysteric is by definition a

victim, structurally de-capitated, locked into torture by architecture and by the latent violence of their interlocutor (the band saw), Bourgeois is refuting Brouillet, Charcot, and the history of hysteria before Freud. She is showing another way to read the body of the hysteric and everything that contextualizes it. She is also drawing a clear and historically substantiated line between men with a form of hysteria resulting from their experiences of war (incarceration, torture) and what afflicted the women the term was invented to describe.

Abu Ghraib

What Bourgeois makes clear is that the mechanism patriarchal forms of power use to contain women is not actually limited to women. In fact, to reduce feminism to the critique of male power is to misunderstand how dangerous patriarchy is for all subjects marked in some way – people of color, gay and queer and trans people, non-neuro-typical people, people who publicly signify their religious faith as one other than the hegemonic religion. Patriarchy's toxicity for all marked subjects lies in its relentless obfuscation of its own power.

Stephen Eisenman makes an analogous point in his book on the images of Abu Ghraib prisoners, *The Abu Ghraib Effect*, the title of which is a pun on Roland Barthes theory of photography's "reality effect". Barthes argues that photography might produce the effect of reality through careful framing and other forms of construction, but that in order to achieve this effect it must simultaneously mask its own efforts at such construction. Eisenman applies this insight to the Abu Ghraib photographs, which he argues were meant to produce the victim's sexualized participation in their own violation using photography's reality effect. Furthermore, Eisenman argues that the photographs follow a well-known formula in Western visual art, which was developed to produce the effect of testimony. He writes:

That feature of the Western classical tradition is specifically the motif of tortured people and tormented animals who appear to sanction their own abuse [...] It is a mark of reification in extremis because it represents the body as something willingly alienated by the victim (even to the point of death) for the sake of the pleasure and aggrandizement of the oppressor.¹⁹

Here, Eisenman generalizes the point I drew from Johnson earlier in this text. The necessary conflation between pleasure and pain applies not only to women. Rather, it applies to all subjects whom power constructs as "rightless" or sub-human. The motif serves a function: the objectification of the victim is in service to the aggrandizement of the oppressor.

¹⁹ Eisenman, Stephen, *The Abu Ghraib Effect* (London: Reaktion, 2007), 16.

Eisenman then makes a rather startling claim: “This mythic motif [tortured person enjoying their debasement] constitutes an unacknowledged basis of the unity of the classical tradition in European or Western art.”²⁰ The implication is that the “pathos formula”, as Eisenman puts it, authorizes the continuity of the Western tradition in art. In other words, what ties the classical tradition together is a motif that naturalizes the subordination of slaves, women, and animals to power by representing that subordination as sexually pleasurable. The Abu Ghraib photographs, according to Eisenman, are drawing on two different authorizing discourses simultaneously; that of the pathos formula in the classical tradition of Western art and that of photography’s reality effect. In both senses, the purpose of the photographs is not limited to the debasement of individuals and cannot be reduced to the insanity or social alienation of specific military personnel. Eisenman writes:

They are the expression of a malevolent vision in which military victors are not just powerful, but omnipotent, and the conquered are not just subordinate, but abject and even inhuman. The presence of the latter, according to this brutal perspective, gives justification to the former; the supposed bestiality of the victims justifies the crushing violence of the oppressor.²¹

The pathos formula, coupled with photography’s reality effect, is used to relegate the conquered to a state outside of language, outside of victimhood. According to Eisenman, the message is similar to that of Robert Fleury’s painting of Pinel, or Brouillet’s painting of Charcot. He argues that the photographs are constructed to communicate that the prisoners at Abu Graib wanted what was done to them, therefore, they cannot be considered victims. Furthermore, since they wanted it they are not even really men.²²

But do the photographs actually communicate this complicity with unequivocal force? Are they truly effective as monuments to the power of a patriarchal visual regime in the way Robert-Fleury and Brouillet are? Or are they paradoxically similar to Bourgeois’s work, in the sense that they open a space for doubt and contradiction rather than close the possibility for testimony? The photographs may well be responding, in some unconscious way, to the mandate of fine art in the Western context for much of its history, which was to produce stable signifiers for power through images of the naturalized oppression of others. But I think it would be a mistake to underestimate the subtlety with which fine art achieved this goal for thousands of years, or to fail to recognize the ineptitude of the Abu Ghraib photographs in comparison. They don’t, in themselves, manage to produce enough ambiguity about their

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Eisenman, *The Abu Ghraib Effect*, 17.

²² For an examination of how homophobia gets projected onto “terrorist subjects and their nations” as a way of deflecting the socio-sexual conservatism of American empire, see: Jasbir K. Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007).

victim's complicity in their own violation. They remain, therefore, primarily documents of violence.

For Judith Butler, the problem of sexuality in the Abu Ghraib photographs is a crucial one because of the response it elicits in viewers to scenes of detainees' humiliation at the hands of US security forces agents. "[T]he problem is not that one person is exulting in another person's genitals. Let's assume that we all do that on occasion and there is nothing particularly objectionable in that exultation," Butler argues. She continues:

What is clearly objectionable, however, is the use of coercion and the exploitation of sexual acts in the service of shaming and debasing another human being. The distinction is crucial, of course, since the first objection finds the sexuality of the exchange a problem, while the second identifies the problem in the coercive nature of sexual acts.²³

The images' brutality lies precisely in that coercion is visible, that consent is manifestly absent, and that these images of detainees testify so lucidly to their abuse. Butler goes on to argue that the photographs are disturbing precisely because they are unmoored from a frame of reference that might serve to stabilize their ethical meaning, such as the grand narrative of Western Art History or the mythology of some just form of violence in war. Butler writes:

I want to suggest that the Abu Ghraib photographs neither numb our senses nor determine a particular response. This has to do with the fact that they occupy no single time and no specific space. They are shown again and again, transposed from context to context, and this history of their successive framing and reception conditions, without determining, the kinds of public interpretations of torture we have.²⁴

These contexts include the art space of the International Center for Photography in New York City, on a tablet or a phone in the subway or the airport, in a print newspaper or magazine, or contextualized in an academic book. The majority of the Western art historical canon is *framed*, its works do not lack context. Art History assiduously maintains this context, this frame for the greatness of their aesthetic achievement. The same can be said for Charcot's photographs: they are explicitly posited as diagnostic tools, folded into a clearly articulated apparatus for the classification of bodies. The same can be said for the gesture modern and contemporary art makes – it is defined almost exclusively by its self-identification with the epistemological category that is art. Each kind of image is able to figure forth or to obscure the victim by virtue of its frame, the conditions of its appearance.

²³ Judith Butler, "Torture and the Ethics of Photography," in *Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable?* (London: Verso, 2010), 86–88.

²⁴ Butler, *Frames of War*, 78.

To generalize, admittedly, all these kinds of images are embedded in a specific time and place, even if they subsequently dispersed. Butler is arguing that the Abu Ghraib photographs, by comparison, do not have a place in a specific discourse. The Abu Ghraib photographs are a third term, then, in the binary I have been tracing. They are not monuments to the power of a patriarchal system that subjugates others by naturalizing said subjugation, largely because they do not manage to credibly naturalize subjugation. They are not images like Bourgeois's work or O'Donnell's that produce a structural understanding of some violent event even while acknowledging their own – necessary – representational inadequacy. Each photograph is, rather, a floating signifier for brutality, which Butler argues "becomes the public condition under which we feel outrage and construct political views to incorporate and articulate that outrage."²⁵

The Right to Remain Silent

O'Donnell has the phrase "Mumbled something about he wished his whole life had been spent Islamic" printed on a steel plaque that floats away from the wall. The statement was recorded by the warden as the last words of an anonymous prisoner. This and other awkward phrases in O'Donnell's latest text work series "The Right to Remain Silent," were preserved because the prisoner chose not to speak at the moment appointed for a final statement. Instead, the warden wrote down whatever was last thing he or she thinks they heard the prisoner say, essentially speaking for them. Having silenced a prisoner in the ultimate sense, the State, nevertheless, evinces the need to be in control of their language to the last.

"Right to Remain Silent" critically monumentalizes this need in order to render the violent contradiction inherent in refusing the prisoner the right to silence at the end of life. An anti-monument to the suffering of others, I have argued, is a representation that refuses to stabilize meaning. Its function is rather to figure forth the impossibility of comprehension. It must fail to master an event through representation, while persisting in the attempt. When victims speak for themselves, their words are recorded by the State, and O'Donnell uses this record to objectify their language, the event being monumentalized is the moment these people become victims of state violence. O'Donnell's work renders their objectification visible. But when the warden speaks for the victim, or monumentalizes his or her own assumption of words uttered, and O'Donnell uses this record, it is not the testimony of the prisoner/victim that is monumentalized. The event O'Donnell represents in the second instance is the State's attempt to naturalize a binary power relationship between itself and the prisoner.

I have read Didi-Huberman and Johnson together to argue that objectification is a process by which subjects are rendered mute through the exclusion of their speech from their subjective representation. I also argued that this is a patriarchal process in so far as it manufactures confusion about what the marked terms wants done to her, a confusion that is used to justify her subjugation to the desire of the un-marked term. I would put death row-prisoners in the category of objectified person because they are marked by the State and their marking is naturalized. The narrative of naturalization goes like this: a prison's function isn't to produce and perpetuate unequal power relations; its function is to sanction "bad people."

What O'Donnell pictures—namely, that the State refuses these people the right to silence—undoes for just a moment the careful naturalization of its violence against them. The State slips to reveal its need control, its need to maintain the prisoner as the marked, subjugated term, even beyond the end. And yet the State fails in this. Because it is possible to lift the words out of the forms in which they were lodged by a given warden, it is possible to read them as a record of violence. Like the Abu Ghraib photographs in structure, although certainly not in degree or content, phrases like "The attorney said back to him I love you too" or "Profanity directed towards staff" are homeless. The works' brutality lies precisely in that State coercion is visible, that consent is manifestly absent. These sentences, unlike those uttered self-consciously by the victims themselves, are unmoored from a frame of reference that might serve to stabilize their ethical meaning.

These sentences are valuable, then, not as some contradiction materialized but because they provide the viewer with an opportunity to feel outrage or some more subtle form of discomfort about what they are reading and, as Butler suggests, to "construct political views to incorporate and articulate that outrage."²⁶ It is through the representation of speech that we recognize mechanisms used to silence the marked subjects in our society, which, in turn, allows us to discern that which we will not tolerate and do not excuse ■

²⁶ Ibid.

THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT

MICHAEL O'DONNELL

**Mumbled something about he wished his
whole life would have been spent as Islamic**

Profanity directed toward staff

He spoke in Irish, translating to Goodbye

Thanked his family

The attorney said back to him I love you too

Then he coughed and nothing else was said

A couple of sentences garbled

**But as he lay there he did praise the Lord
and seemed to be praying**

**Remaining portion of statement omitted
due to profanity**





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
MICHAEL O'DONNELL






































THE EXHIBITIONARY COMPLEX

TONY BENNETT

In reviewing Foucault on the asylum, the clinic, and the prison as institutional articulations of power and knowledge relations, Douglas Crimp suggests that there 'is another such institution of confinement ripe for analysis in Foucault's terms – the museum – and another discipline – art history' (Crimp 1985: 45). Crimp is no doubt right, although the terms of his proposal are misleadingly restrictive. For the emergence of the art museum was closely related to that of a wider range of institutions – history and natural science museums, dioramas and panoramas, national and, later, international exhibitions, arcades and department stores – which served as linked sites for the development and circulation of new disciplines (history, biology, art history, anthropology) and their discursive formations (the past, evolution, aesthetics, man) as well as for the development of new technologies of vision. Furthermore, while these comprised an intersecting set of institutional and disciplinary relations which might be productively analysed as particular articulations of power and knowledge, the suggestion that they should be construed as institutions of confinement is curious. It seems to imply that works of art had previously wandered through the streets of Europe like the Ships of Fools in Foucault's *Madness and Civilisation*; or that geological and natural history specimens had been displayed before the world, like the condemned on the scaffold, rather than being withheld from public gaze, secreted in the *studiolo* of princes, or made accessible only to the limited gaze of high society in the *cabinets des curieux* of the aristocracy (Figure 2.1). Museums may have enclosed objects within walls, but the nineteenth century saw their doors opened to the general public – witnesses whose presence was just as essential to a display of power as had been that of the people before the spectacle of punishment in the eighteenth century.

Institutions, then, not of confinement but of exhibition, forming a complex of disciplinary and power relations whose development might more fruitfully be juxtaposed to, rather than aligned with, the formation of Foucault's 'carceral archipelago'. For the movement Foucault traces in *Discipline and Punish* is one in which objects and bodies – the scaffold and the body of the condemned – which had previously formed a part of the public display of power were withdrawn from the public gaze as punishment increasingly took the form of incarceration. No longer inscribed within a public dramaturgy of power, the body of the condemned comes to be caught up within an inward-looking web of power relations. Subjected to omnipresent forms of surveillance through which the message of power was carried directly to it so as to render it docile, the body no longer served as the surface on which, through the system of retaliatory marks inflicted on it in the name of the sovereign, the lessons of power were written for others to read:

The scaffold, where the body of the tortured criminal had been exposed to the ritually manifest force of the sovereign, the punitive theatre in which the representation of punishment was permanently available to the social body, was replaced by a great enclosed, complex and hierarchised structure that was integrated into the very body of the state apparatus.

(Foucault 1977: 115–16)

The institutions comprising 'the exhibitionary complex', by contrast, were involved in the transfer of objects and bodies from the enclosed and private domains in which they had previously been displayed (but to a restricted public) into progressively more open and public arenas where, through the representations to which they were subjected, they formed vehicles for inscribing and broadcasting the messages of power (but of a different type) throughout society.

Two different sets of institutions and their accompanying knowledge/power relations, then, whose histories, in these respects, run in opposing directions. Yet they are also parallel histories. The exhibitionary complex and the carceral archipelago develop over roughly the same period – the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century – and achieve developed articulations of the new principles they embodied within a decade or so of one another. Foucault regards the opening of the new prison at Mettray in 1840 as a key moment in the development of the carceral system. Why Mettray? Because, Foucault argues, 'it is the disciplinary form at its most extreme, the model in which are concentrated all the coercive technologies of behaviour previously found in the cloister, prison, school or regiment and which, in being brought together in one place, served as a guide for the future development of carceral institutions' (Foucault 1977: 293). In Britain, the opening of Pentonville Model Prison in 1842 is often viewed in a similar light. Less than a decade later the Great Exhibition of 1851 (see Figure 2.2) brought together an ensemble of disciplines and techniques of display that had been developed within the previous histories of museums, panoramas, Mechanics' Institute exhibitions, art galleries, and arcades. In doing so, it translated these into exhibitionary forms which, in simultaneously ordering objects for public inspection and ordering the public that inspected, were to have a profound and lasting influence on the subsequent development of museums, art galleries, expositions, and department stores.

Nor are these entirely separate histories. At certain points they overlap, often with a transfer of meanings and effects between them. To understand their interrelations, however, it will be necessary, in borrowing from Foucault, to qualify the terms he proposes for investigating the development of power/knowledge relations during the formation of the modern period. For the set of such relations associated with the development of the exhibitionary complex serves as a check to the generalizing conclusions Foucault derives from his examination of the carceral system. In particular, it calls into question his suggestion that the penitentiary merely perfected the individualizing and normalizing technologies associated with a veritable swarming of forms of surveillance and disciplinary mechanisms which came to suffuse society with a new – and all pervasive – political economy of power. This is not to suggest that technologies of surveillance had no place in the exhibitionary complex but rather that their entanglement with new forms of spectacle produced a more complex and nuanced set of relations through which power was exercised and relayed to – and, in part, through and by – the populace than the Foucaultian account allows.

Foucault's primary concern, of course, is with the problem of order. He conceives the development of new forms of discipline and surveillance, as Jeffrey Minson puts it, as an 'attempt to reduce an ungovernable *populace* to a multiply differentiated *population*', parts of 'an historical movement aimed at transforming highly disruptive economic conflicts and political forms of disorder into quasi-technical or moral problems for social administration'. These mechanisms assumed, Minson continues, 'that the key to the populace's social and political unruliness and also the means of combating it lies in the "opacity" of the populace to the forces of order' (Minson 1985: 24). The exhibitionary complex was also a response to the problem of order, but one which worked differently in seeking to transform that problem into one of culture – a question of winning hearts and minds as well as the disciplining and training of bodies. As such, its constituent institutions reversed the orientations of the disciplinary apparatuses in seeking to render the forces and principles of order visible to the populace – transformed, here, into a people, a citizenry – rather than vice versa. They sought not to map the social body in order to know the populace by rendering it visible to power. Instead, through the provision of object lessons in power – the power to command and arrange things and bodies for public display – they sought to allow the people, and *en masse* rather than individually, to know rather than be known, to become the subjects rather than the objects of knowledge. Yet, ideally, they sought also to allow the people to know and thence to regulate themselves; to become, in seeing themselves from the side of power, both the subjects and the objects of knowledge, knowing power and what power knows, and knowing themselves as (ideally) known by power, interiorizing its gaze as a principle of self-surveillance and, hence, self-regulation.

It is, then, as a set of cultural technologies concerned to organize a voluntarily self-regulating citizenry that I propose to examine the formation of the exhibitionary complex. In doing so, I shall draw on the Gramscian perspective of the ethical and educative function of the modern state to account for the relations of this complex to the development of the bourgeois democratic polity. Yet, while wishing to resist a tendency in Foucault towards misplaced generalizations, it is to Foucault's work that I shall look to unravel the relations between knowledge and power effected by the technologies of vision embodied in the architectural forms of the exhibitionary complex.

DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, SPECTACLE

In discussing the proposals of late eighteenth-century penal reformers, Foucault remarks that punishment, while remaining a 'legible lesson' organized in relation to the body of the offended, was envisioned as 'a school rather than a festival; an ever-open book rather than a ceremony' (Foucault 1977: 111). Hence, in schemes to use convict labour in public contexts, it was envisaged that the convict would repay society twice: once by the labour he provided, and a second time by the signs he produced, a focus of both profit and signification in serving as an ever-present reminder of the connection between crime and punishment:

Children should be allowed to come to the places where the penalty is being carried out; there they will attend their classes in civics. And grown men will periodically relearn the laws. Let us conceive of places of punishment as a Garden of the Laws that families would visit on Sundays. (Foucault 1977: 111)

In the event, punishment took a different path with the development of the carceral system. Under both the *ancien régime* and the projects of the late eighteenth-century reformers, punishment had formed part of a public system of representation. Both regimes obeyed a logic according to which 'secret punishment is a punishment half-wasted' (Foucault 1977: 111). With the development of the carceral system, by contrast, punishment was removed from the public gaze in being enacted behind the closed walls of the penitentiary, and had in view not the production of signs for society but the correction of the offender. No longer an art of public effects, punishment aimed at a calculated transformation in the behaviour of the convicted. The body of the offender, no longer a medium for the relay of signs of power, was zoned as the target for disciplinary technologies which sought to modify the behaviour through repetition.

The body and the soul, as principles of behaviour, form the element that is now proposed for punitive intervention. Rather than on an art of representation, this punitive intervention must rest on a studied manipulation of the individual. . . . As for the instruments used, these are no longer complexes of representation, reinforced and circulated, but forms of coercion, schemata of restraint, applied and repeated. Exercises, not signs . . . (Foucault 1977: 128)

It is not this account itself that is in question here but some of the more general claims Foucault elaborates on its basis. In his discussion of 'the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms', Foucault argues that the disciplinary technologies and forms of observation developed in the carceral system – and especially the principle of panopticism, rendering everything visible to the eye of power – display a tendency 'to become "de-institutionalised"', to emerge from the closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to

circulate in a “free” state’ (Foucault 1977: 211). These new systems of surveillance, mapping the social body so as to render it knowable and amenable to social regulation, mean, Foucault argues, that ‘one can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society . . . that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social “quarantine”, to an indefinitely generalisable mechanism of “panopticism”’ (ibid.: 216). A society, according to Foucault in his approving quotation of Julius, that ‘is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance’:

Antiquity had been a civilisation of spectacle. ‘To render accessible to a multitude of men the inspection of a small number of objects’: this was the problem to which the architecture of temples, theatres and circuses responded In a society in which the principal elements are no longer the community and public life, but, on the one hand, private individuals and, on the other, the state, relations can be regulated only in a form that is the exact reverse of the spectacle. It was to the modern age, to the ever-growing influence of the state, to its ever more profound intervention in all the details and all the relations of social life, that was reserved the task of increasing and perfecting its guarantees, by using and directing towards that great aim the building and distribution of buildings intended to observe a great multitude of men at the same time.

(Foucault 1977: 216–17)

A disciplinary society: this general characterization of the modality of power in modern societies has proved one of the more influential aspects of Foucault’s work. Yet it is an incautious generalization and one produced by a peculiar kind of misattention. For it by no means follows from the fact that punishment had ceased to be a spectacle that the function of displaying power – of making it visible for all to see – had itself fallen into abeyance.¹ Indeed, as Graeme Davison suggests, the Crystal Palace might serve as the emblem of an architectural series which could be ranged against that of the asylum, school, and prison in its continuing concern with the display of objects to a great multitude:

The Crystal Palace reversed the panoptical principle by fixing the eyes of the multitude upon an assemblage of glamorous commodities. The Panopticon was designed so that everyone could be seen; the Crystal Palace was designed so that everyone could see.

(Davison 1982/83: 7)

This opposition is a little overstated in that one of the architectural innovations of the Crystal Palace consisted in the arrangement of relations between the public and exhibits so that, while everyone could see, there were also vantage points from which everyone could be seen, thus combining the functions of spectacle and surveillance. None the less, the shift of emphasis is worth preserving for the moment, particularly as its force is by no means limited to the Great Exhibition. Even a cursory glance through Richard Altick’s *The Shows of London* convinces that the nineteenth century was quite unprecedented in the social effort it devoted to the organization of spectacles arranged for increasingly large and

undifferentiated publics (Altick 1978). Several aspects of these developments merit a preliminary consideration.

First, the tendency for society itself – in its constituent parts and as a whole – to be rendered as a spectacle. This was especially clear in attempts to render the city visible, and hence knowable, as a totality. While the depths of city life were penetrated by developing networks of surveillance, cities increasingly opened up their processes to public inspection, laying their secrets open not merely to the gaze of power but, in principle, to that of everyone; indeed, making the specular dominance of the eye of power available to all. By the turn of the century, Dean MacCannell notes, sightseers in Paris ‘were given tours of the sewers, the morgue, a slaughterhouse, a tobacco factory, the government printing office, a tapestry works, the mint, the stock exchange and the supreme court in session’ (MacCannell 1976: 57). No doubt such tours conferred only an imaginary dominance over the city, an illusory rather than substantive controlling vision, as Dana Brand suggests was the case with earlier panoramas (Brand 1986). Yet the principle they embodied was real enough and, in seeking to render cities knowable in exhibiting the workings of their organizing institutions, they are without parallel in the spectacles of earlier regimes where the view of power was always ‘from below’. This ambition towards a specular dominance over a totality was even more evident in the conception of international exhibitions which, in their heyday, sought to make the whole world, past and present, metonymically available in the assemblages of objects and peoples they brought together and, from their towers, to lay it before a controlling vision.

Second, the increasing involvement of the state in the provision of such spectacles. In the British case, and even more so the American, such involvement was typically indirect.ⁱⁱ Nicholas Pearson notes that while the sphere of culture fell increasingly under governmental regulation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the preferred form of administration for museums, art galleries, and exhibitions was (and remains) via boards of trustees. Through these, the state could retain effective direction over policy by virtue of its control over appointments but without involving itself in the day-to-day conduct of affairs and so, seemingly, violating the Kantian imperative in subordinating culture to practical requirements (Pearson 1982: 8–13, 46–7). Although the state was initially prodded only reluctantly into this sphere of activity, there should be no doubt of the importance it eventually assumed. Museums, galleries, and, more intermittently, exhibitions played a pivotal role in the formation of the modern state and are fundamental to its conception as, among other things, a set of educative and civilizing agencies. Since the late nineteenth century, they have been ranked highly in the funding priorities of all developed nation-states and have proved remarkably influential cultural technologies in the degree to which they have recruited the interest and participation of their citizenries.

Finally, the exhibitionary complex provided a context for the *permanent* display of power/knowledge. In his discussion of the display of power in the *ancien régime*, Foucault

stresses its episodic quality. The spectacle of the scaffold formed part of a system of power which 'in the absence of continual supervision, sought a renewal of its effect in the spectacle of its individual manifestations; of a power that was recharged in the ritual display of its reality as "super-power"' (Foucault 1977: 57). It is not that the nineteenth century dispensed entirely with the need for the periodic magnification of power through its excessive display, for the expositions played this role. They did so, however, in relation to a network of institutions which provided mechanisms for the permanent display of power. And for a power which was not reduced to periodic effects but which, to the contrary, manifested itself precisely in continually displaying its ability to command, order, and control objects and bodies, living or dead.

There is, then, another series from the one Foucault examines in tracing the shift from the ceremony of the scaffold to the disciplinary rigours of the penitentiary. Yet it is a series which has its echo and, in some respects, model in another section of the socio-judicial apparatus: the trial. The scene of the trial and that of punishment traversed one another as they moved in opposite directions during the early modern period. As punishment was withdrawn from the public gaze and transferred to the enclosed space of the penitentiary, so the procedures of trial and sentencing – which, except for England, had hitherto been mostly conducted in secret, 'opaque not only to the public but also to the accused himself' (Foucault 1977: 35) – were made public as part of a new system of judicial truth which, in order to function as truth, needed to be made known to all. If the asymmetry of these movements is compelling, it is no more so than the symmetry of the movement traced by the trial and the museum in the transition they make from closed and restricted to open and public contexts. And, as a part of a profound transformation in their social functioning, it was ultimately to these institutions – and not by witnessing punishment enacted in the streets nor, as Bentham had envisaged, by making the penitentiaries open to public inspection – that children, and their parents, were invited to attend their lessons in civics.

Moreover, such lessons consisted not in a display of power which, in seeking to terrorize, positioned the people on the other side of power as its potential recipients but sought rather to place the people – conceived as a nationalized citizenry – on this side of power, both its subject and its beneficiary. To identify with power, to see it as, if not directly theirs, then indirectly so, a force regulated and channelled by society's ruling groups but for the good of all: this was the rhetoric of power embodied in the exhibitionary complex – a power made manifest not in its ability to inflict pain but by its ability to organize and co-ordinate an order of things and to produce a place for the people in relation to that order. Detailed studies of nineteenth-century expositions thus consistently highlight the ideological economy of their organizing principles, transforming displays of machinery and industrial processes, of finished products and *objets d'art*, into material signifiers of progress – but of progress as a collective national achievement with capital as the great co-ordinator (Silverman 1977, Rydell 1984). This power thus subjugated by flattery, placing itself on the

side of the people by affording them a place within its workings; a power which placed the people behind it, inveigled into complicity with it rather than cowed into submission before it. And this power marked out the distinction between the subjects and the objects of power not within the national body but, as organized by the many rhetorics of imperialism, between that body and other, 'non-civilized' peoples upon whose bodies the effects of power were unleashed with as much force and theatricality as had been manifest on the scaffold. This was, in other words, a power which aimed at a rhetorical effect through its representation of otherness rather than at any disciplinary effects.

Yet it is not merely in terms of its ideological economy that the exhibitionary complex must be assessed. While museums and expositions may have set out to win the hearts and minds of their visitors, these also brought their bodies with them creating architectural problems as vexed as any posed by the development of the carceral archipelago. The birth of the latter, Foucault argues, required a new architectural problematic:

that of an architecture that is no longer built simply to be seen (as with the ostentation of palaces), or to observe the external space (cf. the geometry of fortresses), but to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control – to render visible those who are inside it; in more general terms, an architecture that would operate to transform individuals: to act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them.

(Foucault 1977: 172)

As Davison notes, the development of the exhibitionary complex also posed a new demand: that everyone should see, and not just the ostentation of imposing façades but their contents too. This, too, created a series of architectural problems which were ultimately resolved only through a 'political economy of detail' similar to that applied to the regulation of the relations between bodies, space, and time within the penitentiary. In Britain, France, and Germany, the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed a spate of state-sponsored architectural competitions for the design of museums in which the emphasis shifted progressively away from organizing spaces of display for the private pleasure of the prince or aristocrat and towards an organization of space and vision that would enable museums to function as organs of public instruction (Seling 1967). Yet, as I have already suggested, it is misleading to view the architectural problematics of the exhibitionary complex as simply reversing the principles of panopticism. The effect of these principles, Foucault argues, was to abolish the crowd conceived as 'a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, individualities merging together, a collective effect' and to replace it with 'a collection of separated individualities' (Foucault 1977: 201). However, as John MacArthur notes, the Panopticon is simply a technique, not itself a disciplinary regime or essentially a part of one, and, like all techniques, its potential effects are not exhausted by its deployment within any of the regimes in which it happens to be used (MacArthur 1983: 192–3). The

peculiarity of the exhibitionary complex is not to be found in its reversal of the principles of the Panopticon. Rather, it consists in its incorporation of aspects of those principles together with those of the panorama, forming a technology of vision which served not to atomize and disperse the crowd but to regulate it, and to do so by rendering it visible to itself, by making the crowd itself the ultimate spectacle.

An instruction from a 'Short Sermon to Sightseers' at the 1901 Pan-American Exposition enjoined: 'Please remember when you get inside the gates you are part of the show' (cited in Harris 1978: 144). This was also true of museums and department stores which, like many of the main exhibition halls of expositions, frequently contained galleries affording a superior vantage point from which the layout of the whole and the activities of other visitors could also be observed.ⁱⁱⁱ It was, however, the expositions which developed this characteristic furthest in constructing viewing positions from which they could be surveyed as totalities: the function of the Eiffel Tower at the 1889 Paris exposition, for example. To see and be seen, to survey yet always be under surveillance, the object of an unknown but controlling look: in these ways, as micro-worlds rendered constantly visible to themselves, expositions realized some of the ideals of panopticism in transforming the crowd into a constantly surveyed, self-watching, self-regulating, and, as the historical record suggests, consistently orderly public – a society watching over itself.

Within the hierarchically organized system of looks of the penitentiary in which each level of looking is monitored by a higher one, the inmate constitutes the point at which all these looks culminate but he is unable to return a look of his own or move to a higher level of vision. The exhibitionary complex, by contrast, perfected a self-monitoring system of looks in which the subject and object positions can be exchanged, in which the crowd comes to commune with and regulate itself through interiorizing the ideal and ordered view of itself as seen from the controlling vision of power – a site of sight accessible to all. It was in thus democratizing the eye of power that the expositions realized Bentham's aspiration for a system of looks within which the central position would be available to the public at all times, a model lesson in civics in which a society regulated itself through self-observation. But, of course, self-observation from a certain perspective. As Manfredo Tafuri puts it:

The arcades and the department stores of Paris, like the great expositions, were certainly the places in which the crowd, itself become a spectacle, found the spatial and visual means for a self-education from the point of view of capital.

(Tafuri 1976: 83)

However, this was not an achievement of architecture alone. Account must also be taken of the forces which, in shaping the exhibitionary complex, formed both its publics and its rhetorics.

SEEING THINGS

It seems unlikely, come the revolution, that it will occur to anyone to storm the British Museum. Perhaps it always was. Yet, in the early days of its history, the fear that it might incite the vengeance of the mob was real enough. In 1780, in the midst of the Gordon Riots, troops were housed in the gardens and building and, in 1848, when the Chartists marched to present the People's Charter to Parliament, the authorities prepared to defend the museum as vigilantly as if it had been a penitentiary. The museum staff were sworn in as special constables; fortifications were constructed around the perimeter; a garrison of museum staff, regular troops, and Chelsea pensioners, armed with muskets, pikes, and cutlasses, and with provisions for a three-day siege, occupied the buildings; stones were carried to the roof to be hurled down on the Chartists should they succeed in breaching the outer defences.^{iv}

This fear of the crowd haunted debates on the museum's policy for over a century. Acknowledged as one of the first public museums, its conception of the public was a limited one. Visitors were admitted only in groups of fifteen and were obliged to submit their credentials for inspection prior to admission which was granted only if they were found to be 'not exceptionable' (Wittlin 1949: 113). When changes to this policy were proposed, they were resisted by both the museum's trustees and its curators, apprehensive that the unruliness of the mob would mar the ordered display of culture and knowledge. When, shortly after the museum's establishment, it was proposed that there be public days on which unrestricted access would be allowed, the proposal was scuttled on the grounds, as one trustee put it, that some of the visitors from the streets would inevitably be 'in liquor' and 'will never be kept in order'. And if public days should be allowed, Dr Ward continued:

then it will be necessary for the Trustees to have a presence of a Committee of themselves attending, with at least two Justices of the Peace and the constables of the division of Bloomsbury . . . supported by a guard such as one as usually attends at the Play-House, and even after all this, Accidents must and will happen.
(Cited in Miller 1974: 62)

Similar objections were raised when, in 1835, a select committee was appointed to inquire into the management of the museum and suggested that it might be opened over Easter to facilitate attendance by the labouring classes. A few decades later, however, the issue had been finally resolved in favour of the reformers. The most significant shift in the state's attitude towards museums was marked by the opening of the South Kensington Museum in 1857 (Figure 2.3). Administered, eventually, under the auspices of the Board of Education, the museum was officially dedicated to the service of an extended and undifferentiated public with opening hours and an admissions policy designed to maximize its accessibility to the working classes. It proved remarkably successful, too, attracting over 15 million visits between 1857 and 1883, over 6.5 million of which were recorded in the

evenings, the most popular time for working-class visitors who, it seems, remained largely sober. Henry Cole, the first director of the museum and an ardent advocate of the role museums should play in the formation of a rational public culture, pointedly rebutted the conceptions of the unruly mob which had informed earlier objections to open admissions policies. Informing a House of Commons committee in 1860 that only one person had had to be excluded for not being able to walk steadily, he went on to note that the sale of alcohol in the refreshment rooms had averaged out, as Altick summarizes it, at 'two and a half drops of wine, fourteen-fifteenths of a drop of brandy, and ten and a half drops of bottled ale per capita' (Altick 1978: 500). As the evidence of the orderliness of the newly extended museum public mounted, even the British Museum relented and, in 1883, embarked on a programme of electrification to permit evening opening.

The South Kensington Museum thus marked a significant turning-point in the development of British museum policy in clearly enunciating the principles of the modern museum conceived as an instrument of public education. It provided the axis around which London's museum complex was to develop throughout the rest of the century and exerted a strong influence on the development of museums in the provincial cities and towns. These now rapidly took advantage of the Museum Bill of 1845 (hitherto used relatively sparingly) which empowered local authorities to establish museums and art galleries: the number of public museums in Britain increased from 50 in 1860 to 200 in 1900 (White 1983). In its turn, however, the South Kensington Museum had derived its primary impetus from the Great Exhibition which, in developing a new pedagogic relation between state and people, had also subdued the spectre of the crowd. This spectre had been raised again in the debates set in motion by the proposal that admission to the exhibition should be free. It could only be expected, one correspondent to *The Times* argued, that both the rules of decorum and the rights of property would be violated if entry were made free to 'his majesty the mob'. These fears were exacerbated by the revolutionary upheavals of 1848, occasioning several European monarchs to petition that the public be banned from the opening ceremony (planned for May Day) for fear that this might spark off an insurrection which, in turn, might give rise to a general European conflagration (Shorter 1966). And then there was the fear of social contagion should the labouring classes be allowed to rub shoulders with the upper classes.

In the event, the Great Exhibition proved a transitional form. While open to all, it also stratified its public in providing different days for different classes of visitors regulated by varying prices of admission. In spite of this limitation, the exhibition proved a major spur to the development of open-door policies. Attracting over 6 million visitors itself, it also vastly stimulated the attendance at London's main historic sites and museums: visits to the British Museum, for example, increased from 720,643 in 1850 to 2,230,242 in 1851 (Altick 1978: 467). Perhaps more important, though, was the orderliness of the public which, in spite of the 1,000 extra constables and 10,000 troops kept on stand-by, proved duly appreciative,

decorous in its bearing and entirely apolitical. More than that, the exhibition transformed the many-headed mob into an ordered crowd, a part of the spectacle and a sight of pleasure in itself. Victoria, in recording her impressions of the opening ceremony, dwelt particularly on her pleasure in seeing so large, so orderly, and so peaceable a crowd assembled in one place:

The Green Park and Hyde Park were one mass of densely crowded human beings, in the highest good humour and most enthusiastic. I never saw Hyde Park look as it did, being filled with crowds as far as the eye could see.

(Cited in Gibbs-Smith 1981: 18)

Nor was this entirely unprepared for. The working-class public the exhibition attracted was one whose conduct had been regulated into appropriate forms in the earlier history of the Mechanics Institute exhibitions. Devoted largely to the display of industrial objects and processes, these exhibitions pioneered policies of low admission prices and late opening hours to encourage working-class attendance long before these were adopted within the official museum complex. In doing so, moreover, they sought to tutor their visitors on the modes of deportment required if they were to be admitted. Instruction booklets advised working-class visitors how to present themselves, placing particular stress on the need to change out of their working clothes – partly so as not to soil the exhibits, but also so as not to detract from the pleasures of the overall spectacle; indeed, to become parts of it:

Here is a visitor of another sort; the mechanic has resolved to treat himself with a few hours' holiday and recreation; he leaves the 'grimy shop', the dirty bench, and donning his Saturday night suit he appears before us – an honourable and worthy object.

(Kusamitsu 1980: 77)

In brief, the Great Exhibition and subsequently the public museums developed in its wake found themselves heirs to a public which had already been formed by a set of pedagogic relations which, developed initially by voluntary organizations – in what Gramsci would call the realm of civil society – were henceforward to be more thoroughly promoted within the social body in being subjected to the direction of the state.

Not, then, a history of confinement but one of the opening up of objects to more public contexts of inspection and visibility: this is the direction of movement embodied in the formation of the exhibitionary complex. A movement which simultaneously helped to form a new public and inscribe it in new relations of sight and vision. Of course, the precise trajectory of these developments in Britain was not followed elsewhere in Europe. None the less, the general direction of development was the same. While earlier collections (whether of scientific objects, curiosities, or works of art) had gone under a variety of names (museums, *studioli*, *cabinets des curieux*, *Wunderkammern*, *Kunstkammern*) and fulfilled a

variety of functions (the storing and dissemination of knowledge, the display of princely and aristocratic power, the advancement of reputations and careers), they had mostly shared two principles: that of private ownership and that of restricted access.^v The formation of the exhibitionary complex involved a break with both in effecting the transfer of significant quantities of cultural and scientific property from private into public ownership where they were housed within institutions administered by the state for the benefit of an extended general public.

The significance of the formation of the exhibitionary complex, viewed in this perspective, was that of providing new instruments for the moral and cultural regulation of the working classes. Museums and expositions, in drawing on the techniques and rhetorics of display and pedagogic relations developed in earlier nineteenth-century exhibitionary forms, provided a context in which the working- and middle-class publics could be brought together and the former – having been tutored into forms of behaviour to suit them for the occasion – could be exposed to the improving influence of the latter. A history, then, of the formation of a new public and its inscription in new relations of power and knowledge. But a history accompanied by a parallel one aimed at the destruction of earlier traditions of popular exhibition and the publics they implied and produced. In Britain, this took the form, *inter alia*, of a concerted attack on popular fairs owing to their association with riot, carnival, and, in their side-shows, the display of monstrosities and curiosities which, no longer enjoying elite patronage, were now perceived as impediments to the rationalizing influence of the restructured exhibitionary complex.

Yet, by the end of the century, fairs were to be actively promoted as an aid rather than a threat to public order. This was partly because the mechanization of fairs meant that their entertainments were increasingly brought into line with the values of industrial civilization, a testimony to the virtues of progress.^{vi} But it was also a consequence of changes in the conduct of fairgoers. By the end of the century, Hugh Cunningham argues, 'fairgoing had become a relatively routine ingredient in the accepted world of leisure' as 'fairs became tolerated, safe, and in due course a subject of nostalgia and revival' (Cunningham 1982: 163). The primary site for this transformation of fairs and the conduct of their publics – although never quite so complete as Cunningham suggests – was supplied by the fair zones of the late-nineteenth-century expositions. It was here that two cultures abutted on to one another, the fair zones forming a kind of buffer region between the official and the popular culture with the former seeking to reach into the latter and moderate it. Initially, these fair zones established themselves independently of the official expositions and their organizing committees. The product of the initiative of popular showmen and private traders eager to exploit the market the expositions supplied, they consisted largely of an *ad hoc* melange of both new (mechanical rides) and traditional popular entertainments (freak shows, etc.) which frequently mocked the pretensions of the expositions they adjoined. Burton Benedict

summarizes the relations between expositions and their amusement zones in late nineteenth-century America as follows:

Many of the display techniques used in the amusement zone seemed to parody those of the main fair. Gigantism became enormous toys or grotesque monsters. Impressive high structures became collapsing or whirling amusement 'rides'. The solemn female allegorical figures that symbolised nations (Miss Liberty, Britannia) were replaced by comic male figures (Uncle Sam, John Bull). At the Chicago fair of 1893 the gilded female statue of the Republic on the Court of Honour contrasted with a large mechanical Uncle Sam on the Midway that delivered forty thousand speeches on the virtues of Hub Gore shoe elastics. Serious propagandists for manufacturers and governments in the main fair gave way to barkers and pitch men. The public no longer had to play the role of impressed spectators. They were invited to become frivolous participants. Order was replaced by jumble, and instruction by entertainment.

(Benedict 1983: 53–4)

As Benedict goes on to note, the resulting tension between unofficial fair and official exposition led to 'exposition organisers frequently attempting to turn the amusement zone into an educational enterprise or at least to regulate the type of exhibit shown'. In this, they were never entirely successful. Into the twentieth-century, the amusement zones remained sites of illicit pleasures – of burlesque shows and prostitution – and of ones which the expositions themselves aimed to render archaic. Altick's 'monster-mongers and retailers of other strange sights' seem to have been as much in evidence at the Panama Pacific Exhibition of 1915 as they had been, a century earlier, at St Bartholomew's Fair, Wordsworth's Parliament of Monsters (McCullough 1966: 76). None the less, what was evident was a significant restructuring in the ideological economy of such amusement zones as a consequence of the degree to which, in subjecting them to more stringent forms of control and direction, exposition authorities were able to align their thematics to those of the official expositions themselves and, thence, to those of the rest of the exhibitionary complex. Museums, the evidence suggests, appealed largely to the middle classes and the skilled and respectable working classes and it seems likely that the same was true of expositions. The link between expositions and their adjoining fair zones, however, provided a route through which the exhibitionary complex and the disciplines and knowledges which shaped its rhetorics acquired a far wider and more extensive social influence.

THE EXHIBITIONARY DISCIPLINES

The space of representation constituted by the exhibitionary complex was shaped by the relations between an array of new disciplines: history, art history, archaeology, geology, biology, and anthropology. Whereas the disciplines associated with the carceral archipelago were concerned to reduce aggregates to individualities, rendering the latter visible to power and so amenable to control, the orientation of these disciplines – as deployed in the exhibitionary complex – might best be summarized as that of ‘show and tell’. They tended also to be generalizing in their focus. Each discipline, in its museological deployment, aimed at the representation of a type and its insertion in a developmental sequence for display to a public.

Such principles of classification and display were alien to the eighteenth century. Thus, in Sir John Soane’s Museum, architectural styles are displayed in order to demonstrate their essential permanence rather than their change and development (Davies 1984: 54). The emergence of a historicized framework for the display of human artefacts in early-nineteenth-century museums was thus a significant innovation. But not an isolated one. As Stephen Bann shows, the emergence of a ‘historical frame’ for the display of museum exhibits was concurrent with the development of an array of disciplinary and other practices which aimed at the life-like reproduction of an authenticated past and its representation as a series of stages leading to the present – the new practices of history writing associated with the historical novel and the development of history as an empirical discipline, for example (Bann 1984). Between them, these constituted a new space of representation concerned to depict the development of peoples, states, and civilizations through time conceived as a progressive series of developmental stages.

The French Revolution, Germaine Bazin suggests, played a key role in opening up this space of representation by breaking the chain of dynastic succession that had previously vouchsafed a unity to the flow and organization of time (Bazin 1967: 218). Certainly, it was in France that historicized principles of museum display were first developed. Bazin stresses the formative influence of the Musée des monuments français (1795) in exhibiting works of art in galleries devoted to different periods, the visitor’s route leading from earlier to later periods, with a view to demonstrating both the painterly conventions peculiar to each epoch and their historical development. He accords a similar significance to Alexandre du Sommerard’s collection at the Hôtel de Cluny which, as Bann shows, aimed at ‘an integrative construction of historical totalities’, creating the impression of a historically authentic milieu by suggesting an essential and organic connection between artefacts displayed in rooms classified by period (Bann 1984: 85).

Bann argues that these two principles – the *galleria progressiva* and the period room, sometimes employed singly, at others in combination – constitute the distinctive poetics of the modern historical museum. It is important to add, though, that this poetics displayed a

marked tendency to be nationalized. If, as Bazin suggests, the museum became 'one of the fundamental institutions of the modern state' (Bazin 1967: 169), that state was also increasingly a nation-state. The significance of this was manifested in the relations between two new historical times – national and universal – which resulted from an increase in the vertical depth of historical time as it was both pushed further and further back into the past and brought increasingly up to date. Under the impetus of the rivalry between France and Britain for dominion in the Middle East, museums, in close association with archaeological excavations of progressively deeper pasts, extended their time horizons beyond the medieval period and the classical antiquities of Greece and Rome to encompass the remnants of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian civilizations. At the same time, the recent past was historicized as the newly emerging nation-states sought to preserve and immortalize their own formation as a part of that process of 'nationing' their populations that was essential to their further development. It was as a consequence of the first of these developments that the prospect of a universal history of civilization was opened up to thought and materialized in the archaeological collections of the great nineteenth-century museums. The second development, however, led to these universal histories being annexed to national histories as, within the rhetorics of each national museum complex, collections of national materials were represented as the outcome and culmination of the universal story of civilization's development.

Nor had displays of natural or geological specimens been organized historically in the various precursors of nineteenth-century public museums. Throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century, principles of scientific classification testified to a mixture of theocratic, rationalist, and proto-evolutionist systems of thought. Translated into principles of museological display, the result was the table, not the series, with species being arranged in terms of culturally codified similarities/dissimilarities in their external appearances rather than being ordered into temporally organized relations of precession/succession. The crucial challenges to such conceptions came from developments within geology and biology, particularly where their researches overlapped in the stratigraphical study of fossil remains.^{vii} However, the details of these developments need not concern us here. So far as their implications for museums were concerned, their main significance was that of allowing for organic life to be conceived and represented as a temporally ordered succession of different forms of life where the transitions between them were accounted for not as a result of external shocks (as had been the case in the eighteenth century) but as the consequence of an inner momentum inscribed within the concept of life itself.^{viii}

If developments within history and archaeology thus allowed for the emergence of new forms of classification and display through which the stories of nations could be told and related to the longer story of Western civilization's development, the discursive formations of nineteenth-century geology and biology allowed these cultural series to be inserted within the longer developmental series of geological and natural time. Museums of science and

technology, heirs to the rhetorics of progress developed in national and international exhibitions, completed the evolutionary picture in representing the history of industry and manufacture as a series of progressive innovations leading up to the contemporary triumphs of industrial capitalism.

Yet, in the context of late-nineteenth-century imperialism, it was arguably the employment of anthropology within the exhibitionary complex which proved most central to its ideological functioning. For it played the crucial role of connecting the histories of Western nations and civilizations to those of other peoples, but only by separating the two in providing for an interrupted continuity in the order of peoples and races – one in which ‘primitive peoples’ dropped out of history altogether in order to occupy a twilight zone between nature and culture. This function had been fulfilled earlier in the century by the museological display of anatomical peculiarities which seemed to confirm polygenetic conceptions of mankind’s origins. The most celebrated instance was that of Saartjie Baartman, the ‘Hottentot Venus’, whose protruding buttocks – interpreted as a sign of separate development – occasioned a flurry of scientific speculation when she was displayed in Paris and London. On her death in 1815, an autopsy revealed alleged peculiarities in her genitalia which, likened to those of the orang-utan, were cited as proof positive of the claim that black peoples were the product of a separate – and, of course, inferior, more primitive, and bestial – line of descent. No less an authority than Cuvier lent his support to this conception in circulating a report of Baartman’s autopsy and presenting her genital organs – ‘prepared in a way so as to allow one to see the nature of the labia’ (Cuvier, cited in Gilman 1985a: 214–15) – to the French Academy which arranged for their display in the Musée d’Ethnographie de Paris (now the Musée de l’homme).

Darwin’s rebuttal of theories of polygenesis entailed that different means be found for establishing and representing the fractured unity of the human species. By and large, this was achieved by the representation of ‘primitive peoples’ as instances of arrested development, as examples of an earlier stage of species development which Western civilizations had long ago surpassed. Indeed, such peoples were typically represented as the still-living examples of *the* earliest stage in human development, the point of transition between nature and culture, between ape and man, the missing link necessary to account for the transition between animal and human history. Denied any history of their own, it was the fate of ‘primitive peoples’ to be dropped out of the bottom of human history in order that they might serve, representationally, as its support – underlining the rhetoric of progress by serving as its counterpoints, representing the point at which human history emerges from nature but has not yet properly begun its course.

So far as the museological display of artefacts from such cultures was concerned, this resulted in their arrangement and display – as at the Pitt-Rivers Museum – in accordance with the genetic or typological system which grouped together all objects of a similar nature, irrespective of their ethnographic groupings, in an evolutionary series leading from the

simple to the complex (van Keuren 1989). However, it was with regard to the display of human remains that the consequences of these principles of classification were most dramatically manifested. In eighteenth-century museums, such displays had placed the accent on anatomical peculiarities, viewed primarily as a testimony to the rich diversity of the chain of universal being. By the late nineteenth century, however, human remains were most typically displayed as parts of evolutionary series with the remains of still extant peoples being allocated the earliest position within them. This was particularly true for the remains of Australian Aborigines. In the early years of Australian settlement, the colony's museums had displayed little or no interest in Aboriginal remains (Kohlstedt 1983). The triumph of evolutionary theory transformed this situation, leading to a systematic rape of Aboriginal sacred sites – by the representatives of British, European, and American as well as Australian museums – for materials to provide a representational foundation for the story of evolution within, tellingly enough, natural history displays.^{ix}

The space of representation constituted in the relations between the disciplinary knowledges deployed within the exhibitionary complex thus permitted the construction of a temporally organized order of things and peoples. Moreover, that order was a totalizing one, metonymically encompassing all things and all peoples in their interactions through time. And an order which organized the implied public – the white citizenries of the imperialist powers – into a unity, representationally effacing divisions within the body politic in constructing a 'we' conceived as the realization, and therefore just beneficiaries, of the processes of evolution and identified as a unity in opposition to the primitive otherness of conquered peoples. This was not entirely new. As Peter Stallybrass and Allon White note, the popular fairs of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had exoticized the grotesque imagery of the carnival tradition by projecting it on to the representatives of alien cultures. In thus providing a normalizing function via the construction of a radically different Other, the exhibition of other peoples served as a vehicle for 'the edification of a national public and the confirmation of its imperial superiority' (Stallybrass and White 1986: 42). If, in its subsequent development, the exhibitionary complex latched on to this preexisting representational space, what it added to it was a historical dimension.

THE EXHIBITIONARY APPARATUSES

The space of representation constituted by the exhibitionary disciplines, while conferring a degree of unity on the exhibitionary complex, was also somewhat differently occupied – and to different effect – by the institutions comprising that complex. If museums gave this space a solidity and permanence, this was achieved at the price of a lack of ideological flexibility. Public museums instituted an order of things that was meant to last. In doing so, they provided the modern state with a deep and continuous ideological backdrop but one which, if it was to play this role, could not be adjusted to respond to shorter-term ideological requirements. Exhibitions met this need, injecting new life into the exhibitionary complex and rendering its ideological configurations more pliable in bending them to serve the conjuncturely specific hegemonic strategies of different national bourgeoisies. They made the order of things dynamic, mobilizing it strategically in relation to the more immediate ideological and political exigencies of the particular moment.

This was partly an effect of the secondary discourses which accompanied exhibitions. Ranging from the state pageantry of their opening and closing ceremonies through newspaper reports to the veritable swarming of pedagogic initiatives organized by religious, philanthropic and scientific associations to take advantage of the publics which exhibitions produced, these often forged very direct and specific connections between the exhibitionary rhetoric of progress and the claims to leadership of particular social and political forces. The distinctive influence of the exhibitions themselves, however, consisted in their articulation of the rhetoric of progress to the rhetorics of nationalism and imperialism and in producing, via their control over their adjoining popular fairs, an expanded cultural sphere for the deployment of the exhibitionary disciplines.

The basic signifying currency of the exhibitions, of course, consisted in their arrangement of displays of manufacturing processes and products. Prior to the Great Exhibition, the message of progress had been carried by the arrangement of exhibits in, as Davison puts it, ‘a series of classes and subclasses ascending from raw products of nature, through various manufactured goods and mechanical devices, to the “highest” forms of applied and fine art’ (Davison 1982/83: 8). As such, the class articulations of this rhetoric were subject to some variation. Mechanics Institutes’ exhibitions placed considerable stress on the centrality of labour’s contributions to the processes of production which, at times, allowed a radical appropriation of their message. ‘The machinery of wealth, here displayed,’ the *Leeds Times* noted in reporting an 1839 exhibition, ‘has been created by the men of hammers and papercaps; more honourable than all the sceptres and coronets in the world’ (cited in Kusamitsu 1980: 79). The Great Exhibition introduced two changes which decisively influenced the future development of the form.

First, the stress was shifted from the *processes* to the *products* of production, divested of the marks of their making and ushered forth as signs of the productive and co-ordinating

power of capital and the state. After 1851, world fairs were to function less as vehicles for the technical education of the working classes than as instruments for their stupefaction before the reified products of their own labour, 'places of pilgrimage', as Benjamin put it, 'to the fetish Commodity' (Benjamin 1973: 165).

Second, while not entirely abandoned, the earlier progressivist taxonomy based on stages of production was subordinated to the dominating influence of principles of classification based on nations and the supra-national constructs of empires and races. Embodied, at the Crystal Palace, in the form of national courts or display areas, this principle was subsequently developed into that of separate pavilions for each participating country. Moreover, following an innovation of the Centennial Exhibition held at Philadelphia in 1876, these pavilions were typically zoned into racial groups: the Latin, Teutonic, Anglo-Saxon, American, and Oriental being the most favoured classifications, with black peoples and the aboriginal populations of conquered territories, denied any space of their own, being represented as subordinate adjuncts to the imperial displays of the major powers. The effect of these developments was to transfer the rhetoric of progress from the relations between stages of production to the relations between races and nations by superimposing the associations of the former on to the latter. In the context of imperial displays, subject peoples were thus represented as occupying the lowest levels of manufacturing civilization. Reduced to displays of 'primitive' handicrafts and the like, they were represented as cultures without momentum except for that benignly bestowed on them from without through the improving mission of the imperialist powers. Oriental civilizations were allotted an intermediate position in being represented either as having at one time been subject to development but subsequently degenerating into stasis or as embodying achievements of civilization which, while developed by their own lights, were judged inferior to the standards set by Europe (Harris 1975). In brief, a progressivist taxonomy for the classification of goods and manufacturing processes was laminated on to a crudely racist teleological conception of the relations between peoples and races which culminated in the achievements of the metropolitan powers, invariably most impressively displayed in the pavilions of the host country.

Exhibitions thus located their preferred audiences at the very pinnacle of the exhibitionary order of things they constructed. They also installed them at the threshold of greater things to come. Here, too, the Great Exhibition led the way in sponsoring a display of architectural projects for the amelioration of working-class housing conditions. This principle was to be developed, in subsequent exhibitions, into displays of elaborate projects for the improvement of social conditions in the areas of health, sanitation, education, and welfare – promissory notes that the engines of progress would be harnessed for the general good. Indeed, exhibitions came to function as promissory notes in their totalities, embodying, if just for a season, utopian principles of social organization which, when the time came for the notes to be redeemed, would eventually be realized in perpetuity. As

world fairs fell increasingly under the influence of modernism, the rhetoric of progress tended, as Rydell puts it, to be 'translated into a utopian statement about the future', promising the imminent dissipation of social tensions once progress had reached the point where its benefits might be generalized (Rydell 1984: 4).

Iain Chambers has argued that working- and middle-class cultures became sharply distinct in late nineteenth-century Britain as an urban commercial popular culture developed beyond the reach of the moral economy of religion and respectability. As a consequence, he argues, 'official culture was publicly limited to the rhetoric of monuments in the centre of town: the university, the museum, the theatre, the concert hall; otherwise it was reserved for the "private" space of the Victorian residence' (Chambers 1985: 9). While not disputing the general terms of this argument, it does omit any consideration of the role of exhibitions in providing official culture with powerful bridgeheads into the newly developing popular culture. Most obviously, the official zones of exhibitions offered a context for the deployment of the exhibitionary disciplines which reached a more extended public than that ordinarily reached by the public museum system. The exchange of both staff and exhibits between museums and exhibitions was a regular and recurrent aspect of their relations, furnishing an institutional axis for the extended social deployment of a distinctively new ensemble of disciplines. Even within the official zones of exhibitions, the exhibitionary disciplines thus achieved an exposure to publics as large as any to which even the most commercialized forms of popular culture could lay claim: 32 million people attended the Paris Exposition of 1889; 27.5 million went to Chicago's Columbian Exposition in 1893 and nearly 49 million to Chicago's 1933/4 Century of Progress Exposition; the Glasgow Empire Exhibition of 1938 attracted 12 million visitors, and over 27 million attended the Empire Exhibition at Wembley in 1924/5 (MacKenzie 1984: 101). However, the ideological reach of exhibitions often extended significantly further as they established their influence over the popular entertainment zones which, while initially deplored by exhibition authorities, were subsequently to be managed as planned adjuncts to the official exhibition zones and, sometimes, incorporated into the latter. It was through this network of relations that the official public culture of museums reached into the developing urban popular culture, shaping and directing its development in subjecting the ideological thematics of popular entertainments to the rhetoric of progress.

The most critical development in this respect consisted in the extension of anthropology's disciplinary ambit into the entertainment zones, for it was here that the crucial work of transforming non-white peoples themselves – and not just their remains or artefacts – into object lessons of evolutionary theory was accomplished. Paris led the way here in the colonial city it constructed as part of its 1889 Exposition. Populated by Asian and African peoples in simulated 'native' villages, the colonial city functioned as the showpiece of French anthropology and, through its influence on delegates to the tenth Congrès Internationale d'Anthropologie et d'Archéologie Préhistorique held in association with the

exposition, had a decisive bearing on the future modes of the discipline's social deployment. While this was true internationally, Rydell's study of American world fairs provides the most detailed demonstration of the active role played by museum anthropologists in transforming the Midways into living demonstrations of evolutionary theory by arranging non-white peoples into a 'sliding-scale of humanity', from the barbaric to the nearly civilized, thus underlining the exhibitionary rhetoric of progress by serving as visible counterpoints to its triumphal achievements. It was here that relations of knowledge and power continued to be invested in the public display of bodies, colonizing the space of earlier freak and monstrosity shows in order to personify the truths of a new regime of representation.

In their interrelations, then, the expositions and their fair zones constituted an order of things and of peoples which, reaching back into the depths of prehistoric time as well as encompassing all corners of the globe, rendered the whole world metonymically present, subordinated to the dominating gaze of the white, bourgeois, and (although this is another story) male eye of the metropolitan powers. But an eye of power which, through the development of the technology of vision associated with exposition towers and the positions for seeing these produced in relation to the miniature ideal cities of the expositions themselves, was democratized in being made available to all. Earlier attempts to establish a specular dominance over the city had, of course, been legion – the camera obscura, the panorama – and often fantastic in their technological imaginings. Moreover, the ambition to render the whole world, as represented in assemblages of commodities, subordinate to the controlling vision of the spectator was present in world exhibitions from the outset. This was represented synecdochically at the Great Exhibition by Wylde's Great Globe, a brick rotunda which the visitor entered to see plaster casts of the world's continents and oceans. The principles embodied in the Eiffel Tower, built for the 1889 Paris Exposition and repeated in countless subsequent expositions, brought these two series together, rendering the project of specular dominance feasible in affording an elevated vantage point over a micro-world which claimed to be representative of a larger totality.

Barthes has aptly summarized the effects of the technology of vision embodied in the Eiffel Tower. Remarking that the tower overcomes 'the habitual divorce between *seeing* and *being seen*', Barthes argues that it acquires a distinctive power from its ability to circulate between these two functions of sight:

An object when we look at it, it becomes a lookout in its turn when we visit it, and now constitutes as an object, simultaneously extended and collected beneath it, that Paris which just now was looking at it.

(Barthes 1979: 4)

A sight itself, it becomes the site for a sight; a place both to see and be seen from, which allows the individual to circulate between the object and subject positions of the dominating vision it affords over the city and its inhabitants (see Figure 2.6). In this, its distancing effect,

Barthes argues, 'the Tower makes the city into a kind of nature; it constitutes the swarming of men into a landscape, it adds to the frequently grim urban myth a romantic dimension, a harmony, a mitigation', offering 'an immediate consumption of a humanity made natural by that glance which transforms it into space' (Barthes 1979: 8). It is because of the dominating vision it affords, Barthes continues, that, for the visitor, 'the Tower is the first obligatory monument; it is a Gateway, it marks the transition to a knowledge' (ibid.: 14). And to the power associated with that knowledge: the power to order objects and persons into a world to be known and to lay it out before a vision capable of encompassing it as a totality.

In *The Prelude*, Wordsworth, seeking a vantage point from which to quell the tumultuousness of the city, invites his reader to ascend with him 'Above the press and danger of the crowd/Upon some showman's platform' at St Bartholomew's Fair, likened to mobs, riotings, and executions as occasions when the passions of the city's populace break forth into unbridled expression. The vantage point, however, affords no control:

All moveables of wonder, from all parts,
All here – Albinos, painted Indians, Dwarfs,
The Horse of knowledge, and the learned Pig,
The Stone-eater, the man that swallows fire,
Giants, Ventriloquists, the Invisible Girl,
The Bust that speaks and moves its goggling eyes,
The Wax-work, Clock-work, all the marvellous craft
Of modern Merlins, Wild Beasts, Puppet-shows,
All out-o'-the-way, far-fetched, perverted things,
All freaks of nature, all Promethean thoughts
of man, his dullness, madness, and their feats
All jumbled up together, to compose
A Parliament of Monsters.
(VII, 684–5; 706–18)

Stallybrass and White argue that this Wordsworthian perspective was typical of the early nineteenth-century tendency for the educated public, in withdrawing from participation in popular fairs, also to distance itself from, and seek some ideological control over, the fair by the literary production of elevated vantage points from which it might be observed. By the end of the century, the imaginary dominance over the city afforded by the showman's platform had been transformed into a cast-iron reality while the fair, no longer a symbol of chaos, had become the ultimate spectacle of an ordered totality. And the substitution of observation for participation was a possibility open to all. The principle of spectacle – that, as Foucault summarizes it, of rendering a small number of objects accessible to the inspection of a multitude of men – did not fall into abeyance in the nineteenth century: it was surpassed through the development of technologies of vision which rendered the multitude accessible to its own inspection.

CONCLUSION

I have sought, in this chapter, to tread a delicate line between Foucault's and Gramsci's perspectives on the state, but without attempting to efface their differences so as to forge a synthesis between them. Nor is there a compelling need for such a synthesis. The concept of the state is merely a convenient shorthand for an array of governmental agencies which – as Gramsci was among the first to argue in distinguishing between the coercive apparatuses of the state and those engaged in the organization of consent – need not be conceived as unitary with regard to either their functioning or the modalities of power they embody.

That said, however, my argument has been mainly with (but not against) Foucault. In the study already referred to, Pearson distinguishes between the 'hard' and the 'soft' approaches to the nineteenth-century state's role in the promotion of art and culture. The former consisted of 'a systematic body of knowledge and skills promulgated in a systematic way to specified audiences'. Its field was comprised by those institutions of schooling which exercised a forcible hold or some measure of constraint over their members and to which the technologies of self-monitoring developed in the carceral system undoubtedly migrated. The 'soft' approach, by contrast, worked 'by example rather than by pedagogy; by entertainment rather than by disciplined schooling; and by subtlety and encouragement' (Pearson 1982: 35). Its field of application consisted of those institutions whose hold over their publics depended on their voluntary participation.

There seems no reason to deny the different sets of knowledge/power relations embodied in these contrasting approaches, or to seek their reconciliation in some common principle. For the needs to which they responded were different. The problem to which the 'swarming of disciplinary mechanisms' responded was that of making extended populations governable. However, the development of bourgeois democratic polities required not merely that the populace be governable but that it assent to its governance, thereby creating a need to enlist active popular support for the values and objectives enshrined in the state. Foucault knows well enough the symbolic power of the penitentiary:

The high wall, no longer the wall that surrounds and protects, no longer the wall that stands for power and wealth, but the meticulously sealed wall, uncrossable in either direction, closed in upon the now mysterious work of punishment, will become, near at hand, sometimes even at the very centre of the cities of the nineteenth century, the monotonous figure, at once material and symbolic, of the power to punish.

(Foucault 1977: 116)

Museums were also typically located at the centre of cities where they stood as embodiments, both material and symbolic, of a power to 'show and tell' which, in being deployed in a newly constituted open and public space, sought rhetorically to incorporate the people within the processes of the state. If the museum and the penitentiary thus

represented the Janus face of power, there was none the less – at least symbolically – an economy of effort between them. For those who failed to adopt the tutelary relation to the self promoted by popular schooling or whose hearts and minds failed to be won in the new pedagogic relations between state and people symbolized by the open doors of the museum, the closed walls of the penitentiary threatened a sterner instruction in the lessons of power. Where instruction and rhetoric failed, punishment began.

Notes

ⁱ This point is well made by MacArthur who sees this aspect of Foucault's argument as inimical to the overall spirit of his work in suggesting a 'historical division which places theatre and spectacle as past' (MacArthur 1983: 192).

ⁱⁱ For discussion of the role of the American state in relation to museums and expositions, see, respectively, Meyer (1979) and Reid (1979).

ⁱⁱⁱ For details of the use of rotunda and galleries to this effect in department stores, see Ferry (1960).

^{iv} For further details, see Miller (1974).

^v A comprehensive introduction to these earlier forms is offered by Impey and MacGregor (1985) and Bazin (1967).

^{vi} I have touched on these matters elsewhere. See Bennett (1983) and (1986).

^{vii} For details of these interactions, see Rudwick (1985).

^{viii} I draw here on Foucault (1970).

^{ix} For the most thorough account, see Mulvaney (1958: 30–1).

Image details:

- 25-43. *The Right to Remain Silent*, text on galvanised steel. 200 x 96 x 2 cm, 2016.
46. *Final Sentence*, text on galvanised steel. 100 x 96 x 2 cm, 2004 on-going.
47. *Stay Strong*, copper. 400 x 2 cm dia, 2015.
48-49. *All the Electrocuted*, copper. 300 x 300 cm, 2014.
50. *Copper Weaving*, copper cable. 300 x 300 cm, 2016.
51. *Named Victims*, copper. 150 x 1 cm, 2015.
52. *That's It*, text on gold leaf. 30 x 12 cm, 2014.
53. *Wax Slabs*, cast wax. 250 x 1000 x 50 cm, 2012.
54. *Souls*, cast epoxy and mahogany. 230 x 200 x 50 cm, 2014.
55. *Mengele's Party*, cast epoxy and mahogany. 240 x 200 x 200 cm, 2016.
56. *Stay Strong Red*, digital photo/inkjet print. 138 cm dia, 2014.
57. *I Can Taste It*, digital photo/inkjet print. 138 cm dia, 2014.
58. *Parrot*, analogue/inkjet print. 300 x 300 cm, 2012.
59. *Polar Bear*, analogue/inkjet print. 300 x 300 cm, 2011.
60. *Looking for Adolf, Trafalgar Square 1914*, analogue/inkjet print. 350 x 450 cm, 1997-2017.
61. *Hanging About*, wood. 800 x 300 x 130 cm, 2014.

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